This week Turkish President Recip Tayyip Erdogan threatened to rescind permission for the U.S. to use the shared Turkish-NATO air base at Incirlik. Along with Incirlik, Mr. Erdogan and his ministers also announced that the Kurecik NATO early warning radar base in eastern Malatya province could be closed to American and NATO use.
Erdogan made the threats in an effort to thwart looming U.S. sanctions against Turkey for its purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system and its invasion of northern Syria, where Turkish proxy forces attacked U.S. Kurdish allies and committed grave human rights abuses against civilians. The U.S. Congress and Senate also just passed a bill recognizing the Armenian genocide committed by the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century, further aggravating relations with Turkey.
Although US President Trump had no interest in the Armenian genocide bill and even had Republican senators block the bill on three separate occasions, eventually the Senate passed it against his will. The same looks increasingly probably for sanctions against Turkey, with various bills starting to make their way through the US legislature.
A tough stance against Turkey actually seems to be the only issue sparking bipartisan agreement in Washington these days, with even Republican senators and congressmen willing to defy the president on the issue. It looks increasingly likely that as with the Armenian genocide bill, bipartisan and hence veto-proof sanctions against Turkey may be in store for the near future.
Depending on how the sanctions are constructed, they could go further than denying Turkey American weaponry and severely harm a Turkish economy already teetering on the brink of depression. Such an outcome would cause severe problems for Mr. Erdogan, whose popularity has been waning and who now faces a new upstart opposition party being founded by his former political allies.
Some analysts wonder if the Turkish-American rupture in relations could get as bad as during the 1974-78 period, after Turkey invaded Cyprus. Following the invasion, Washington imposed a moratorium on weapons sales to Turkey and Ankara responded by barring the Americans use of the Incirlik air base. The United States did not regain use of Incirlik until 1978, when it resumed military aid to Turkey.
Although Turkey has not yet closed the base to the Americans and Washington has not yet passed a sanctions bill against Turkey, relations are actually already worse than in 1974. At the time of Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus, the Americans and Turks shared a lot of important strategic interests. They simply disagreed about Cyprus. Turkey found Greek Cypriot attempts to unify with Greece and their repression of its ethnic Turkish Cypriot kin unacceptable, while Americans did not care that much about these issues and only wished to avoid a military conflict between their Greek and Turkish NATO allies.
During the Cold War, Turkey remained essential to American and NATO strategies against the Soviet Union. Turkey’s land border with the Soviet Union made it one of the most important NATO allies. Turkey at the time also remained a militantly secular and pro-Western state, avoiding any deep entanglements into the Middle East.
None of these things remain true today. The Cold War is over and many Americans see radical Islamist jihadis as a greater threat than Russia. Even for those who still view Russia as a serious threat, Ankara’s increasing love affair with Moscow – including joint pipeline projects and the purchase of Russian military hardware – make Turkey an increasing liability for NATO. The Erdogan government’s support of Islamist groups across the region, from the relatively moderate Muslim Brotherhoods to the likes of Hamas, al Qaeda in Syria and others, likewise indicates new Turkish interests completely at odds with American interests. Combined with Ankara’s growing Islamist discourse and virulently anti-American rhetoric (mainly for domestic consumption), many in Washington wonder whether or not Turkey is the new emerging threat for them to be concerned about. Turkish irredentism and military maneuvers and brinksmanship on the Mediterranean, with Turkish naval vessels threating Greek, Cypriot and Israeli ships drilling for gas, do not help matters either.
Under these circumstances, wise policy makers in Washington might consider withdrawing American forces and particularly American nuclear warheads from the Incirlik base even if Erdogan does not carry out his threat. Greece, Cyprus and Iraqi Kurdistan offer alternative locations for the bases. Behind closed doors, the Americans could even propose a deal with the Russians and ask them “What will you give us in return for withdrawing our forces from Turkey?”
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
