Turkey-PKK peace talks would bolster Syria security: ICG
Heiko Wimmen, who oversees the International Crisis Group’s Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon projects, says the US and the wider international coalition should help Turkey and Kurdish forces in northern Syria develop “confidence building measures” to pave the way for the resumption of talks.
Wimmen says the only way to stabilize the security situation in the region is to involve the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and for Turkey to engage in a gradual return of the peace process, which collapsed in early 2015.
To begin with, the PKK should agree to a unilateral ceasefire, he says.
A former associate researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin, Wimmen believes a failure to resume talks will lead the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to pivot its focus away from fighting remnants of the Islamic State group (ISIS) and instead move its forces north.
This risks allowing a resurgence of ISIS in areas they had once controlled, Wimmen warns.
Concerning the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and its fractious relationship with Iraq’s federal government in Baghdad, Wimmen believes restoring security cooperation in the disputed territories would be a win-win situation for both sides that would prevent an ISIS resurgence.
He warned that Iraq’s top priority is to avoid being dragged into a proxy war between its two main allies, Iran and the US.
Below is the full interview Wimmen gave Rudaw by email on Saturday.
Interview by Rebwar Qaremani
Rudaw: Syrian Kurdish forces have withdrawn from a strip along the Turkish border, according to officials of the People’s Protection Unites (YPG). However, it seems, key differences persist between Turkey and the US. Do you think the deal will survive in the long run, given the persisting disagreements between Washington and Ankara, the interconnection of Kurdish issues on both sides of the Syria-Turkey border, and the failure of the so-called Manbij roadmap? What are the key obstacles in the long term?
Heiko Wimmen: So far, there is not really a “deal”, there is a security arrangement between the US and Turkey which includes removal of YPG fortifications and heavy weaponry from defined border areas. But even if these military fixes work, they won’t amount to an agreement that could address Turkey’s national security concerns about the YPG (and by extension PKK) gaining political and military clout through controlling all of northeast Syria. As long as the YPG preserves its ties to the PKK and as long as the PKK is involved in an insurgency against the Turkish state, Ankara will continue to have a zero sum approach to YPG control over northeast Syria. However far they pull back their heavy weapons will not be far enough. Whatever the PYD/YPG/SDF do to show they are not PKK will not persuade Ankara. The deal may hold as long as the US is there, but the situation will almost certainly deteriorate once they pull out. So the current arrangement may gain time, but it cannot address the core problem.
What should the US and its western partners do to protect the US-Turkey deal in northeast Syria? And what would the failure of the deal entail for the US, Syrian Kurdish forces, and the security of the region?
The US and the international coalition should use their presence to nudge their Kurdish partners and Turkish allies towards confidence building measures that could pave the way to a resumption of political talks. The only way to stabilize the border in a sustainable fashion is by a gradual return to the peace process between the PKK and Turkey, starting with a unilateral ceasefire on the side of the PKK. There are signs from Qandil that this may be possible; whether Turkey will accept is less clear. The US must exhort its Kurdish partners to move in this direction, and its western partners/NATO allies should impress on Ankara to respond positively.
A failure of the deal, manifested in tensions/clashes between SDF/YPG and Turkish forces would lead the SDF to scale back its anti-ISIS efforts and move its forces north, away from the Euphrates valley. ISIS would be able to consolidate its insurgent presence there, and move closer to re-establishing territorial control in parts of the Deir ez-Zor countryside.
Two years after the Kurdistan independence referendum, Erbil and Baghdad relations seem to have improved. But they are still at odds over key longstanding issues, including KRG oil sales, the KRG’s share of the federal budget, and the disputed areas. What are the key initiatives that both sides should take in order to make progress in the talks?
The referendum has made it clear that there is strong support for independence in the KRI, while the aftermath has shown there is little outside support for it. Erbil found out that in an outright confrontation with Baghdad it can only lose, while by playing politics in Baghdad it can win allies that help avoid such a confrontation. This may be a good starting point for compromise. A good place to start (re)building trust and create win-win situations may be to negotiate security arrangements in the disputed areas.
The KRG has set up a committee tasked with dealing with the issue of the disputed areas and Article 140. Given the active ISIS presence in those areas and the security gaps created by the failure of Kurdish and Iraqi forces to coordinate, the situation in those areas is no longer a simply internal Kurdish-Iraqi issue, but rather a regional security problem. What should the local and international parties do to solve – or at least contain the outcomes of – such a complicated problem?
Coordinated security arrangements are essential to prevent a return of ISIS. They are also a good starting point to create win-win situations that can help to build trust. What should be avoided are zero-sum solutions and hard lines of demarcation between what supposedly belongs to Erbil and what to Baghdad, which can only destroy the mosaic of local communities and is liable to lead to violence. Rather, local government should be empowered, within a general move towards decentralization in all of Iraq, to give all communities present a fair share of meaningful power.
The KRG and the Iraqi government appear eager to reach an agreement regarding Kurdish oil exports and the KRG’s share of the budget. What are key factors at play to accelerate or slow down those talks?
The success of such talks will depend on the general state of relations between Erbil and Baghdad. It appears important though that the formulas that are adopted are properly institutionalized and not dependent on deals/understandings between specific politicians, and that proper mechanisms are agreed to implement them, as well as criteria that would call for changes (such as fluctuations in the price of oil, change in output capacity, agreements with foreign governments).
Bases and ammunition depots controlled by the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have been hit with explosions. Media reports, citing US and Middle Eastern sources, indicate Israel was involved. If Israel is found to be behind (at least some of) these attacks, what would its implications be for Iraq, US forces in Iraq, and the ongoing contained tensions between Washington and Tehran?
The consequences would be highly detrimental. Iraqi political forces that are already pushing for an end to the US presence and accuse Washington of collusion with Israel will feel vindicated and step up their campaign, potentially leading to the fall of the current Iraqi government. The intensity of the US-Iranian confrontation in Iraq and through Iraqi allies will increase.
What are Israel’s objectives in hitting pro-Iran Shiite militias in Iraq?
Israel has over years now conducted countless attacks against alleged Iranian entrenchment in Syria; it appears plausible that they would extend this campaign to cover Iraq as well. PM Netanyahu explicitly said Iran will not have immunity anywhere, giving a strong indication that this is happening. The most plausible explanation is that Israel wants to roll back Iran’s regional posture and power projection as much as possible as long as there is a US administration sympathetic to this goal.
The US withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran has put the whole region on alert. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has recently played down direct talks with his US counterpart Donald Trump. What are the local, regional, and international dynamics that could transform the current situation between Iran and the US and its regional allies?
Key regional players, such as the UAE, may realize that a prolonged US-Iran confrontation does not serve their interest, and may indeed pose an existential threat to their position and economic/political model. Russia may have the potential to deter US military action against Iran but has been reluctant to get involved. The Chinese position may be crucial: if China refuses to abide by US sanctions, their effect would be greatly reduced, yet it remains unclear whether Beijing wants to open yet another front with Washington.
On many occasions, the Iraqi government maintained its position to remain neutral in the US-Iran tensions, while keeping its strategic ties with both sides. Will Iraq be able to keep this on track in the long time? What will be the long-term impact of current US-Iran tensions on the security and politics of Iraq?
The approach to keep strategic ties with both sides is certainly smart, but if the US and Iran enter into an even sharper confrontation, it is difficult to see how it could hold up. The US presence in Iraq, and generally the relations between Baghdad and Washington would become a point of conflict in domestic politics that will be nearly impossible to bridge. The result is likely to be political stalemate and a paralysis of governance that may even open Iraq to new destabilization. Baghdad needs to clearly signal to Washington, as well as the members of the international coalition against ISIS, that such scenarios threaten to undermine the stability of Iraq, and with it the consolidation of the successes of the anti-ISIS campaign. Baghdad should also intensify the outreach to its Arab neighbors and diversify its economic relations to better avoid being hit by the fallout of the American “maximum pressure” approach, and balance Iranian influence in the country, which would also serve the interest of the US.
Wimmen says the only way to stabilize the security situation in the region is to involve the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and for Turkey to engage in a gradual return of the peace process, which collapsed in early 2015.
To begin with, the PKK should agree to a unilateral ceasefire, he says.
A former associate researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin, Wimmen believes a failure to resume talks will lead the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to pivot its focus away from fighting remnants of the Islamic State group (ISIS) and instead move its forces north.
This risks allowing a resurgence of ISIS in areas they had once controlled, Wimmen warns.
Concerning the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and its fractious relationship with Iraq’s federal government in Baghdad, Wimmen believes restoring security cooperation in the disputed territories would be a win-win situation for both sides that would prevent an ISIS resurgence.
He warned that Iraq’s top priority is to avoid being dragged into a proxy war between its two main allies, Iran and the US.
Below is the full interview Wimmen gave Rudaw by email on Saturday.
Interview by Rebwar Qaremani
Rudaw: Syrian Kurdish forces have withdrawn from a strip along the Turkish border, according to officials of the People’s Protection Unites (YPG). However, it seems, key differences persist between Turkey and the US. Do you think the deal will survive in the long run, given the persisting disagreements between Washington and Ankara, the interconnection of Kurdish issues on both sides of the Syria-Turkey border, and the failure of the so-called Manbij roadmap? What are the key obstacles in the long term?
Heiko Wimmen: So far, there is not really a “deal”, there is a security arrangement between the US and Turkey which includes removal of YPG fortifications and heavy weaponry from defined border areas. But even if these military fixes work, they won’t amount to an agreement that could address Turkey’s national security concerns about the YPG (and by extension PKK) gaining political and military clout through controlling all of northeast Syria. As long as the YPG preserves its ties to the PKK and as long as the PKK is involved in an insurgency against the Turkish state, Ankara will continue to have a zero sum approach to YPG control over northeast Syria. However far they pull back their heavy weapons will not be far enough. Whatever the PYD/YPG/SDF do to show they are not PKK will not persuade Ankara. The deal may hold as long as the US is there, but the situation will almost certainly deteriorate once they pull out. So the current arrangement may gain time, but it cannot address the core problem.
What should the US and its western partners do to protect the US-Turkey deal in northeast Syria? And what would the failure of the deal entail for the US, Syrian Kurdish forces, and the security of the region?
The US and the international coalition should use their presence to nudge their Kurdish partners and Turkish allies towards confidence building measures that could pave the way to a resumption of political talks. The only way to stabilize the border in a sustainable fashion is by a gradual return to the peace process between the PKK and Turkey, starting with a unilateral ceasefire on the side of the PKK. There are signs from Qandil that this may be possible; whether Turkey will accept is less clear. The US must exhort its Kurdish partners to move in this direction, and its western partners/NATO allies should impress on Ankara to respond positively.
A failure of the deal, manifested in tensions/clashes between SDF/YPG and Turkish forces would lead the SDF to scale back its anti-ISIS efforts and move its forces north, away from the Euphrates valley. ISIS would be able to consolidate its insurgent presence there, and move closer to re-establishing territorial control in parts of the Deir ez-Zor countryside.
Two years after the Kurdistan independence referendum, Erbil and Baghdad relations seem to have improved. But they are still at odds over key longstanding issues, including KRG oil sales, the KRG’s share of the federal budget, and the disputed areas. What are the key initiatives that both sides should take in order to make progress in the talks?
The referendum has made it clear that there is strong support for independence in the KRI, while the aftermath has shown there is little outside support for it. Erbil found out that in an outright confrontation with Baghdad it can only lose, while by playing politics in Baghdad it can win allies that help avoid such a confrontation. This may be a good starting point for compromise. A good place to start (re)building trust and create win-win situations may be to negotiate security arrangements in the disputed areas.
The KRG has set up a committee tasked with dealing with the issue of the disputed areas and Article 140. Given the active ISIS presence in those areas and the security gaps created by the failure of Kurdish and Iraqi forces to coordinate, the situation in those areas is no longer a simply internal Kurdish-Iraqi issue, but rather a regional security problem. What should the local and international parties do to solve – or at least contain the outcomes of – such a complicated problem?
Coordinated security arrangements are essential to prevent a return of ISIS. They are also a good starting point to create win-win situations that can help to build trust. What should be avoided are zero-sum solutions and hard lines of demarcation between what supposedly belongs to Erbil and what to Baghdad, which can only destroy the mosaic of local communities and is liable to lead to violence. Rather, local government should be empowered, within a general move towards decentralization in all of Iraq, to give all communities present a fair share of meaningful power.
The KRG and the Iraqi government appear eager to reach an agreement regarding Kurdish oil exports and the KRG’s share of the budget. What are key factors at play to accelerate or slow down those talks?
The success of such talks will depend on the general state of relations between Erbil and Baghdad. It appears important though that the formulas that are adopted are properly institutionalized and not dependent on deals/understandings between specific politicians, and that proper mechanisms are agreed to implement them, as well as criteria that would call for changes (such as fluctuations in the price of oil, change in output capacity, agreements with foreign governments).
Bases and ammunition depots controlled by the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have been hit with explosions. Media reports, citing US and Middle Eastern sources, indicate Israel was involved. If Israel is found to be behind (at least some of) these attacks, what would its implications be for Iraq, US forces in Iraq, and the ongoing contained tensions between Washington and Tehran?
The consequences would be highly detrimental. Iraqi political forces that are already pushing for an end to the US presence and accuse Washington of collusion with Israel will feel vindicated and step up their campaign, potentially leading to the fall of the current Iraqi government. The intensity of the US-Iranian confrontation in Iraq and through Iraqi allies will increase.
What are Israel’s objectives in hitting pro-Iran Shiite militias in Iraq?
Israel has over years now conducted countless attacks against alleged Iranian entrenchment in Syria; it appears plausible that they would extend this campaign to cover Iraq as well. PM Netanyahu explicitly said Iran will not have immunity anywhere, giving a strong indication that this is happening. The most plausible explanation is that Israel wants to roll back Iran’s regional posture and power projection as much as possible as long as there is a US administration sympathetic to this goal.
The US withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran has put the whole region on alert. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has recently played down direct talks with his US counterpart Donald Trump. What are the local, regional, and international dynamics that could transform the current situation between Iran and the US and its regional allies?
Key regional players, such as the UAE, may realize that a prolonged US-Iran confrontation does not serve their interest, and may indeed pose an existential threat to their position and economic/political model. Russia may have the potential to deter US military action against Iran but has been reluctant to get involved. The Chinese position may be crucial: if China refuses to abide by US sanctions, their effect would be greatly reduced, yet it remains unclear whether Beijing wants to open yet another front with Washington.
On many occasions, the Iraqi government maintained its position to remain neutral in the US-Iran tensions, while keeping its strategic ties with both sides. Will Iraq be able to keep this on track in the long time? What will be the long-term impact of current US-Iran tensions on the security and politics of Iraq?
The approach to keep strategic ties with both sides is certainly smart, but if the US and Iran enter into an even sharper confrontation, it is difficult to see how it could hold up. The US presence in Iraq, and generally the relations between Baghdad and Washington would become a point of conflict in domestic politics that will be nearly impossible to bridge. The result is likely to be political stalemate and a paralysis of governance that may even open Iraq to new destabilization. Baghdad needs to clearly signal to Washington, as well as the members of the international coalition against ISIS, that such scenarios threaten to undermine the stability of Iraq, and with it the consolidation of the successes of the anti-ISIS campaign. Baghdad should also intensify the outreach to its Arab neighbors and diversify its economic relations to better avoid being hit by the fallout of the American “maximum pressure” approach, and balance Iranian influence in the country, which would also serve the interest of the US.