On December 6, 2006, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (HDK) splintered from the parent Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) after a disagreement over leadership and the path the party was taking.
They have been in occasional discussion about reunification since 2012, though delegations have changed over the years and they have at times fallen out and then reconciled.
The parties have, however, recently made progress, reaching an understanding on some matters, spurred by dramatic events in the Kurdistan Region, Iran, and for Kurds across the Middle East.
“There are good opportunities to reach mutual understanding. Discussions have been held on the question of organizations, future congress, administration structure, party relations, and the manner of taking a stance on events,” Hama Nazif Qadiri, member of the political bureau of the PDKI, told Rudaw.
Kamal Karimi, politburo member of HDK, said they have started another round of negotiations that are beginning with verbal agreement on some issues.
“If we reach a final agreement, we will enter a new phase for the manner of executing these things,” he said.
They have agreed on a joint body to run affairs until they can hold a joint congress. This means the two parties will reunify before holding a party congress, according to Karimi.
Qadiri said there is also verbal agreement to work jointly under the PDKI name and a special body will be formed to run pre-congress elections, as well as the congress itself.
No discussions have so far been held as to how the congress will take place, nor have they discussed the question of party leader, both Qadiri and Karimi stated.
“The important thing is that we have the will to reunify. We don't have problems with positions of power. The problem is to reunify the democrats,” Qadiri said.
“The PDKI party viewed HDK as part of the PDKI in the past. This perspective has now changed. They have now come to accept that the HDK is a different organization,” said Karimi.
“There are some examples explaining this change, such as the formation of a help centre for parties from east [Iranian] Kurdistan. They formed the centre in coordination with three other political parties from east Kurdistan,” he explained.
Komala is also part of the help centre.
The parties have their headquarters in the Kurdistan Region and have been affected by developments after the independence vote and the mid-October Iraqi takeover of the disputed areas.
“We felt great danger following the events of October 16. The situation in the Kurdistan Region is suitable for Iran. The status of the Kurdistan Region has changed. There are more dangers. Iran can put pressure on us through the Iraqi government and parliament,” Karimi said.
In his recent visit to Iran, Iranian officials warned KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani that they would not accept insecurity on the border, in an apparent attempt to pressure the KRG into curtailing the activities of the Iranian Kurdish parties.
“Our policy is that we don't want to be the reason for blaming the Kurdistan Region. Rather, we want to activate internal forces in east Kurdistan. Civil endeavors and armed movements at the heart of east Kurdistan are our agenda,” Qadiri said.
He believes the statements made by Iranian officials are excuses to meddle in the affairs of the Kurdistan Region. His party’s activities are focused on Iranian Kurdistan and he hopes that the Kurdistan Region’s policy lives up to the expectations Iranian Kurds have of the KRG.
He is also concerned about Tehran’s influence in Baghdad.
“The Iraqi government is shaky and has clung to Iran. We have always been living with this risk that the Iraqi government might be turned into a tool to pressure parties from east Kurdistan,” Karimi said.
His party is prepared for any possibilities, he added, and if Tehran pressures the KRG, the Kurdish parties will return to the mountains in Iranian Kurdistan, something Iran won’t like.
Qadiri believes that Iranian threats against the Kurdistan Region are intended to push the KRG to commit to decisions made by Baghdad in order to allow Iran to impose its will.
