Sign In / Up

Add contribution as a guest

Your email will not be displayed publicly
Benefit of signing in/signing up to personalize comment

Comment as a guest

Your email will not be displayed publicly
Benefit of signing in/signing up to personalize comment

Login

Not a member Register   Forgot Password
or connect using
 

Email

 

Rudaw

Analysis

Is Russia’s campaign in Syria really coming to an end?

By Paul Iddon 21/3/2016
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (left) met Russia's Vladimir Putin during a surprise visit to Moscow last October.  Photo: Ria Novosti.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (left) met Russia's Vladimir Putin during a surprise visit to Moscow last October. Photo: Ria Novosti.
Just under six months after deployment to Syria, the Russians are drawing down: warplanes have taken off from their airbase in Latakia and headed home; the bulk of the small deployment of soldiers is also packing up and leaving.

But the bases will remain open and, at the very least, a residual force capable of bombing anywhere in Syria will remain in place, along with the infrastructure to facilitate any rapid re-deployment, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has indicated.

The drawdown, which came after a surprise announcement by Putin last Monday, has led to a barrage of commentary and analysis over what it signifies: Has Russia achieved all of its goals in Syria? Is the Bashar al-Assad regime now secure enough to negotiate from a position of strength?

The Kremlin’s goal from the get-go was to shore-up that regime. The injection of advanced Russian airpower into the conflict surely did turn the tables in in favor of the regime. Damascus was able to mount offensives on multiple fronts, after several months of maintaining an almost entirely defensive posture.

However, there have been conspicuous limits to how far the Russians have gone, as well as how far they had initially intended to go. It was clear they weren’t going to go full throttle and help Assad reclaim control of the entire country. But even short of that, it isn’t clear if the Russian intervention has helped secure a lasting situation on the ground in Syria.

The Russians came with a clear intention to wage an extremely decisive campaign. The flexibility of the deployment ensured it could pull out quickly if necessary and not become stuck in a quagmire, where they would end up pouring in money and men in a futile attempt to subdue their many enemies, as happened to the Soviet war in Afghanistan.

Using their air power against numerous ragtag adversaries lacking the  capability to defend against such attacks, the Russians were able to bombard opposition-held areas with impunity, hitting hospitals and infrastructure in a clear attempt to dissuade local populations from supporting and hosting anti-Assad groups in their midst.

In some areas the Russians have achieved clear victories. Russian pilots gave close air support to Syrian offensives in Latakia, enabling Syrian troops to push opposition forces from that strategically important province.

Moscow also supported a Syrian offensive into Aleppo in February, crippling the opposition groups that had become deeply entrenched in that war-torn city. In the south, the Russians have also supported Syrian military offensives against US-backed rebel groups in the province of Deraa, the cradle of the original uprising which sparked this war.

But elsewhere, all the Russians have been able to do has been to relentlessly attempt to pound their enemies into submission. In the north, they have tried to sever supply lines to groups such as Jaish al-Fatah from Turkey, by bombarding their positions and the general infrastructure in the northwest. But by no means have they destroyed or completely defeated those groups.

And they are conspicuously beginning to wind down in Syria without completely helping the regime retake the province of Idlib, which fell to the Turkish-backed Jaish last May: Idlib is the only provincial capital city in Syria where the regime lost complete control, aside from ISIS-occupied Raqqa.

Bruised and battered as those forces are, they remain undefeated and in place.

If the current peace negotiations collapse -- which is certainly a possibility -- Russia could feel compelled to bolster its residual force in order to preserve the gains it has helped the regime make in the last few months.

In those circumstances a drawn down Russian military presence could well see Turkey seek to reverse Assad’s Russian-backed gains by increasing its support to those aforementioned groups. That would mean that, despite its best efforts to draw down as soon as possible, the Kremlin may find itself nevertheless soon falling victim to mission creep.

There is no reason to believe that this deployment is Russia’s Gulf War, though there is one striking parallel:  During the first Gulf War the administration of then President George H.W. Bush strove to keep the war as short and as decisive as possible, repeatedly promising that it wouldn’t be “another Vietnam.” Nevertheless, leaving the Iraqi regime intact meant that Washington was felt forced to impose no-fly zones to try to contain Saddam Hussein’s murderous ambitions against Iraq's Kurds and Shiites. The zones remained in place for another 12 years before the regime was finally deposed by the second Bush administration.

Similarly, the Russians could well find themselves becoming involved much more directly in the Syrian conflict for a lot longer than they had initially planned and anticipated.

Paul Iddon is a Rudaw reporter based in Erbil, Kurdistan Region.

Comments

 
Dutchman | 21/3/2016
Putin is a pathological lyer. His words generally don't mean anything. Remember the 'green men' on the Crimea whose regiment numbers where pubplicly knowm? Putin just denied they were Russian, only months later telling on Russian tv that he, 'smart leader', fooled everyone. So when he says Russia is leaving Syria today, the Russian air force might as well stay for ten years. And when he praises the kurds today, he might as well bomb them tomorrow. Assad went to the same school as Putin: he just denies barrel bombs excist. These guys are mafia leaders.

Be Part of Your Rudaw!

Share your stories, photos and videos with Rudaw, and quite possibly the world.

What You Say

Guest | 10/16/2018 5:19:46 PM
I agree with you Mr. Romano. Except, I don't think Turkey is an emerging threat, it's conversion to a totalitarian style government along with its...
Masque du Furet | 10/17/2018 4:54:08 AM
Well, as hostage diplomacy seems efficient, it is time for Tutkey to find new hostages (mormons, popists might be interesting). OTOH, if US do not...
Time for US to reassess Turkey's support for extremists
| yesterday at 10:22 | (5)
Baban | 10/16/2018 8:47:00 PM
A cruical milestone in the history of our homelands, a beautiful insight in the work of uncovering important artifacts that i hope will take shape...
haluk | 10/17/2018 4:53:04 AM
Around 1200 BC, different factors such as climate change, volcano eruptions, earthquakes and large scale migrations (the mysterious "sea people")...
Ancient lost city of Mardaman slowly gives up its secrets
| yesterday at 07:13 | (2)
Kdp sold kirkuk | 10/17/2018 3:28:43 AM
Both sold kirkuk. Kurdistan will never be indipendent with kdp puk. Why kdp join iraq govermentare they not against iraq or are they just liars?
Shawn | 10/17/2018 4:21:31 AM
This PUK guy is blaming KDP for the mess the KirKuk in!!! Are you kidding. This PUK dude needs to get his head out his rear and shut the F****k...
KDP, PUK in row over Kirkuk governorship
| yesterday at 08:05 | (8)
Y. A. | 10/16/2018 11:28:54 PM
May Allah Khode help The Kurds and make their enemies taste occupation so they would feel it as they have made the Kurds feel it
Kawan | 10/17/2018 1:44:33 AM
A dark day in kurdish history
The fall of Kirkuk: Flashbacks of October 16
| yesterday at 12:00 | (10)
0.266 seconds