WASHINGTON DC - A former US Department of State official expressed concerns over the inability of Kurdistan Region’s political parties to form a cabinet nearly a year after the election.
“I think it is disappointing that we're almost a year after the elections in Kurdistan and there's still not a government formed,” Victoria Taylor, a former deputy assistant secretary for Iraq and Iran who now leads the Iraq initiative at the Atlantic Council, told Rudaw on Thursday.
The Kurdistan Region’s ruling parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have failed to form a cabinet after parliamentary elections were held in October, leaving the legislature inactive for years.
“I think that the KRG [Kurdistan Regional Government] would be much more effective if we had, you know, a final confirmed cabinet in place,” she said.
On relations between Erbil and Baghdad, Taylor underlined the need for continuous talks.
“There needs to be really an ongoing dialogue between Erbil and Baghdad over a number of these issues,” she said, pointing to long-running disputes over oil exports, budget shares, and disputed territories.
Exports through the Iraq-Turkey pipeline have been suspended since March 2023, after a Paris-based arbitration court ruled in favor of Baghdad that Ankara had violated a 1973 pipeline agreement when it allowed Erbil to begin independent oil exports in 2014.
The KRG Council of Ministers on Wednesday directed its delegation to continue negotiations with Baghdad on resuming exports and revenue sharing, to reach an agreement as soon as possible.
“It's important that the leaders in Baghdad and Erbil continue to talk to one another to see if agreements can be put in place,” Taylor said.
Washington and Erbil maintain close relations. The United States has been a key supporter of the Kurdistan Region since it gained autonomy in the 1990s. The US has played a central role in developing the Kurdish Peshmerga, leading the global coalition against the Islamic State (ISIS) and backing ongoing reform efforts. It is also preparing to open a new consulate general in Erbil, which will be the largest in the world.
The following is the full transcript of the interview with Victoria Taylor.
Rudaw: Looking at the current status of US-Iraq relations, what's the biggest challenge for the two nations, while having President Trump in office?
Victoria Taylor: So, I would say, you know, this is a critical moment in the relationship, and during this time period, particularly September, we know there's a major change that's underway, and that's the end of Operation Inherent Resolve, military presence in Iraq. And I think it's both a challenge and an opportunity. And so I think, of course, this relationship between the US and Iraq over the past 20 years has been shaped by the US military presence.
And I think we really need to consider how we can alter and transition this relationship from one based on security cooperation into one that is a broader partnership. And so I think with the Trump administration, as we see their focus throughout the Middle East and throughout the world, there's an intense focus on business partnerships, and so in that, I think there's an opportunity for the Iraqi government, you know, both in Baghdad and the government and Erbil as well, to identify ways to strengthen the economic partnership between our two countries. And I think that is one of the greatest challenges and moments of opportunity right now in the bilateral relationship.
You mentioned the security agreement that the Iraqis and the US are now discussing. However, I haven't seen any solid agreement between the two nations regarding the future security agreement, which we are approaching on September 25, when the mission of the coalition forces will change. So why haven't we seen any deal between these two countries? Shall we expect any agreement soon?
I think, I don't know if we're going to see a major announcement or public rollout of this transition. Of course, there was the public announcement at the end of September last year, signaling the timeline for the end of the Operation Inherent Resolve mission in Iraq, and then the end of the support operations out of Erbil in September 2026. I think that there's still a lot that needs to be defined in terms of the future security partnership and what the elements of that partnership will look like. And I do think that will be a critical conversation between the two governments, but I think that that will be, of course, of interest to both the American and the Iraqi public as well. And so I hope that over these coming months, we will gain greater insight into, you know, how this administration views the future of that partnership.
How does this administration view that partnership? I've learned from my sources that the Iraqi foreign minister has been requesting a meeting with Secretary Rubio since May, and that request remains on the table. However, Washington has not responded to them. They wanted to come to Washington to talk about the security agreement and other issues that they have with paying Iranian debts and Russian debts. To your view, why is this administration showing a lack of interest in dealing with Baghdad, not like the former administration?
Well, I, you know, I can't really speak to exactly what is happening in terms of scheduling meetings, but I think that we have seen, you know, phone calls between Secretary Rubio and the [Iraqi] Prime Minister [Mohammed Shia’ al Sudani]. And so, you know, I think that there is a need for ongoing engagement, really, at all levels and across the different ministries in Baghdad, and I think an important, really touchstone for the security conversation will be the military dialogue. Normally, that military dialogue should be held at some point this year, and so I hope that there will be a scheduling of that dialogue so that there can be really an exchange of ideas between both of our militaries. And always those discussions also include the Peshmerga as well, to discuss really what the shape of that security partnership is. And so I think that's a conversation that we really should hope takes place this year.
How do you assess Iraq’s balancing act between its relations with the United States and Iran's growing influence over Iraq?
So, you know, I think I'm going to take this opportunity to talk about the PMF [Popular Mobilization Forces] legislation. Obviously, this was a piece of legislation which was of significant concern to the Trump administration. But I think it's not an issue that is just limited to the administration itself. I think there's concern within Washington as well, from both parties, about, you know, the nature of the Popular Mobilization Forces, and what a successful reform would look like. And I think the key concern for Americans is really that there are militias within the PMF, which we've designated as terrorist organizations, which have not only killed Americans, but they've killed and kidnapped Iraqis as well. They've threatened some of Iraq's neighbors. And so I think that you know, as this administration and as American policymakers think about the nature of Iranian influence, I think that was a very significant and core issue.
I think what we saw was that actually the Iraqi government was sensitive to those concerns, and I think that it is a direct result of American engagement that that legislation did not move forward. And so I think what I take away from that is that the US still has significant influence in Iraq, that there is an Iraqi government that wants to maintain a strong partnership with the United States, and that the US does have opportunities to try to ensure that Iraq continues to have a balanced foreign policy that takes US security concerns into consideration.
Iraq is set to hold an election by the end of this year. What do you expect from this electoral process, and do you think that there will be an opportunity for fundamental reforms when the new Iraqi government is shaped?
It's very difficult for me to make any kind of prediction about what's going to happen during the elections. Of course, it's something that I'm very interested in. I know American policy makers will be very interested, and I think that what everyone will want to see is a government, you know, both an election which has taken place in a transparent and fair way, that the government is formed as quickly as possible, that it reflects, you know, the will of the voters, but that we have a partner on the other side in Baghdad who still cares about the relationship with the United States. I think that will be really what US policymakers are looking for.
And are there politicians in Iraq who don't care about the United States? Because we have some politicians who openly and publicly stand against the US and they sometimes even say the US is interfering in Iraq’s affairs. Is that because they are aligned with Iran, or is that the natural thinking of Iraqi politicians and nationalists?
So, of course, we know that there are politicians within Iraq who, you know, may be quite critical of the United States and not as supportive of the US-Iraq partnership. I don't think that's the majority of politicians, and I don't think that's the majority of Iraqis. And so I think most of us have confidence that the eventual government that emerges will be one that recognizes the importance and value of that relationship and what the United States can bring to help Iraq achieve the kind of prosperous and sovereign future that most Iraqis want.
How do you view the trajectory of the relationship between Kurdistan and the United States? Since the Trump administration came back to the White House, have you seen a shift in policy towards the Kurdistan Region?
I would say I don't know that I would suggest that there has been any shift. I think that successive administrations, of course, have valued the Iraqi Kurdistan region and its leaders as important partners, and that partnership, you know, is long standing and historical. I think that both this administration and the Biden administration before it understood that Kurdish political leaders were an important voice in Baghdad, and that actually ensuring that relations between Erbil and Baghdad, or trying to support relations between Erbil and Baghdad that were as effective as possible, was in the US national interest. And so I don't know that I would say there's a change. But certainly, you know, within Washington, across both parties, there's a great deal of support for the Kurdistan Region and its role within Iraq.
Okay. When it comes to the disputes between Baghdad and Erbil,does the United States take any sides in these disputes, or are they just trying to be a mediator and trying to urge or engage both parties to get together and solve their issues?
I would say, you know, in most cases, I think the United States has really tried to encourage dialogue, has tried to engage both sides and to find ways to try to, you know, broker compromises, an agreement. You know, depending on the issue we may or may not have clear ideas about what compromise could look like. You know, I think one important issue, which I'm sad has still not been resolved, is, you know, the Iraq-Turkey pipeline impasse. And I think that's an example of an issue where the US has engaged actively and heavily, but, you know, we can't always reach the kind of agreement I think we'd like to see, but I think that's an area where we're going to continue to see the US government engaged to try to see if they can push that forward and get oil back in the pipeline.
So, now, as you're working in a think tank, from your perspective, do you think that the Kurds are a balance of power for America in Iraq? When it comes to the US national security interests, are the Kurds a balance of power for the United States in Iraq and in the region as a whole? How do you see that?
Yeah, I mean, I would say… So from my perspective now, on the outside, I don't know that it has changed much from when I was inside the government and I think it's important for US national security interests to have active engagement with all political parties, and I think that's a political reality, because Iraq is a complicated political system where one politician, one government leader, can't control all elements of power. So it's important for US national security interests that we have strong and ongoing partnership with our friends in Kurdistan, but just as well, we must engage with Sunni politicians and Shia politicians as well to really ensure that US interests are protected.
Is there one Iraqi policy, and the Kurdistan Region is within that policy, or are there two Iraqi policies, one policy for the Kurdistan Region, another policy for the other parts of Iraq?
I mean, we're dealing with the reality where Kurdistan is part of Iraq. And of course, the Kurdistan Region has a certain degree of autonomy. We engage with, of course, our KRG counterparts in Erbil, and I think that, you know, American officials will continue to have engagement both in Baghdad and Erbil, but it reflects the political reality of a Kurdistan that is integrated in an important part of Iraq.
So, as an outsider, do you see one policy or two policies?
I think it's part and parcel of one policy,
The Kurdistan Region held an election last year in October. We will enter October again next month and still we don't have a new government. And the parliament has been inactive for years, actually. How do you see this, and how does this impact the stability in the region? How does this impact relations between the United States and the Kurdistan Region? When I say the United States, I mean the US national security interests in that region, when their friends are not acting as they are expecting them to.
Yeah, I think it is disappointing that we're almost a year after the elections in Kurdistan and there's still not a government formed. You know, I think that is important, not only for the voters and the people of Kurdistan to have a government in place, but I do think that it is, you know, something that us policymakers notice and care about. And it would be much more, you know, I think that the KRG would be much more effective if we had, you know, a final confirmed cabinet in place. And so, you know, I certainly hope that the negotiations that have been going on between the PUK and KDP reached some kind of agreement.
You know, if we're talking about Lalezar [the arrest of Lahur Talabany in August], I mean, I think it was probably just as shocking maybe to Americans to see the violence as it was to our friends in Kurdistan. And I think, you know, it's obviously, you know, a shame when you see loss of life and violence in such a situation. I think, you know, these are very serious allegations of a plot, and so I think American policymakers and American watchers of Iraq would certainly like to see a real investigation and a fair judicial process. But of course, no one likes to see a firefight break out anywhere in the world.
How does the United States look at this incident? Is it internal affairs? Is it a family affair? Or is it a really serious incident that may impact the whole region, and possibly Iraq as well? There were reports that the United States was interfering, attempting to stop [PUK] leader Bafel Talabani, and seeking some form of engagement with them. Do you think that the United States sees this incident as a very serious incident, or will they see it as just an internal matter or a family affair?
Well, it's not really up to the United States to investigate this, but you know, certainly I think that the people of Kurdistan and the voters will likely have an expectation of some kind of process and some information that will be provided to them. And Americans would be interested in seeing the results of that just as much as our friends in Kurdistan.
But do they pay attention to that?
Certainly, I think people in Washington will be interested to see how that proceeds.
As we discuss the security situation in Sulaimani and the Kurdistan region, what roles do you see Erbil playing in shaping overall Iraqi security, amid the disputes between Erbil and Baghdad?
I'm not sure I know specifically which disputes.
They have disputes over Article 140, disputes over the disputed area, and then there are disputes between the Peshmerga and some elements in Iraq. There is supposed to be a joint operation between these two. There's still the threat of ISIS. How do you see the role of Erbil in the Iraqi security sector, given these disputes with Baghdad?
Yeah. I mean, I think the reality is that, you know, there needs to be really an ongoing dialogue between Erbil and Baghdad over a number of these issues. And I understand that sometimes the root of these issues, you know, is, you know, they're very challenging issues to resolve, questions of constitutionality, questions of federalism, and how, you know, the resources are allocated. So I think resolving them is not easy, but in each case, I think it's important that the leaders in Baghdad and Erbil continue to talk to one another to see if agreements can be put in place.
What are the most realistic opportunities for US companies to establish economic ties with Iraq, specifically between Erbil and the United States, and between Baghdad and the United States?
You know, I think while it is definitely important that the Iraqi economy develop beyond the energy field, obviously the most prime opportunities, I think, still remain in the energy sector. And so, of course, we've seen over the course of this past year, you know, an initial agreement signed with Chevron and Baghdad, but we saw a couple big deals signed between Erbil and US companies as well, again in the energy sector. But you know, I certainly hope that there are opportunities to expand beyond that. I know, you know, both governments have been eager to target companies in other sectors, whether agriculture, health care, digital. But I think that a lot more work needs to be done there, and frankly, a lot more reforms probably need to happen, both in Baghdad and in Erbil to just continue improving the investment climate and making it an easier place to do business.
So Iraq gave five rounds of oil contracts to China and it was upsetting the United States. Even you showed your concern about this. And then Iraq established some form of economic relations with Russia. Still, they owe Russian companies and they cannot pay their debts. And they have some economic ties with Iran. How do these relations between Baghdad and China, Baghdad and Russia, and Baghdad and Iran concern the United States? And what's the implication of that on the calculations of US policy towards Iraq when it comes to Iraq navigating economic relations with China, Russia and Iran?
I mean, I think, you know, of course, the US would prefer to see stronger Iraqi economic relations with Europe, with the United States, with Gulf countries.
But not with Russia and China and Iran?
I mean, I think there's a recognition that, you know, the Iranians, the Russians and Chinese, you know, can use that influence also for political purposes. And certainly, we understand that Iraq will have trade and economic ties with other countries, but we continue to believe that, you know, closer integration and economic integration between Iraq and regional partners, and by that I mean more of the Gulf, between the United States and Iraq, between Europe and Iraq, I think helps take the Iraqi economy in a more modern and forward looking direction.
How does the rising crisis from Syria to the Gulf areas affect US commitment and US policy towards Iraq and the Kurdistan Region? Were there any implications with the changing government in Syria on that policy towards Iraq and the Kurdistan Region?
I think that the changes throughout the region, even over the past two years, not even just in Syria, just show how integral Iraqi security is to regional security. And so I think for that reason, it was just another reminder that Iraq can often be, you know, at the center of regional developments. I think you know, of course, the recent 12 day war was an example when the Iraqi government was actually very successful in keeping Iraq out of a conflict. And so I think that you know, continued diplomatic and security engagement in Iraq is important. Not only for Iraqi security, but for US interests in the Middle East.
Were the Iraqis successful in preventing Iraq from falling into a war, even when the events happened in Syria, and then the 12-day war? Or was there US pressure on Iraq to keep them away from that fighting? Which one is true?
You know, I can’t say which was the one…
I've heard that Iraq wanted to go to Syria and fight against Ahmad al-Sharaa and defend Syrian Bashar al-Assad’s government. Later, the Biden administration, you were in office, you told Iraq not to do it.
I would say, you know, certainly I remember when there were some officials, you know, publicly suggesting that, you know, Iraq should go into Syria. I don't think there was ever any serious consideration of that by the Iraqi government. And you know, based on, you know, what I know, I think that, you know, the Iraqi government has really tried to play more of a stabilizing role, and trying to play a role that, you know, preserved Iraqi security interest and maintained stability. And so I think, you know, we had a very tough period for about three months after October 7, but you know, hopefully that will have just been a short period, and what is a broader trend of stability and security in Iraq. And I think that's, you know, not only in the US interest, it's certainly in the interest of the Iraqi people.
Thank you so much Victoria for being on Rudaw and thanks for your insightful perspective.
Great to be here. Thank you.