When the US came to Iraq and toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003, Kurdish interests lay in Baghdad, to the extent that some allies and foreign observers still accuse the Kurds of surrendering to Baghdad at a time when they already had semi-autonomous rule.
Although strengthening ties with Baghdad provided the Kurdistan Region with some gains, a few years later a dangerous fact emerged: the chauvinistic and fascist mentality of Arab [political leaders] did not fade with the collapse of Saddam Hussein. Kurds were heavily disappointed when they realized this. Some of those who succeeded Saddam, who had been the victims of Baathist fascism and had collaborated with them in toppling the regime, became sources of disappointment for Kurds.
Forming the post-Saddam [Iraqi] government with Kurds, these people soon showed that they could do worse to Kurds than Saddam had done, if they were to possess the same level of power.
This disappointment in Baghdad pushed Kurds to seek new support; after much effort and compromise, they turned to Turkey. This gave Kurds the hope that they could at least compensate the losses they suffered with Baghdad. Kurdistan was then warned by inside and outside observers not to put all its eggs in Turkey’s basket, especially when Turkey was becoming the central power of the Middle East as Iran became more isolated.
Once again, despite some achievements, again Kurdistan was left disappointed by Turkey following Islamic State (ISIS) war and October 16 events [capture of disputed areas from Peshmerga control by Iraqi Army and the PMF].
The Kurdistan Region reluctantly headed back to Baghdad again, following its disappointment in Turkey and the loss of disputed areas. Despite the fact that Baghdad’s future threats against Kurdistan will not be of any less gravity than those of Saddam Hussein, Kurds do not have better options. The appointment of Adil Abdul-Mahdi as Prime Minister of Iraq in late 2018 was a turning point for both Erbil and Baghdad. The Region must benefit from this opportunity and take the necessary steps to resolve its issues with Baghdad. However, they should learn a lesson from the past by not putting all its eggs in Baghdad’s basket.
Ayad Allawi succeeded Saddam Hussein and reigned for a while, during which Kurds enjoyed good relations with Baghdad. Kurds then pinned too much hope on Allawi. Alawi was soon succeeded by the sectarian trio of Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Nouri al-Maliki and Haider al-Abadi who invalidated the hopes Kurds had pinned during the eighty-year reign of the Sunni dictatorship in Iraq and its five genocidal crimes against Kurds. The Daawa Party trio’s ten-year reign forced Kurds to find a way out of Iraq.
We should, therefore, not pin too much hope on Abdul-Mahdi. Because his objectives do not match with those of Shiite expansionism, he could be removed from his position at any time.
Even if his cabinet continues, we still cannot expect him to resolve all Erbil-Baghdad issues for which the two governments need to have normalized and friendly relations. The PM, as a Kurdish ally, wants to gain a reputation by resolving issues. Erbil also seeks resolution, but we have to admit that the issues are deep and complicated. Mullah Mustafa Barzani (founder of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party) negotiated [with Baghdad] from 1970-1974. Jalal Talabani [founder of the ruling Patriotic Union of Kurdistan] was visiting Baghdad for about two years in the eighties. After 1991, the parties of Kurdistan continued talks with Baghdad, but all was in vain. Even when Saddam’s regime collapsed, Kurds still went to Baghdad and took part in the processes of drafting the constitution and Iraqi cabinet formation. The results were clear: things got worse.
Some of the newly-emerged issues between Erbil and Baghdad, such as the Kurdish share of the Iraqi budget and Baghdad’s treatment of Erbil, can be resolved through law or political accords. This is an unlikely possibility because the Iraqi government does not have the backing of most of the Iraqi parliament blocs that a potential agreement with Erbil would need. The blocs can just reject these agreements. Let’s assume that Baghdad (government and lawmakers) approve such agreements to tie Erbil to Baghdad. The essence of the Kurdish issue is not oil and money, but territory and identity, as well fear of another potential genocide. Baghdad cannot currently resolve any of these issues, and it cannot regain the trust of Kurds.
Kurdish officials should, therefore have a clear vision when going to Baghdad. Normal conditions, healthy relations and friendly treatment between both governments are not concrete, but transient. There should be a Plan A, B, and C. We have to benefit from the rivalry between major powers to keep the balance in the region. We also need another policy which considers mutual interests and keeps balance between the regional powers, by considering improving ties with Tehran, Ankara, Damascus and Western Kurdistan (northern Syria) instead of focusing exclusively on Baghdad.
Translated by Karwan Faidhi Dri
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Arif Qurbany is an author and pundit.
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