The European Union and the Kurds in Iraq

The first instance of the European Union (EU) addressing the Kurdish issue in Iraq was in the aftermath of the chemical attacks on Halabja in 1988. A number of sympathetic members of the European Parliament held a press conference in Strasbourg on 1 April 1988 condemning the attacks. Two weeks later, the European Parliament issued a resolution on the use of chemical attacks in the Iraq-Iran war, including a reference to Halabja.

The EU was a silent actor throughout the 1990s, refraining from any contractual relationship with the Saddam’s regime. It was only after the fall of Saddam that the EU presented a strategy for a renewed engagement with Iraq in June 2004. 

The EU has been the principal provider of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Iraq in the last two decades. Contributing 1 billion euros between 2003 and 2009 and 1.6 billion euros from 2014 to 2019, the EU has been the largest international donor to the country. In addition, the EU has sent special missions -- EU-JUST-LEX in 2005 and EUAM in 2017 -- tasked with strengthening Iraq’s security and the rule of law. The Kurdistan Region has gradually been integrated into the EU’s bilateral relations with Iraq. In that process, the passage of the 2005 Iraqi constitution which recognized the Kurdistan Region as a federal region opened the door for EU’s interactions with the Region. The EU has, since then, built multifaceted interactions with the Kurdistan Region, including political dialogue, humanitarian aid and development cooperation. 

The rationale for EU engagement in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region 

Since the EU does not have a particular ‘Kurdish policy’, the EU’s interactions with the Kurds are to be studied in the context of its bilateral relationship with Iraq. The EU attaches importance to its relations with Iraq for a number of reasons. Iraq has a geo-strategic position as one of the EU’s ‘neighbours of neighbours’. As such, Iraq is viewed as a partner in facing regional challenges, and a potential trading partner. The EU, therefore, has a direct interest in assisting Iraq to achieve stability. What role do the Kurds play in this context?

The EU and its member states regard the Kurdistan Region as an important partner inside Iraq. The importance of the Kurds is partly thanks to their political role as representative of one of the three main groups in Iraq. It is also linked to the Kurdistan Region’s own track record as a bastion of peace, stability and a place where peaceful coexistence has been achieved with a great deal of success. To facilitate its political interactions, the EU has, since 2015, a liaison office in Erbil. In addition, the EU has established two separate offices in Erbil responsible for the coordination and streamlining of humanitarian aid and development cooperation in the Kurdistan Region.

Kurds as partners in facing regional challenges 

In the war against the Islamic State (ISIS), the Kurds in Iraq played a crucial role as a ground force. Following the rapid expansion of ISIS from Syria to Iraq, ISIS moved toward the Kurdistan Region in August 2014. A number of EU member states, France in particular, expressed deep concern. The EU Foreign Affairs Council held an emergency meeting in August 2014, deciding that member states were allowed to provide military aid to the Kurdish Peshmerga forces. This decision formed the foundation for a number of EU member states supplying crucial aid to the Peshmerga, as well as providing training missions. 

The second regional challenge which has elevated the profile of the Kurds externally and led to intensified EU interactions with the Kurdistan Region is the issue of migration and refugees. Until 2019, the Kurdistan Region had been hosting approximately 1.5 million Iraqi IDPs, in addition to 250,000 Syrian refugees. The EU responded by establishing an office of the European Commission for humanitarian aid (ECHO) in Erbil in 2014, which served as a coordination hub for the allocation of EU funds and  managing projects across northern Iraq. Since 2015, the EU has provided over 458 million euros in humanitarian aid to displaced Iraqis and Syrian refugees inside Iraq. Equally, the EC’s Development Cooperation office (DEVCO) has been instrumental in assisting funding and managing projects in various sectors, including education, healthcare, water and sanitation. 

KRI as an energy actor

In addition to the Kurdish role in regional challenges, the importance of the Kurds is tied to the large amount of oil and natural gas in the Kurdistan Region. According to the 2013 British Petroleum annual statistical review of world energy, it has an estimated 45 billion barrels of oil reserves, which, if the Kurdistan Region was a state, would make it the country with the 10th largest oil reserves globally. In addition, it holds around 25 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas and up to 200 trillion cubic feet of largely unproven natural gas, amounting to 3 percent of global natural gas reserves. The KRI passed a crucial Oil and Gas Law in 2007 paving the way for its own oil sector. Although no direct references to this in any official EU document, there is awareness, however, amongst EU member states as well as in the EU institutions regarding the potential of ‘Kurdish oil’. This awareness has been partially the result of perpetual disputes between KRI and the Iraqi federal government and partially due to the interest and involvement of a number of European oil companies in the KRI.

The EU’s limited political role 

Being a leading humanitarian actor in Iraq and a normative power, the EU’s rhetoric has included broad and substantive guidance for Iraq to overcome its political, economic and societal challenges. While the EU takes the lead in humanitarian and stabilisation efforts in Iraq, it has not demonstrated the same sort of leadership in the political realm. Instead, when it comes to highly charged political issues, the EU has tended to opt for a ‘wait and see’ approach often aligning itself with policy initiatives of its two powerful member states, France and Germany. The KRI’s referendum on independence in September 2017 provides a fitting example in this regard. In the wake of the referendum and following the imposition of harsh measures from Baghdad on the KRI, the EU did not initiate any political or diplomatic initiative, other than calling for restraint. It was only following a diplomatic intervention by France that the tense situation could gradually return to normalcy. Unlike the EU, France acted swiftly and decisively, inviting both Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani and the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to Paris. In terms of substance, the French policy did not differ greatly from that of the EU, both placing a strong emphasis on Iraq’s sovereignty, while also expressing support for KRI as a constitutional entity. The difference, however, was in the willingness and confidence to intervene and exert political and diplomatic pressure on Baghdad. The Barzani-Macron meeting in November 2017 had a major boosting effect on the KRI public and political leaders’ morale. It marked the beginning of a successful diplomatic campaign by President Barzani to free the Kurdistan Region from the isolation that it had found itself in following the referendum. Reacting to the French initiative, Germany responded quickly by inviting KRI President to Berlin. It was only after these diplomatic steps, taken by its two powerful member states that the EU broke its silence, albeit still not forcefully.

Three factors shaping the EU’s actorness

Given its high level of internal coherence on Iraq, the practical capabilities at its disposal and the great deal of goodwill it enjoys in Iraq, the EU could, indeed, have played a more assertive political and diplomatic role. This would have been compatible with its rhetoric which heavily emphasizes on Iraq’s unity, strengthening a national identity and achieving national reconciliation. The abovementioned, coupled with its rhetoric, have created expectations amongst the Iraqis regarding the EU’s ability as a mediator. In dealing with the EU, the Kurds have to consider three factors that have conditioned the EU’s political role. The first factor is the level of coherence amongst and between its political actors. The EU is cautious not to operate beyond its given mandate. The second factor is the EU’s acceptance. For instance, in dealing with the Kurds, the EU is acting with prudence, trying not to cause any frown eyebrows in Baghdad. The third factor is a matter of principle. Unlike most other superpowers or regional powers, the EU tries to refrain itself from any direct political interference unless there is a formal invitation from the host country. These conditions, have, at times, left an image of the EU as an influential actor that politically punches below its weight.