In October, the United Nations arms embargo on Iran is set to expire, allowing Tehran to purchase conventional military hardware to modernize its armed forces. Analysts, however, say even if the US fails to extend the embargo indefinitely, Tehran is unlikely to go on a spending spree for new armaments any time soon.
Under the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the UN Security Council agreed to end its arms embargo on Iran in October 2020. The US unilaterally pulled out of the agreement in 2018 and is now scrambling to prolong that embargo indefinitely.
Iran’s conventional military arsenal is aging with most of its hardware purchased by the last shah during his manic military build-up in the 1970s.
If the embargo isn’t extended, the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) speculates Iran could buy advanced Russian S-400 air defence missiles, Sukhoi Su-30 air superiority fighter jets, and T-90 main battle tanks. Such acquisitions would substantially bolster and modernize Iran’s conventional air and ground forces.
Kerim Has, a Moscow-based analyst on Russian foreign affairs in the Middle East, believes that Russia would “definitely” look to sell arms to Iran if the embargo is lifted and also believes Tehran would be keen on Russian hardware.
“However, there would still be serious impediments both in technical and regional circumstances,” Has told Rudaw English.
For one, Iran’s economy has been battered by severe economic sanctions, the sharp fall in world oil prices, and the coronavirus pandemic. Consequently, Tehran may simply lack the capital to purchase large quantities of sophisticated and expensive arms for the time being.
“Tough negotiations are certainly ahead,” Has said.
Furthermore, the US may simply impose unilateral sanctions against anyone openly exporting arms to Iran even if it fails to prevent the lifting of the UN embargo. This would cause Moscow a “headache” if it chooses to push ahead with an Iranian arms deal.
“Russian foreign policy has to rigorously consider the fragile regional balance of power, and be more careful to prevent harming Moscow’s newly emerging power broker role in the Middle East,” Has said.
Russia, he explained, is still a “unique power” insofar as it keeps contacts with various states and most non-state actors in the Middle East and “needs to maintain this dialogue to strengthen its position.”
“Russia’s relations with Israel in Syria and oil agreement with Saudi Arabia would likely be the decelerator factors in Russian arms sales to Iran in the post-UN embargo period compared to a decade ago,” he said.
Additionally, Moscow would have to minimize the risk of Tehran transferring Russian weaponry to proxy militias in the region like Hezbollah, “as it could destabilize the already sensitive balance in the region.”
The most realistic scenario Has foresees “seems to be that Iran will first likely just attempt to modernize its arsenal and replace some of the more aged equipment with little spending.”
“In parallel to this, Tehran will get into a prolonged bargaining process with prospective dealers, primarily with Russia, for more sophisticated weapons,” he said.
Although Russia would welcome the chance to strike new arms deals, and Iran needs to modernize its antiquated conventional arsenal, there are other factors at play that could prevent Tehran making significant acquisitions if the embargo is lifted.
Among them is the internal power dynamics of the Islamic Republic itself. The most powerful and trusted military force in Iran is not its conventional and regular armed forces – it’s the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which protects the ruling elite in Tehran and enforces its will.
The IRGC has actively hindered or outright prevented the regular Iranian armed forces from building up and modernizing its arsenal with new arms acquisitions over the years.
One case in point was when the Iranian army sought to upgrade its armoured units by ordering 300 T-90s from Russia, only to have the IRGC pressure it into cancelling. The IRGC did buy 24 T-90s from Russia in late 2015, but immediately sent them all to Syria to be used by allied pro-Assad paramilitaries.
Tom Cooper, a widely published aviation expert and military historian who has closely documented these developments, doesn’t believe anything will fundamentally change if the embargo is lifted in October.
“Overall, I do not expect any kind of major acquisitions from Russia: even if [there were], Moscow simply couldn’t deliver what would be necessary to shift the balance of power in the Gulf region, while Iran cannot afford it, nor is Tehran searching for that kind of re-armament,” Cooper told Rudaw English.
“The IRGC is following its own way, and that’s it,” he added.
