Reading ‘The Account of Soldiers of Southeast War’ by Mohammed has helped this author to understand the implications, fear, and anxiety that the partisan activities conducted by PKK guerillas create among the Turkish society and army.
Nadira Matir, a Turkish journalist, recounts the stories of this book as told by 40 gendarmes and officers in the Turkish army, who took part in the guerilla war at different stages in Turkey.
The book chronicles the poor psychological state of the Turkish army because of the guerrillas. Turkish soldiers needed several years in order to be able to reintegrate into society and with their families after the completion of their military service.
The other side of the Kurdish armed struggle is not often discussed. Turkey denied the existence of more than 20 million Kurds living in the country, and issued a law to prohibit the use of the Kurdish language, expressions and music.
Finally, Turkey was forced to resort to a strategy of “opening up to democracy” and then agreed to a peace process with the Kurds. It was the implications of the PKK armed struggle and their partisan warfare that created conditions for dialogue. This process led to a bit of freedom in politics and media work for Kurds.
The situation in Turkey now has reversed. During the peace process, the Kurds benefitted from the recognition, political and media work opportunities created as a result. But Recep Tayyip Erdogan benefitted greatly from the peace process. He has managed to control the army, security and other state establishments.
The fear and anxiety which the army suffered from is now affecting Turkish society. Now, the state enjoys a frightening amount of pride. Freedom for Kurds to engage in political work is gradually being restricted. The Kurds are also not doing well militarily.
From the middle of 1980s until the beginning of the peace process, the partisan activities of PKK guerrillas have been ongoing in all the difficult situations during which state of emergency and the army’s hegemony was imposed on Kurdistan.
But after the peace process reached deadlock and the war broke out in Turkey again, the ability of the Kurds to engage in confrontations and partisan activities has dangerously waned.
Turkey exploited years of peace process and dialogue with PKK in order to ensure some kind of certainty to distance the danger of war inside the country.
During the peace process, Turkey asked PKK guerrillas to go outside Turkish borders. Most PKK partisan units went to the Kurdistan Region. Because of the ISIS war and events in Rojava, the PKK pulled out its remaining forces in Turkey, despite indications that the peace process was reaching deadlock. This created conditions for Turkey to move its fighting fronts with PKK outside of its borders.
Since that point, the timing and location of war against the PKK was controlled by Turkey, which is the most dangerous thing for any partisan force. In recent years, the PKK wanted to change this equation. But the situation remained in Turkey’s interest because of Turkey’s reaction toward the destruction of areas in Diyarbakir, Sirnak and Jazira.
Turkey then decided to chase the PKK wherever they are in order to maintain the equation. What happened in Afrin and the danger in Shingal and Qandil are the results of this equation.
This way, Turkey becomes more confident in its efforts to undermine the PKK and neutralize the dangers inside the country. Hence, if the PKK doesn’t want to submit to Turkey’s strategy, it should go back deep insider Turkish territory, just like the years before the peace process was adopted.
If we compare these two stages from the perspective of military technology, Turkey’s military industry has developed, but the PKK has also obtained advanced weapons. In the past, PKK’s largest weaponry was perhaps heavy machine guns.
But nowadays, in the fight against ISIS, the PKK obtained heavy weapons from the black market, from Rojava and the US-led coalition. That is why the PKK is currently the most heavily equipped armed group in the region. They are also ahead of all the other forces in terms of military discipline and training.
What is then the secret behind the PKK silence in the face of Turkey’s hegemony? Why are they not truly taking the war back within Turkey? Why don’t they open several fighting fronts? Why didn’t the PKK at least resort to organizing some protests in Turkey in order to pressure Ankara against its aggression? If things are allowed to continue this way, Turkey will attack and capture anywhere it wants.
The case of Afrin showed the truth — the international community and international law and other values are merely lies. No one is ready to ruin relations with Turkey. That is why the PKK should do what needs to be done.
The historical responsibility lies with current PKK leaders. Perhaps now, some PKK leaders might have slipped into the regional rivalry and equations which take these regional strategies more seriously than the Kurdish question in Turkey. The steps taken by the PKK in the future need to be decisive.
