Ties between the Kurdistan Region and Turkey are mutually beneficial and have reached an optimal level. This could be considered a huge foreign policy success for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), were it not for the fact that overdependence on Turkey can lead to two undesirable outcomes in the foreseeable future.
First, the KRG’s reliance on Turkey as the sole energy export route and dependence on Turkish imports give Ankara an upper hand in this relationship. By promoting Turkey as the sole export route, the KRG loses any possibility of maneuvering politically or economically. This would be a formidable challenge, should relations between two sides deteriorate or should Erbil pursue policy choices that Ankara dislikes. Clearly, this relationship appears imbalanced in favor of Turkey.
Second, the national interest and foreign policy strategies of countries are subject to radical change, depending on who is in power. Turkey is no different in this respect and changes in policy there are only one election away. If the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) loses the next election there is no guarantee that its successor will pursue the same policy choices toward Erbil.
One should remember that a mere few years ago relations between Turkey and the Kurdistan Region were very bitter. Indeed, the Turkish parliament had even discussed military intervention.
Therefore, these vital questions remain unanswered: What are the KRG’s choices should Turkey attempt to take advantage of Erbil’s overdependence on Turkey? What are Kurdistan’s choices should election results in Turkey bring about a new government that rejects such intimate courtship with the Kurdistan Region? And what are the KRG’s plans and alternatives should Turkey try to mend fences with Baghdad at Erbil’s expense?
If any of these changes occur, the Kurdistan Region would simply freeze both economically and politically. The Kurdish leadership is enjoying its relations with Turkey to the point that it does not see any reason to critically evaluate the relationship.
The problem is not in the KRG’s relations with Turkey. The relationship is mutually beneficial and should be strengthened and sustained. The trouble is in Erbil’s overdependence on its northern neighbor as the sole export route for its oil and gas. This approach leaves Kurdistan no opportunity to maneuver politically or economically in negotiations on the issue.
The KRG must stop promoting Turkey as the only energy export route and focus on the alternatives instead. There are positive political developments in the region that might give the KRG different opportunities and alternatives.
First of all, no matter how difficult the task, the KRG should mend fences with Baghdad. Syria is an option as well. The current crisis in Syria excludes that possibility at the moment, but a possible future energy deal with Syria could prove to be vital to the KRG.
Iran is another obvious option. The KRG could consider Iran as a possible entrepot, if recent developments between Iran and the West result in the reduction or ultimate removal of economic sanctions against Tehran.
Finding other energy export routes does not mean that the KRG should exclude Turkey as a partner in that project. Erbil should sustain its relations with Ankara. But at the same time it should find other alternatives in order to have more leverage in negotiations.
The Kurdistan Region, considering its landlocked position, needs the neighboring states for its political and economic survival and development.
There are 31 landlocked countries in the world, all of them dependent on neighboring countries to connect to international markets. Lack of territorial access to the sea has proven a formidable challenge for the development of landlocked countries because of the resulting high transit and transportation costs.
The cooperation between Turkey and KRG has reached a level that was unthinkable just a few years ago. Turkey has become the biggest contributor to the economic development of the Kurdistan Region. Turkish companies comprise more than half of the foreign companies operating in Kurdistan. Up to 80 percent of Turkish investment in Iraq is oriented towards the Kurdistan Region, where the first oil pipeline to Turkey is in the final construction stages. Recently a comprehensive deal was finalized between the two sides to build a second multi-billion dollar oil and gas pipeline.
Several top KRG officials, including Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and Minister of Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami, have made clear that Turkey is the only door of hope for the Kurdistan Region and that there is no alternative for Kurdish energy exports.
Erbil has clearly put all its eggs in one basket, and that is never a good idea.
