In fact, Kurds had a chance in these 14 years to offer good governance by providing service projects and maintaining a power sharing system, creating an image of themselves which would make other ethnic and religious groups wish Kirkuk was governed by Kurds even a hundred years ago. However, Kurds governed the province in a way that has led other groups to reject them for the next hundred years.
All Kurdish individuals – from all ranks including those who governed it – admit that Kurdish governance was bad in Kirkuk. Kurds, Turkmen, and Arabs complained about Kurdish governance and the international community and Baghdad were not happy about its reign. What happened to us was a consequence of mistakes and administrative and security mismanagement as well as the type of relations and the political direction of parties.
It is true that October 16 was a turning point when Kirkuk was taken from Kurds and handed to Arabs, but even if it were governed for more years by Kurds, there would still be no hope for the resolution of issues in favor of the Kurdish project. The people of Kirkuk would become more worried about and discontent with the Kurdish local government, resulting in the marginalization of Kirkuk people in resolving issues. These facts cannot be concealed or denied.
By touching on these bitter facts, I want to ask whether we can draw lessons from our mistakes during that 14-year reign and whether we can act differently if we regain control of the province. Of course, we will not, as we still hold the same notions to return to the province and govern it with the same or even worse mentality which our people and others detest. We want to repeat the same mistakes.
Look what Kurdish political parties are now doing over Kirkuk, focusing on how to elect a governor and who shall s/he be, without thinking about the consequences. What can the election of the governor change in Kirkuk? Let’s suppose that the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) agreed on a governor. Will other ethnic and religious groups easily accept a Kurdish governor in this situation? If all the members of the Kurdish Brotherhood bloc attend a meeting of the provincial council while Turkmen and Arabs boycott it, would this be considered a bilateral Brotherhood decision? Will Baghdad accept the exclusion of Turkmen and Arabs from the decision-making process? Kurdish political parties should have the answers to these and other similar questions and find solutions to each possibility, then take a step forward to regain control of the province.
Failures usually become a great chance for smart people to rise up again in a way that they do not fail easily next time. Kurds now have such a chance – after their fall in Kirkuk – to correct a mistake and the correction will help them avoid failure next time. The chance – which Kurds had to exploit when Saddam Hussein was ousted and Kurds entered Kirkuk – is finding a real partner. Despite historical evidence, which proves that Kirkuk is part of Kurdistan, Kurds cannot govern Kirkuk alone due to ethnic cleansing and the Arabization process. Kurds had to make deals with the Turkmen to join them in order to give more legitimacy to the process of taking the province out of the hands of Arabs. We did not do this, and thereby reaped the consequence. It is true that we cannot go backwards to correct mistakes but we can compensate for every mistake through true policy.
Kurds and Turkmen have a lot in common. There are some interests which can guarantee a long-lasting unity. There are some threats against both sides. It is an opportunity for both Kurds and Turkmen to take the right path based on their mutual interests following an agreement between both the KDP and PUK. Now, Turkmen have realized Baghdad’s strategy. They know that the first stage by Baghdad against them is to shift the Turkmen sectarian majority from Sunni to Shiite, then blend the Shiite Turkmen into Shiite Arab. For them, the Kurds are the only hope to preserve their identity in Kirkuk.
Turkmen fear for their future and need assurances, while Kurds need a partner in Kirkuk. Kurds can think about a strategic deal with the Turkmen, starting now. Kurds have to prioritize their fate and identity over posts. We can agree with the Turkmen to hold the positions of governor and other security and service positions biannually for a long time. Kurds and Turkmen can also form alliances in local elections. This can be the basis for the future of Kirkuk. This can correct the past mistakes and bring back trust between Kurds and Turkmen who will be immune from marginalization. The deal can also pave the way for real coexistence and the future of both sides, making them the decision-makers for the fate of Kirkuk.
This could be the only reasonable path for Kurds to change Kirkuk. The question is: will they take this path?
 | Arif Qurbany is an author and pundit.
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