Turkey has reportedly hinted at military action against the jihadist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group which controls most of Syria’s northwest Idlib province.
Sources claim Turkey has already told its Syrian militiamen proxies in northwest Syria – most likely the National Liberation Front (NLF) – to prepare for a military operation if the HTS does not willingly disband.
Asharq Al-Awsat also cited an unnamed adviser to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan pointing out that the continued HTS presence in the province “grants the Syrian regime and Russia a pretext to attack the northwestern province”.
Ankara has long feared a major escalation in the war between HTS and the regime could result in a new influx of millions of Syrians into Turkey.
Between October 2017 and May 2018, the Turkish Army established 12 observation posts around Idlib under the framework of the Russian-sponsored Astana Agreement, which ostensibly sought to make Idlib a de-escalation zone.
It was able to do so with the consent of the HTS. The militants even escorted Turkish troops through the province.
In September 2018, Russia and Turkey agreed to a ceasefire in Idlib after Turkey agreed it would move to contain HTS, create a demilitarized zone around the province, and reopen the vitally-important M5 highway in return for the regime ceasing its destructive attacks.
Turkey completely failed to do any of this.
After just over a week of fighting in January, the NLF ceded even more territories to HTS. Far from being contained, HTS was able to expand. NLF fighters have even fought alongside HTS against regime offensives.
The Syrian regime and Russia continued to launch strikes on Idlib at the end of April and the regime mounted some successful ground offensives reclaiming territory from HTS, which notably included the town of Khan Sheikhoun in August.
Today, if Turkey takes action of its own against HTS, it might be able to stave off a major regime offensive that could trigger the kind of refugee crisis Turkey has long feared.
However, actively targeting HTS could have negative consequences for Turkey. The group might target Turkish observation posts or even Turkey itself, possibly using its makeshift armed drones. An unidentified drone was incidentally shot down for violating Turkish airspace on September 29.
Russia recently revealed that its Khmeimim airbase in Syria had either shot down or disabled 118 drones over the past two years, 58 of which were downed this year alone. The Russian airbase was also targeted by a ‘drone swarm’ in January 2018.
Many of these drones likely originated from Idlib, which neighbours the province of Latakia where Khmeimim is located.
Timur Akhmetov, an Ankara-based researcher for the Russian International Affairs Council, believes any Turkish operation against HTS “would definitely be welcomed by Russia”.
“The security situation would be improved considerably and Turkey would basically take full responsibility for the situation in Idlib,” he told Rudaw English.
The latest regime advances into Idlib have made Turkey’s southernmost observation posts more difficult to resupply and defend. At their Morek outpost, troops were cut off from a resupply convoy, which Syrian warplanes also targeted.
If Turkey were to take decisive military action of its own against HTS, either now or in the near future, it might gain more control over developments in Idlib and avoid being gradually pushed out of the strategically-important province altogether.
However, there are still several reasons to doubt Turkey’s willingness to take military action.
“The idea that Turkey will, directly or through its Arab proxies, initiate another round of hostilities against HTS seems unlikely,” Kyle Orton, an independent Syria analyst, told Rudaw English.
“That option has been tried repeatedly and always ends badly.”
Orton also pointed out that Turkey’s control over Syrian territories near its borders “is quite extensive”, meaning that Ankara already has a de-facto buffer in place “to avoid what probably scares Ankara most right now, namely another torrent of refugees”.
“They don’t really need a military offensive to get that,” he said.
On the other hand, Orton does think it is conceivable that Turkey would carry out “some demonstrative attack” as a “political maneuver to manage relations with Russia”.
He doubts this will work, since Russia has proven unable to prevent regime offensives in Idlib and is unlikely be able to do so “even if it wanted to, and there is no reason to think it does want to”.
More broadly, Orton believes the latest Russian-brokered ceasefire in Idlib announced on August 30 is “practically meaningless” and amounts to little more than “another tactical move by the pro-Assad coalition as it seeks total re-conquest of Syria”.
Both analysts doubt Turkey and Russia would ever team-up in a military campaign against HTS.
“Russia could theoretically coordinate a Turkish offensive, at least through sharing coordinates of HTS targets, but still would prefer Turkey to bear the bulk of the operation’s weight,” Akhmetov said.
“This would further drive a wedge between Ankara and anti-Assad opposition groups.”
Orton believes any coordinated operation between the two in Idlib would “be solely for political purposes, since militarily the Turks have more freedom of action in that province than any other state”.
“The political cost with Turkey’s Arab allies would be high for coordinating with Russia and it is not clear what Ankara would gain from it.”
“Still, the US has been coordinating its strikes against jihadists in Idlib with Russia, so anything is possible.”
