ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - The recently-passed law in the Turkish parliament, which allows some Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) fighters to be reintegrated into the society, is likely be enforced in the coming weeks, said the leader of a pro-Kurdish party on Thursday.
Tuncer Bakirhan, co-chair of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), told Rudaw's Shawkat Harki that it is not clear when the PKK fighters will return to Turkey but expected the framework law, which was passed earlier this month, to be implemented "by the end of September or in October."
Turkish lawmakers last week passed the landmark bill with 468 votes in favour, 88 against, and six abstentions in Turkey's 562-member parliament. The legislation comprises 12 articles and establishes the legal framework for post-disarmament procedures and the reintegration of PKK members under the peace process.
The bill was jointly prepared by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and was also signed by the DEM Party, along with lawmakers from the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP).
Bakirhan also shared his views on Kurdish unity, the Iran war and the future of Kurds in Syria.
The following is the full transcript of the interview with Tuncer Bakirhan:
Rudaw: What timetable is envisaged for implementing the law prepared as part of the process aimed at resolving the Kurdish issue in Turkey? One of the issues the public is most curious about is the return of PKK members. If the process continues in this way, when could the first returns begin?
Tuncer Bakirhan: The process is now proceeding within an official framework. The decision was published in the Official Gazette, and the council stipulated in the law has been established under the chairmanship of the vice president. There is now one more important stage: the National Security Council’s verification-determination decision. Once this decision is published in the Official Gazette, the law will fully enter into force.
It would not be right to give a definite date for the returns at this point. It is difficult to discuss the timetable of such a sensitive process by giving a specific day. But all indications suggest that these formal stages will be completed by the end of September or in October and that the law will be implemented. The answer to the question everyone is asking — “When will the first returns begin?” — also depends on this timetable.
I want to particularly emphasize one point here. For this process to function properly and for the arrivals to be safe and orderly, [PKK leader] Mr. [Abdullah] Ocalan must be actively involved. We are not the only ones saying this. The leaders of the dissolved PKK repeatedly emphasize the same reality: They say they cannot tell any of their comrades to lay down their arms and return without Ocalan being involved. Anyone who knows the relationship between the PKK and Ocalan knows that this is not something being said merely for the sake of saying it.
The problem is this: Mr. Ocalan is currently trying to play this role under extremely restrictive conditions. Our proposal on this is clear: The Peace and Political Participation Council, through which Mr. Ocalan can play his role, should be established as soon as possible. This is the way for Mr. Ocalan to become genuinely involved. Once this council is formed, we can comfortably say that arrivals can begin both from the mountains and from Europe.
What steps need to be taken to ensure that the process is not limited to political statements and produces concrete results? Do you consider the steps taken by the government so far sufficient? In particular, can we say that an adequate legal basis has been established for the PKK members who are expected to return? Are new legal arrangements needed?
First of all, it should be said that statements are understandable up to a point. But we also know this: Statements are like bread. They work when they are fresh; if they are left sitting, their structure deteriorates and nobody eats them. I think we have partially moved beyond the stage of statements. The law adopted in parliament by a large majority is very important in this regard. I consider it valuable because we are now moving from intentions to practice.
Most of the concrete steps that need to be taken span the political, legal, social and psychological spheres, and for a significant number of them, there is no need to write even a single comma. For example, the trustees can be reinstated. The language of the media can change. ECHR rulings can be implemented; a ruling sitting on a shelf is not a ruling, it is a postponed injustice, and the names of hundreds of our friends are on that shelf. Likewise, socializing peace cannot be our responsibility alone; our reach does not extend everywhere. The state also needs to persuade people, go to them and talk to them. Believe me, if these things are done, the process will gain greater momentum.
There is a defined legal status for those who will return, and the state has made preparations; our preparations are more focused on the political and social groundwork. But law on paper is like learning to swim from a book. Can you learn to swim without getting into the water? Whether a bridge can bear the load is understood not by looking at its design, but when the first convoy crosses it. Once implementation begins, most of today’s uncertainties will disappear on their own, and the remaining ones will be discussed at the table. What I mean is that once people begin returning, we will see more clearly which provisions are working and where problems arise. If necessary, some articles will be amended and some gaps will be addressed through new regulations.
And within the framework of your question, of course, new arrangements will be needed under all circumstances. As the process moves forward, needs will reveal themselves and will be addressed over time. What matters is moving forward; I mean moving forward in good faith and knowing that this genuinely serves the country’s interests. The rest will follow.
During discussions on the framework law, how do you assess the approaches of the New Party and the CHP in particular? Do you think the opposition appears to have sufficiently embraced this process?
A large part of the opposition supports the process and the law. This provides important groundwork for requirements such as adopting legal arrangements through broad consensus and socializing peace. The CHP’s signing of the bill and its support for it by largely voting in favor during the general assembly are valuable. The New Party leadership’s support for the bill is important and deserves to be underlined. However, both the number of “no” votes by New Party lawmakers and the way they tried to legitimize voting ‘no’ pointed to a lack of politics. Voting against it by citing the city one represents is an injustice both to that city and to the country. They cannot find a single city or even a single street in Turkey that does not want peace or opposes the words ‘people should not die.’ Despite this negative picture, the New Party’s position at the central level and its contribution to the ‘yes’ vote on the law are still encouraging for the future. But unless the line advocated by Ozgür Ozel acquires an institutional and political rationale, there will be deviations. In my view, an opposition party that is split down the middle over resolving Turkey’s fundamental issue has, above all, also damaged its claim to govern the country.
Looking at the coming year, what do you think is the most critical threshold for the process to succeed? What are the fundamental responsibilities of the government, the opposition and the DEM Party to prevent the process from failing?
The most critical threshold in this process is properly managing the social psychology. This issue has a painful history of more than 40 years in Turkey, and that history has left deep scars on both sides of the country. There are still families of soldiers who have lost their children, as well as families who have lost children in the mountains or who are waiting for children who are in the mountains, in prison or in exile.
Nobody in this country has the luxury of dismissing the concerns of others. The Kurds’ demand for freedom and Turks’ security concerns are both important items on the agenda of this process. This cannot work without taking both seriously. Nor is this solely the responsibility of politicians. I am talking about a broad sphere of responsibility, from the language used by the media and the words chosen by columnists to the tone of discussions on social media and debates in parliament. We all share this responsibility.
Beyond that, there are three things we need to do over the coming year: Take the steps required by the law on time and in full. Make the channels of dialogue and negotiation between the parties genuinely functional. And most importantly, establish the working and communication conditions that will allow Mr. Ocalan himself to be involved. I explained this in detail in response to the previous question. This process has its own stages. Everyone needs to approach these stages and realities with appropriate patience and responsibility.
What are those responsibilities?
I can summarize the responsibilities as follows: The government’s responsibility is to create the political climate that will make peace permanent and to take the steps required of it on time. The opposition’s responsibility is to stop viewing peace and democracy as preconditions for one another; they should be seen not as two issues waiting for each other, but as two fundamental issues that reinforce each other.
But what I really need to discuss is the responsibility of the DEM Party. We, too, must now act not with the language of activists, but with a constructive mindset. We need to stop being the side that merely demands and waits for things and instead become an actor that organizes the democratic demands necessary to resolve the Kurdish issue and takes ownership of them.
I want to particularly emphasize one point here. Our concern is not to adopt a position that has ceased to be an actor and simply says, ‘We want this, we want that.’ As democratic demands become organized, their legal expression will emerge in one way or another. Issues such as giving local administrations a democratic character, education in the mother tongue and the right to organize do not simply fall from the sky; they are matters of struggle and construction. We, in particular, have a great deal of responsibility in this regard.
The role of the Kurdistan Regional Government in the process has frequently been emphasized. What is expected from the Kurdistan Region in the next stages? At one point, there were also scenarios circulating publicly suggesting that PKK members who lay down their arms would settle in the Region. What is your assessment of this?
The role of the Kurdistan Regional Government is not secondary; it is very important. We emphasize this frequently because the Kurdistan Region occupies such a position due to its geographical location, historical relationships, political channels and capabilities on the ground.
I can say this: There is an understanding that the [Kurdistan] Regional Government should both be involved in the process and assume a facilitating role to ensure that the mechanisms function during the returns. There will be legal, administrative, logistical and humanitarian dimensions. All these dimensions concern Erbil, Sulaimani and Ankara simultaneously.
As for the scenarios: The public does not like a vacuum; if there is a vacuum, it fills it with stories. We also read claims such as ‘they will settle here’ or ‘they will be sent there.’ At this point, I would like to make a reminder based on experiences of conflict and resolution: The details are technical, the mechanisms are defined, and politics has to proceed above the noise. Therefore, I favor waiting for implementation. As implementation begins, many issues that appear uncertain today will become concrete.
The future of Rojava and the talks with the Damascus government are among the most important issues on the Kurdish agenda. What kind of status do you think Kurds should have in Syria’s new structure? As a reflection of the current process in Turkey, do you expect a change in Turkey’s policy toward Rojava?
Syria’s future can be secured through a democratic system. Building a democratic Syria requires recognizing and guaranteeing the rights of all peoples and faiths in Syria, particularly the Kurds. This does not mean assimilating the Kurds; it means strengthening their political agency. Let us put it very clearly: The rights gained by the Kurdish people do not take anything away from the rights of other peoples. On the contrary, the expansion of rights is a gain for everyone. The countries of the region need to understand this reality in this way. The Kurds living there and their political forces will decide within what architecture and in what form the Kurds will take their place in Syria. At the level of principle, it is not for us to determine how the Kurdish people or any other people should live. But we must emphasize this: Turkey should also support the Kurds obtaining their rights in Syria.
The Iran war and developments in the region are reshaping the balance of power in the Middle East. What are the biggest risks this war and its potential regional expansion could pose to the Kurds? What policy should be pursued to prevent the Kurds from once again becoming caught in the middle of regional conflicts?
The war in Iran and developments in the region are actually completely changing the balance of power in the Middle East. If you ask me who would be most affected if this war turns into a regional conflict, my answer is clear: Almost every area inhabited by Kurds, particularly Iran, Iraq and Syria, would be at risk. We have already seen this since the first days of the war. The Iranian regime and forces affiliated with it have targeted Kurdistan Regional Government territory, sometimes directly and sometimes through Iran-aligned groups in Iraq. Despite all this, the Kurds have repeatedly said they will not become part of a regional war and will not become a battering ram for any power.
So what are the Kurds supposed to do if attacks continue every single day? Presumably, they will not wait silently like sacrificial sheep. Let me be clear: Like anyone who comes under attack, the Kurds have the right to defend themselves, and no Kurdish force has any hesitation about that. But until now, the Kurds have not fallen into the games of other powers. They have prioritized dialogue and negotiation, and they continue along this path. In my view, Iran should take Syria as an example. Despite all its shortcomings, there is a government in Damascus that has chosen dialogue with the Kurds. The Kurds in Syria are trying to resolve their issues with the central government through talks. Which Damascus would be more stable: one at war with the Kurds or one trying to resolve its problems through negotiations? The answer is obvious. Both Damascus and the Kurds stand to benefit from negotiations and dialogue.
Although tensions arise from time to time in Iraq as well, Baghdad and Erbil recognize one another and maintain dialogue. That is the right approach.
Iran, however, is still trying to suppress, silence and eliminate the Kurds through repression, executions and force. It must abandon this approach as soon as possible. Iran should recognize the democratic rights of the different peoples and faiths living within its territory, particularly the Kurds. This is the best path. If it continues with executions and attacks, it will experience a major rupture itself. The Kurds will not refrain from defending themselves either. This would not be the Kurds’ own choice, but an unavoidable consequence imposed upon them. What the region needs is not another war, but a foundation for lasting peace and dialogue.
Looking at relations among Kurds and discussions about national unity, how do you assess the current divisions among Kurdish political movements and different political groups? What steps do you think need to be taken for the Kurds to move closer together around a common national perspective?
The debate about national unity among Kurds has never ended, but most of the time it has been treated as an agenda item rather than as a historical consciousness. The debate about Kurdish national unity is not new; it is a pursuit that has sometimes gained momentum and sometimes receded over many years. Yet national unity has distinct meanings at the intellectual, political and historical levels. Frankly, I do not believe its importance has been fully understood.
National unity is not merely a sentiment. It is not enough for siblings sharing the same house to love one another; if they have not discussed who will open the door, who will pay the bills and who will say what when guests arrive, that house is disorganized. The late development of a common language among Kurds is one of the fundamental tragedies of our history. Every time, everyone has been proven right, but nobody has won. Kurdish politics must now look not only at today’s problems, but also at how the next 50 years will be built.
I want to make an explicit call from here. One of the first steps toward the national unity that the Kurdish people have long yearned for is for the KDP and PUK to demonstrate a strong will to work together. Why should two major political forces with years of experience, institutions and social support not establish a stronger common political line on shared issues? Why should they not defend a common future together? Are the issues between them greater than the future of an entire people? Has the time not come to produce new politics? Would that not create stronger political ground in this geography? The reason attacks against Kurds are so easy today is the fragmentation among Kurds.
This is an explicit call. Go ahead, take the lead, take the first step. Give the Kurds something to celebrate with this honorable step. The tensions and divisions that periodically emerge between Erbil and Sulaimani pain us.
Because a national perspective is now imposing itself as a necessity. The world is changing and the Middle East is being redesigned; we are living in an era in which those who do not have a seat at the table find their names on the menu. In such times, small calculations can lead to great losses.
There is a need for unity, but even more importantly, there is a need to think together. There is a need for collective wisdom, and while doing all this, it is possible to coexist without erasing differences. National unity does not mean everyone thinking the same way; it means people who think differently acting together on shared issues.
When national unity is mentioned, some circles become uncomfortable. How do you interpret that?
I know there may be circles that become alarmed when they hear these words and anxiously ask, ‘What does he mean?’ Let me say this very openly and sincerely: The unity we are talking about here is not a unity formed against anyone.
First, national unity needs to be defined. Kurdish national unity does not mean all Kurds joining the same party, organization or ideological line. Quite the opposite: It means preserving differences while adopting a common position on fundamental issues such as Kurdish existence, language, rights, gains and future. This right, which is denied to no other people in the world — the right to act together — cannot be denied to the Kurds either. There is no reason to be concerned about it.
Our position as Kurds living in Turkey is clear and has not changed: Ankara is the address where we will resolve our problem, and we seek the solution here, on these lands. We regard every inch of Turkey as our homeland. Stronger political, cultural and economic interaction with our brothers and sisters beyond the borders is not to anyone’s detriment; it is a gain that benefits everyone. Even today, Turkey benefits the most from the Khabur [Ibrahim Khalil] border crossing; there are thousands of people from Turkey, from Trabzon to Diyarbakir, working and investing in Kurdistan Regional Government territory. When the Qamishli-Nusaybin border crossing opens tomorrow, once again we will all benefit together: Damascus, Ankara and Qamishli. Unity and peace among the Kurds strengthen stability in the region, and regional stability directly contributes to Turkey’s security and prosperity. In other words, this issue of unity is not a threat; it is a foundation that also benefits Turkey and from which everyone stands to gain.
In this context, has Ocalan conveyed any assessment to you regarding Iran’s attacks? In particular, does he have any proposal or appeal concerning the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government, which has been at the center of the attacks?
During his meeting with our Imrali delegation, Ocalan made very important assessments that also address this question. I can summarize Mr. Ocalan’s views under four points. He says:
First: The fragmented situation between Sulaimani and Erbil must end. Problems should be resolved around democratic principles and a centralized regional government should emerge.
Second: All forces and political actors in the Kurdistan Region should have the right to a voice and political participation in this regional government because every fragmented position leaves the Region more vulnerable to attacks.
Third: Iran must immediately halt its attacks on Kurdistan Regional Government territory, particularly Sulaimani and Erbil, and put an end to executions.
Fourth: Iran must recognize Kurdish rights and adopt a democratic approach. Turkey should also play a positive role in this process. If Iran does not change its policy of attacks against the Kurds and does not end the executions, the Kurds will have no option other than to defend themselves in a spirit of national unity. The Kurds should, of course, do this of their own will, without becoming a battering ram for any other power. Indeed, the position Kurdish organizations have taken so far in the face of Iran’s attacks has been along these lines. Iran should act with an awareness of this reality.
The DEM Party is entering its congress process. What kind of DEM Party do you aim to emerge from the congress? Should we expect a significant change in the party’s political line, organization or approach to Turkish politics? You also said in a statement that Selahattin Demirtas would be at the congress. Is that a hope, or is there a concrete plan for this?
We will hold a congress on September 6. Starting on September 7, we will begin preparations for a major transformation congress. As soon as possible, we will renew and strengthen ourselves in terms of our program, our language, our politics and our cadres.
The September 6 congress is important for this reason: It will be a congress that produces a leadership and a new structure suited to the new period. This leadership will prepare the groundwork for an ambitious undertaking. But let me make one thing clear: Our main goal is not for the congress after this one to be merely a political party congress. We want to transform it into the congress of a democratic republic movement and expand this movement throughout Turkey.
You said ‘the congress of a democratic republic movement.’ How would that differ from an ordinary party congress?
If we explain this process merely as the silencing of weapons and a few legal steps, our explanation will be incomplete. This process will change many things in Turkey. I believe it will bring about serious changes across a broad spectrum, from the language and dynamics of politics to social life. Those who correctly understand this change will move forward, while those who remain stuck on day-to-day issues will fall behind. When I say this, I am sure many people will rightly point to some of the negative examples we see today. I do not consider these insignificant at all. Of course, we will object to them, but fundamentally we also need to correctly understand the changing realities of the world, the region and Turkey.
We are now entering a period without weapons and conflict. From now on, our responsibility is not merely to resist, but to build something. It is to put forward the idea of a new order and a new future. We cannot continue as before; we need a new language and a new path. From now on, whoever builds something, whoever offers the people a genuine future, will have the decisive voice in politics.
For years they said it was a ‘security issue,’ restricted the democratic sphere, legitimized repression and continually postponed a solution. Now that excuse is disappearing. Only one path remains: democratic politics and the people’s will for a solution. This gives us a great opportunity, but it also places a great responsibility on us. We are entering a period in which our words, our program and our ability to solve problems will be put to the test. This is how we view the congress.
On the other hand, with the implementation of the framework law, Demirtas, [Figen] Yuksekdag and thousands of our friends, as well as those returning from exile and many of our friends from various fields of struggle, will participate in political life. We will continue to shoulder our responsibility toward society side by side.
