Kurdish opposition parties of Iran were persuaded to consider the situation of south Kurdistan’s semi-autonomous government by choosing life in refugee camps rather than confronting the Islamic Republic of Iran. This was an appeasement policy to ward off Iran’s and Turkey’s fears of the formation of a Kurdish entity.
The PKK in Turkey refused to pursue the strategy pursued by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in northern Iraq. This led to a war between the PKK and these two political parties.
It was these actions of eastern (Iranian) and northern (Turkish) Kurds that led Iran and Turkey to feel they can have relations with the Kurdistan Region without provoking Kurdish nationalist feelings in their own countries.
Due to strategic disagreements between Iran and Iraq, Iran was very helpful to the Kurdistan Region, meaning it could survive economic and political embargos imposed by Iraq.
Following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s reign and assumption of power by the Shiites, and due to Iranian hegemony over Iraq, big regional changes happened.
This changed Turkey’s stance on the Kurdish cause too, especially with respect to its treatment of the Kurdistan Region, such that Ankara tied part of its oil and energy strategy to the Kurdistan Region. Turkey paid particular attention to this strategy, such that some suspected Ankara was encouraging Kurds to go for independence.
Following the Arab spring, events in Syria, the emergence of protests and demonstrations in Rojava, agreement between Iran, PKK, and Assad, transportation of Pasdaran army to Syria to help Assad survive, the deployment of some PKK commanders to capitalize on Kurdish national feelings in Rojava, and emergence of ISIS, Turkey feared that the Rojava cantons, unlike the KRG, will pose a direct threat to its economic strategy and security, leading to the development of the Kurdish question in the region.
Iran played an important role in stoking Turkish fears. Iran benefitted from the abilities of the PKK and Democratic Union Party (PYD in Rojava), making Turkey consider the Kurdish cantons in northern Syria a bigger threat than the Shiites and Iran.
This persuaded Turkey to give up on its dreams in the Kurdistan Region and adopt the same economic strategy with the Shiite Turkmen in Kirkuk area.
The meetings held last year between Turkish and Iranian intelligence agencies and their military and political agreements led to Turkey agreeing to bring the Kurdistan Region to its knees.
This was in return for securing strategic projects and protecting Turkish interests in Iraq, most importantly paving the way for Turkey to control Kurdish areas in Syria and distancing the danger from Qandil.
The details of the Turkey-Iran agreements remain unknown, but it is clear that they aim to hurt the Kurdish cause. The Kurdistan Region no longer has the role it had and its effect on the Kurdish cause has dramatically weakened.
The fall of Afrin in Rojava will serve many of the interests of regional countries. After the events of October 16, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi for the first time revealed that they have reached an agreement with Turkey to remove the danger of terrorism and high Turkish officials have several times stressed that they will have joint operations with Iraq to destroy the PKK in Qandil.
It is likely that the Turkish and Iraqi armies will attack the PKK in Shingal and Qandil.
It is clear that there is a regional plot against the Kurdish nation, which some western countries are aware of and have agreed to. The starting point of the implementation of this plot was the capture of Kirkuk.
What is currently happening in Afrin and any developments in Qandil is an implementation of the agreement between Turkey, Iran and the west – an agreement whose specifics we don’t know, but may be revealed in a few years.
Under these circumstances, how can the Kurds manage to survive? How can they neutralize this regional plot when they still have the force necessary to be a source for instability in the region?
The Kurds’ weak point is their disunity and affiliation with regional powers. This has made it possible for us to be made an instrument for the implementation of these threats and dangers.
It is very important to be aware of this plot. It appears that the PKK was aware of this plot before anyone else, which is why they, after the October 16 events, didn’t allow Iraqi forces to go from Shingal through Syrian territory to finish the second phase of the operation to attack the Kurdistan Region, capture Fish Khabur, and connect Iraq with Turkey outside the Kurdistan Region and connect their oil and gas pipelines. This was after the Iraqi forces were defeated in Pirde and Sihela.
What the PKK did was a great help for the protection and survival of the Kurdistan Region as a Kurdish entity. This showed that the Kurds could reverse equations if they are united. Can the current threats and dangers to the Kurdish question unite us or will they divide us further?
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
