Following his order, coalition aircraft wishing to use Iraqi airspace must now obtain direct approval from Baghdad. The US-led coalition promptly announced it will abide by Baghdad’s new conditions.
Since the US-led air campaign against the Islamic State group (ISIS) began in 2014, the coalition has coordinated directly with Baghdad. This was not the case in neighbouring Syria, where the US refused to coordinate its campaign with the regime of Bashar al-Assad.
Abdul-Mahdi might simply be exercising his right to restrict the use of Iraqi airspace by foreign aircraft to demonstrate his grip on Iraq’s sovereignty to silence his vocal domestic rivals.
He might also have restricted access to Iraqi airspace in response to suspected Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed elements of the Iraqi state-sanctioned Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), known in Arabic as Hashd al-Shaabi.
Israel is alleged to have been behind at least three airstrikes on Iraqi soil this summer. The first two in July hit a target near Amerli in Saladin province and Camp Ashraf base in Diyala province.
Both of these bases are controlled by the Badr Organization, undoubtedly Iran’s most loyal long-term ally in Iraq.
The third alleged strike took place on August 12 against the al-Saqr military base southwest of Baghdad, which stored weapons belonging to the Hashd.
Interestingly, Abdul-Mahdi’s ban on unauthorized flights coincided with his order that bases and arms depots inside Iraqi cities be relocated, which strongly suggests there is some connection between these recent explosions and the implementation of the flight ban.
There is also speculation that the Israeli aircraft behind these strikes – probably its new stealthy fifth-generation F-35 fighter-bombers, the same aircraft which saw its combat debut in Israeli service last year – used coalition call-signs and even replicated their identification friend or foe (IFF) radar identifications so as not rouse suspicion from Baghdad.
This could explain how the bombers were able to penetrate so deeply into Iraqi airspace.
Israel has bombed Iranian-related targets in Syria hundreds of times since 2013 and has acknowledged this ongoing air campaign.
If Israel has expanded its campaign to Iraq this would mark the first time it has bombed the country since its air force attacked the Osirak nuclear reactor in a daring raid back in 1981.
Incidentally, in May, Iraq’s parliament considered legislation that called on Baghdad to seek compensation from Israel for the 1981 attack.
Israel’s motive for targeting Iranian-backed Hashd forces in Iraq could likely be to deny them possession of long-range missiles supplied by their patrons in Tehran. Reports and analysis over the past year suggest that Iran may have supplied its Hashd proxies in Iraq with artillery rockets and could even be aiming to supply them with short-range ballistic missiles.
The Israeli air campaign in Syria has primarily sought to prevent Iran from using Syria as a conduit to provide the Hezbollah in Lebanon with missiles.
If Israel has reason to suspect Iran is trying to make Iraq a launch pad for its proxies to one day fire missiles at Israel, possibly as part of a larger regional war, then it might well be taking preemptive military action now, as the Israelis invariably tend to.
However, bombing Iranian-related targets in Syria is one thing. Expanding its air campaign to Iraq is quite another, since the US wants to retain Iraq as a regional ally it can work with.
Tehran would like nothing more than to undermine cooperation between Baghdad and Washington since that would enable it to more easily entrench its proxies in Iraq.
Baghdad, meanwhile, is likely keeping up its balancing act to maintain cordial relations with the two perennial rivals.
By imposing the flight restrictions in Iraqi airspace, Abdul-Mahdi is taking clear steps to impose Iraq’s sovereignty. At the same time, he is not pointing any fingers at Israel, likely because he doesn’t want to risk an escalation that could result in his country becoming a major battlefield in the regional Iran-Israel proxy war.
His dilemma is unenviable. On the one hand, he cannot be seen as weak when it comes to defending Iraqi sovereignty. On the other, his government also cannot be weak in the face of an Iranian build-up of missiles on its soil, which is, more likely than not, what brought about the first suspected Israeli airstrikes on Iraqi soil in 38 years.
