Kurds supportive of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the autonomous cantons in northern Syria usually feel a justifiable sense of alarm upon hearing news of such visits by high-ranking Turkish officials. They worry, “Will Ankara convince the Barzanis to cooperate with them on some new campaign against the PKK or their kin in Syria?” Others wonder, “Is this the prelude to more air strikes around PKK camps in Iraqi Kurdistan, or another embargo on the Syrian Kurds?”
With Turkey actively trying to convince the United States to allow it to set up a 32-kilometre deep “safe zone” in northern Syria, some worries do not seem misplaced. Such a buffer zone would swallow up almost all the cities of the cantons and the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD). Even then, Turkey would likely not be appeased, just as the removal of PYD-aligned fighters in Manbij did not put an end to Ankara’s threats in the area or stop the occupation of Afrin.
Although Minister Cavusoglu undoubtedly pressed the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) on these issues during his meetings with them, the purpose of the visit probably did not center on such issues. There is something that frightens Ankara more than the PKK or autonomy in northern Syria. As the recent municipal elections in Turkey amply demonstrated, economic decline threatens President Erdogan and his government much more than Kurdish bogeymen.
Cavusoglu’s visit comes just as American waivers for sanctions on Iran are set to expire. Although Cavusoglu and President Erdogan made a big show of denouncing and rejecting Washington’s threat to blacklist companies and countries importing Iranian oil, Turkey seems to have little choice in complying with the sanctions now that the waiver program will not be renewed.
Since a while, Turkey has imported as much as 50% of its crude oil from Iran. Although Ankara was able to reduce the share of Iranian imports to lower levels for some months of the last few years (to as low as 20%), alternative suppliers of oil to Turkey such as Russia and Saudi Arabia involve much higher transport and associated fees than Iranian crude. Increasingly fraught Turkish-Saudi relations, and Ankara’s fear of becoming even more energy-dependent on Russia, also cloud the picture. Azerbaijani hydrocarbon imports to the Turkish market appear to be already near capacity.
Natural gas imports, which are crucial to running Turkey’s power stations, prove even more problematic. Over the last several years, Turkey imported some 15% of its natural gas from Iran. Gas pipelines and infrastructure take a lot more time and effort to set up than crude oil facilities, and without pipelines liquified natural gas (LNG) makes for a much costlier import. Turkey gets most of its natural gas from Russia, making the dependence problem all the more acute.
All of which leaves one neighbor able to replace Iranian oil and gas imports quickly and cheaply: Iraq. Cavusoglu’s trip began with Baghdad and Basra, but tellingly ended with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq – through which all hydrocarbon imports to Turkey must pass. Iraqi Kurdistan also produces a substantial portion of Iraq’s oil and gas from within its own territory.
Ankara has been pursuing energy agreements with Erbil for several years, although the cooperation declined in the wake of Kurdistan’s referendum on independence in 2017 and improved Ankara-Baghdad relations. Even when the referendum took place, however, unlike Iran, Turkey never closed its border with Iraqi Kurdistan or halted trade.
We can therefore expect the announcement of new, more extensive oil and gas deals between Ankara, Erbil and Baghdad in the near future. Whether they remain part of Iraq indefinitely or one day again push for independence, this will be good news for the Kurdistan Region. As always, the land-locked Region needs revenue, good relations with neighbors and, depending on the situation, alternatives to Baghdad and Iran.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
