From the outset of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the European Union (EU) adopted a two-track policy in Syria, which, on the one hand, focuses on a peaceful transition of power, and, on the other hand, focuses on taking the lead in international humanitarian efforts in meeting the needs of the Syrian people, both inside Syria and in countries hosting Syrian refugees.
The EU has thus positioned itself as a leading humanitarian actor, while also helping to facilitate UN-led efforts to shape the future of Syria. Whereas the EU has been successful in its humanitarian endeavour, the war in Syria is driven and shaped by a fierce geopolitical competition between several global - and regional - powers, including Russia, the United States, Turkey and Iran. While France forms an exception in this regard, its military presence and its diplomatic efforts are not overtly supported by the EU. Hence, the EU is widely regarded as a key payer, but not a key player in Syria.
In terms of EU’s engagement with the Kurds, the EU has been reluctant to act. While the Kurds have established a semi-autonomous area in the northeast, called Rojava, the EU has not formally recognised or interacted with Rojava. Two factors seem to be at play here. First, the EU’s respect for international rules and its regard for the sovereignty of Syria. In the absence of constitutional or parliamentary recognition, Rojava lacks the necessary legitimacy to be regarded as a formal sub-state actor.
The second factor is tied to Turkey’s fierce opposition to Rojava and its terrorist designation of the Kurdish Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG), which Turkey considers a branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). With a shaky migrant package deal in place, the priority for the EU and its member states is to not antagonise Turkey. In light of this, maintaining the migrant package deal with Turkey outweighs, politically, the importance of engaging with the Kurds and recognising Rojava at this point in time.
The role of the EU, under the current status quo, is limited to the provision of humanitarian assistance, as well as a modest role in facilitating intra-Syrian talks regarding the future of Syria. Given that the EU’s non-military role is limited in the current circumstances, the strategic impact of the EU’s role in Syria in general and in the Kurdish issue, in particular, will largely depend on the extent to which the state structure and governance in Syria will be transformed.
If Syria ever becomes a democratic and pluralistic state, the Kurds will likely consolidate their territorial gains and will be in the position to secure some form of constitutional recognition of Rojava. The geostrategic importance of Rojava will likely serve as a push factor for the EU to adopt a more comprehensive approach. The EU would also potentially become more vocal in its normative role. In this context, the Kurdish issue would likely serve as a benchmark for the state of democracy and the protection of minority rights in Syria. The Kurds, as well as other democratic forces inside Syria, would be the main beneficiaries of a potential intensified EU engagement in a future Syria.
This is the third part of a series looking at EU policies and interests in relation to the Kurdish question in all four parts of Kurdistan.
Zana Kurda is an expert in EU-Kurdish affairs, holding a PhD from the Vrije Universiteit Brussels.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
