Mr. Haidar was of course referring to Gorran’s stance on a number of issues in Baghdad. Gorran MPs in Baghdad have repeatedly voted for budgets very inimical to the Kurdistan Region. Wikileaks also shows the late Gorran Leader, Nawshirwan Mustafa, telling American officials behind closed doors in 2010 that Gorran is for a strong central government in Baghdad and against the incorporation of Kirkuk into the Kurdistan Region. When a united Kurdish bloc in Baghdad could have accomplished much for the Kurdistan Region, Gorran repeatedly refused to join such a front. Even now, following this month’s Iraqi elections [in which Gorran fared poorly], the Movement refused to join with other Kurdish parties in negotiations to form a new government in Baghdad. On social media platforms, even the most rabid and biased critics of the Kurds appear acceptable to Gorran followers provided these critics spend a fair amount of time denouncing KDP and PUK corruption and poor governance.
Anyone trying to understand what is going here should understand a simple truth: Since its inception, Gorran has prioritized its antipathy to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and, to a much lesser extent, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), above all else. This columnist assumes that like others, Gorran leaders wish the best for Kurdistan and its people — but in their view, “the best” can only come with the smashing of the current Kurdistan Regional Government and its two ruling parties (the KDP and PUK). Gorran views these parties as family mafias of a sort, interested in little beyond stealing the nation’s wealth and consolidating their power.
Therefore, it makes a certain amount of sense for Gorran to turn to outsiders — in Baghdad, in neighboring states, or amongst the media and academies' most virulent anti-Kurdistan voices — to help them get the KDP and PUK out of power. With such an uncompromising view of the other main Kurdish parties, Gorran people might even rather see the Kurdistan Region fail, or collapse, so that it might be built anew. In this line of reasoning, regional autonomy or even independence means little if it includes dictatorial rule by the KDP’s Barzani family or the PUK’s Talibanis. Gorran’s mistrust and enmity for especially the KDP appears to run that deep.
This columnist likewise assumes that KDP and PUK leaders also have Kurdistan’s best interests at heart. Self-interest and some bad history between the parties still gets in the way of that sometimes, however. Most importantly, since no one trusts the other parties to lead Kurdistan competently, each does its utmost to gain and stay at the helm of the Kurdistan Regional Government. That may also occasionally entail breaking rules and compromising basic institutions of government. Because they view Gorran as little more than Iranian collaborators and traitors intent on destroying Kurdistan out of spite, KDP leaders have trouble sharing any power with them.
It is in this context that Masoud Haider’s expulsion from Gorran — or his resignation 40 days earlier by his account — comes as good news. Although a visceral critic of both the KDP and PUK, Mr. Haider’s logic appears to center on refusing to let such antipathy steer him towards policies that run counter to the Kurdistan Region’s interests. If all the Kurdish parties — the KDP, PUK, Gorran, the Islamists, and the smaller parties — could agree to set aside their intra-Kurdish squabbles in some contexts, for the sake of everyone, then the situation of the Kurdistan Region might improve markedly.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
