No alternative to Sharaa in Syria, says US analyst

WASHINGTON DC - Washington is working to make sure that Syria's interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa will not become like ousted dictator Bashar al-Assad because there is no other alternative, according to an American analyst and former US special envoy to Syria.

“[I]f I were advising the US government, I would say two things. One is Ahmed al-Sharaa is more trustworthy than any other potential leader of a united Syria. That's the first thing. And two, we really don't have an alternative,” James Jeffrey told Rudaw on Thursday. 

It is "absolutely important that Syria be a unified, peaceful, prosperous state in the center of the Middle East, and that right now, we see no alternative to working with the rest of the international community to ensure that Mr. al-Sharaa becomes a winner, not a loser, not a second Assad. Yes, that's where our policy is,” he added.

Jeffrey, who served as Washington’s special envoy for the US-led global coalition against the Islamic State (ISIS) from 2019 to 2020, also noted that the US expects the new government in Damascus to work with them in the fight against ISIS. 

"We expect Syria to have military forces that will cooperate with us in the fight against the Islamic State. That has long been the case with the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] forces. That is increasingly the case with forces that al-Sharaa commands and controls. And we want to see cooperation between these forces in the short-term, in the common fight against the Islamic State," the former ambassador stated. 

Jeffrey also said that there should be no partitioning of Syria, and that the example of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is not viable in Syria’s Kurdish-administered northeast.

The following is the full transcript of the interview with James jeffrey:

Rudaw: Let’s start with Iraq. The US and Iraq are entering a new phase in their security relationship. In your view, what should be the main pillars of this partnership moving forward?
 
James Jeffrey: The main pillar should be the national interests of both countries. Iraq wants desperately to reintegrate into the larger world, emerging from 20 years of war and too much dependency on Iran — the United States is the doorway to that. The United States, on the other hand, wants to have a good relationship with one of the most important countries in the region. As everybody knows, with four million barrels of oil a day, it's the second largest exporter in OPEC. It also has a large educated population, and the United States has deep security and other ties with the Iraqi people since the time of [former dictator] Saddam [Hussein]'s overthrow, and, of course, with the people of the north even earlier. 

As Iraq is proceeding with this security dialogue, they are looking to have a smaller US footprint in Iraq. Do you think that the Iraqi government is fully prepared to assume responsibility for its internal security without having a substantial US footprint on the ground? 

Well, remember, this footprint has given up its combat mission. It's basically in a training and equipping and intelligence sharing mode. We can do this with very few troops under US military command. In addition, as we did from 2011 to 2014, we can do this through the embassy. The embassy has what's called an office of defense cooperation, security cooperation, which has had a general in charge of it, reporting to the ambassador, as well as to the US military, that can do training and equipping, and it has a defense attaché’s office.  So even if the US military units, as units leave, there will still be a security relationship. In addition, as we saw in 2014, if Iraq is threatened by some sort of outside invasion, the United States is likely to return — I'm absolutely convinced it will.

So then, how should the Trump administration reconcile its desire to reduce its overseas commitment with the ongoing need to counter ISIS remnants and also to contain the Iranian influence in Iraq?

Well, most of our action against ISIS [Islamic State] is being done in Syria, and we need some support out of Iraq at the moment, although we could also support it out of Jordan or Türkiye. And in terms of Iranian influence, that's basically a diplomatic issue, not a military issue. If Iran uses military force against us or our partners and friends, we will respond militarily. But the Iranian threat to Iraq is in your parliament, it's in the Hashd al-Shaabi, it is in the control that Iran exercises illegitimately over electricity and gas and Iraq's decisions in that regard.

Do you think that the Iraqi government or the future government can rein in these groups and reduce the influence of Iran in their country?
 
We certainly are happy with some of the decisions Prime Minister [Mohammed Shia’] al-Sudani has taken, including pulling back a recent law that would further deepen the role of the Hashd al-Shaabi in the Iraqi state. And we're willing to, if he is reelected, give him every opportunity to continue to broaden and deepen the relationship between Iraq and the outside world, that's what's important.

So as Iraq and the United States are trying to shape their security partnership in the future, how central are the Peshmerga forces in that security partnership, especially as the United States wants to reduce its direct military presence in Iraq?

Well, once again, we will have a security relationship with all of our partners in Iraq and the Peshmerga and the Kurdistan Regional Government are among the important partners. And we have had a relationship with them since well before 2003, in the 1990s with Operation Northern Watch. The United States will maintain its consulate. It will maintain its security work with the Peshmerga, and importantly, it will monitor very closely any increase in ISIS activity anywhere in Iraq. We have a common interest with all Iraqis to smash ISIS if it returns.

So, as you mentioned, the Kurdish Peshmerga and the KRG have a long history with the United States, since 1991. And even before that, there were some connections between the Kurdish revolutionary people and the US. So, do you expect the Trump administration will maintain the support for the Kurdish Peshmerga forces beyond the security partnership? As you know, there's a memorandum between these two, the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Pentagon. And this memorandum is set to expire by September next year.  

I have no doubt that the United States will maintain a security relationship. I am fairly confident it will be with this memorandum or a new version of it. But there can be other tools as well. The important thing is whether or not we have a force presence in Erbil or elsewhere in Iraq, or whether we do this through the embassy and the military personnel assigned to the embassy. Whether we do it with this memorandum or a new memorandum, that support, I am sure, will continue because it is in the interest of Iraq, of the Kurdistan Regional Government, of the United States, and the people of the entire region to have a security relationship with one of the more stabilizing forces in the region, which is the Kurdistan Regional Government.
 
So, do you expect that even if this memorandum is set to expire, then there will be a new memorandum, or they will try to have a sort of connection with the Peshmerga through the Iraqi government?

I am very confident there is great support in Congress for that kind of support. Again, the Trump administration is interested in not being bogged down with large numbers of forces. These forces are not large in Iraq and Syria, there are a few thousand at most, and they can be reduced further. We are a military with our reserves of 2.1 million troops.

So, I will ask one more question on Iraq, then jump into Syria. As you know, Iraq is heading into an election by the end of this year. So, what do you expect from this election? What coalition do you expect will be formed after the election, and how should the United States interpret this election? Is it an opportunity to reset its relations with Iraq, or is it a challenge for its long time or long-term interest in that region?

I don't predict election outcomes before they occur. I would say that the United States is ready to work with whoever is elected. If whoever is elected wants to continue and expand the kind of close relations we've had with Mr. al-Sudani, that's good. If they want to go in another direction, as we've seen with other Iraqi prime ministers, that's not so good from our standpoint, but we would argue it's not so good from Iraq's standpoint. And again, we will work with whoever is in charge, because a good American-Iraqi relationship, a good relationship between Americans and the Kurdistan Regional Government, are in the interests of Iraqis, of Americans and everybody in the region.

Does the United States have any concerns about Iranian influence or interfering in this election?

I don't know about specifically the election. We are unhappy about Iranian influence, particularly illegitimate influence through the Hashd al-Shaabi and through other mechanisms everywhere in Iraq and beyond Iraq.

So let's talk about Syria. You've worked on Syria, you have good insights about Syria. With a Syria led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, what's the main objective of the United States in pushing the Kurds to integrate with a centralized government in Damascus?

Well, first of all, there cannot be a separate set of entities inside Syria that will open the door to further war. Even the kind of autonomy that the Kurdistan Regional Government has in Iraq, that has historical precedence in an international climate that is different than in Syria. Most importantly, Kurdistan Regional Government has had pretty close relations with Ankara for well before 2003. Mr. [Jalal] Talabani and Mr. [Masoud] Barzani, coordinating with me, used to visit the leadership in Ankara in the 1990s for example. You do not have that same positive relationship between the SDF and Ankara — there is tension, there has been some violence, and it stems from the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] background of the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces].

So then, what is the US interest in that? This is the Turkish interest, that they don't want to have a semi-autonomous region in that region. Then, what is the US interest? Is that not aligned with the US interests for having a decentralized government in Syria?

The US does not make decisions normally on whether you have an autonomous regional system like you have in the United States and Germany, or a centralized system like you have in Britain or France — that's for the people of Syria to decide. And the people of Syria seem to be working that out. We are in contact with everybody involved. Syrians in Damascus, people in the northeast, they have a roadmap that was signed on the 10th of March between General Mazloum [Abdi, SDF chief] and President al-Sharaa. They’re working through it. There are disagreements, that's normal. The United States is supportive of everyone.

The United States does not dictate the negotiation between Damascus and Kurds in Syria?
 
That's exactly correct.
 
The Kurds are governing this region for decades. It's not an autonomous administration that only represents the Kurds, but there are other entities, other minorities that are represented by the autonomous administration. So why are they concerned about integrating with the central government when even their closest supporter or ally like the US encourages them to do that?
 
Well, first of all, we see, like it or not, nation states as the basic building blocks, blocks of security, stability and diplomatic engagement in the region. We're very reluctant to encourage autonomous zones within countries. We have seen that, and particularly in the case of Syria, lead to fighting. We don't want to see that. The other question is the attitude of the neighbors. Neither Iraq nor Türkiye want to see an autonomous northeast Syria zone. So as those are the two neighbors of the autonomous northeast Syria zone, it's hard to see in practical terms how it would function if it has two countries on its borders who really are going to look to Damascus, not to Qamishli or some other place, as their basic interlocutor. That, again, was not the case with Türkiye.
 
You've worked on the region, so do you think that a decentralized or federalism system is a viable solution for Syria? Or do you think that the United States is expecting too much from the Kurds and also the minorities and Damascus to accept centralization?

I think, as a general rule — but I'm very cautious about advocating that rule — but as a general rule, local administration, electing mayors, electing local judges, or selecting local judges and local security forces tend to promote stability. And in addition, every group in a society, be they Druze, be they Christian, be they Turkmen, be they Alawite, be they Kurd, should have a say in the overall functioning of a country. That is, it should be a country that represents all of the people. Those are basic principles that we have in our own constitution and we have seen work around the world. Now, how the Syrian people implement that is a question for all of the Syrian people to come together on. 

So, you said that the United States is not dictating these negotiations between the two entities, so do you think that the United States can realistically mediate between the Kurdish demand for autonomy and Arab nationalists as they see decentralized Syria as a threat to their territorial integrity?

At the end of the day, the United States will let the Syrian people take whatever decision they want to take, but we do this in recognition of the fact that the United States is not going to militarily defend any area, nor does it see much support from the neighboring countries to a decentralized Syria with the exception the Israelis have extended some support for the Druze. But as you know, the United States has expressed some concern about that.

So, it's true that the United States will let the people of that region make their decision, but if we look into the history, the United States always keeps their interest in the region. And if we look into the history of Syria in 1950 and then after the Baathist party came to power, the United States tried to have some covert operation to make sure that the people who were in charge, or were ruling the country, were aligned with the United States. So if the al-Sharaa, or if the transitional government fails to reach a durable agreement with the Kurds and with the Druze and with other minorities, is there a US contingency plan, or should we look for uncertainty?

In particular with this administration, read Donald Trump's speech in Riyadh back in May, the United States is not going to intervene in domestic affairs. However, it is our position that we and the rest of the international community want a close relationship with a stable Syria at peace. We do not want to see a return of the 2011-2024 period. And reconciliation between all elements of Syrian society is a prerequisite for that kind of stability, and thus a prerequisite for a good relationship with the United States, with Arab countries, with Türkiye, with Israel, with Europe and with the UN. That is the position that we're taking, be it with our friends in the northeast, be it with our friends in Damascus.

Then what do you envision for Kurdish forces post-Assad in Syria? Can they still remain as a core partner of the United States without deepening tensions with Turkey and with regional actors in the Middle East?
 
We expect Syria to have military forces that will cooperate with us in the fight against the Islamic State. That has long been the case with the SDF forces. That is increasingly the case with forces that al-Sharaa commands and controls. And we want to see cooperation between these forces in the short-term, in the common fight against the Islamic State. And we have proposed, from military channels, some ways to do that. Over the long term, how do you integrate other units? I know in Iraq, it's very complicated. There are Peshmerga brigades that are part of the Iraqi army. There are Peshmerga brigades that are part of the local security of the Kurdistan Regional Government, and then there are Asayish forces and others. It all depends on the local circumstances and talking it out among the various parties. That's what happened in Iraq.
 
Do you think that the US policy decision makers learned a lesson from Iraq and they don't want to repeat the same policies they pursued after 2003, they don't want to repeat the same things in Syria?

We think that the current Iraqi situation is a good situation for stability, progress and prosperity in Iraq, and we're proud of all of our contributions. We do not think that that is a model that we would want to extend to any other country, without looking at what the people of that country believe in and want and the specific circumstances. So I would be careful there.

Just staying on Syria, how do you envision the future of the Syrian state? We've seen there were tensions and skirmishes between the fighters belonging to Damascus and with the Druze, and with Alawites, and the Kurds have the same fear. So, does the United States fully trust Ahmed al-Sharaa, are they still testing him, or do they expect him to change his behavior?

Well, I can't speak for the US government. I would say that, if I were advising the US government, I would say two things. One is Ahmed al-Sharaa is more trustworthy than any other potential leader of a united Syria. That's the first thing. And two, we really don't have an alternative? Do we?

This is a question for US policy and decision makers and analysts. Do you think…

No. What I'm saying is, as an analyst, I do not think the US has an alternative.

So, this was the best option for the United States?
 
I think this is the best option for the United States.

And then as an analyst, do you think that this will create a headache for the United States in the future? For example, the United States does not have good relations with nationalists. Sharaa is not pro-West. It's true that he's not pro-other countries, but he's not pro-West. He's not pro-American and his past was witness to that. So, do you think that relying on Ahmed al-Sharaa will protect US national security interests in the future?

Well, you said, will we have headaches? I can assure you, we will have headaches with Syria. We have headaches with Israel bombing Doha last week. We have headaches with decisions that our friends in Britain are taking on recognizing Palestine, even though they're hosting Donald Trump. Headaches does not determine a relationship. What we think is that it is absolutely important that Syria be a unified, peaceful, prosperous state in the center of the Middle East, and that right now, we see no alternative to working with the rest of the international community to ensure that Mr. al-Sharaa becomes a winner, not a loser, not a second Assad. Yes, that's where our policy is.

Then how do you see the regional actor’s role in Syria, like Israel and Turkey? Do you think that they will lead Syria into a more destabilized state?

That's a very good point. I think, from my own experience with Syria, that the most important thing is not the policy of one or more states towards Syria, but the unity of policy. That is, if the Arab states, if Türkiye, if Israel, if Europe, if the UN and if the United States have the same set of policies, Russia and Iran are a bit of outliers. Then I am convinced, even if those policies are not the best in the world, given the power, the economic, the military, the diplomatic power of all of those centers of policy, that Syria will move more or less in the right direction. So far, we have that unity. Limited exception is Israel, but you note that Israel is negotiating very, very intensively with the al-Sharaa government, and over the last several days, the al-Sharaa government has indicated, without denial by Israel, that they're close to agreement. So I think we're in a good place in terms of the international community working with the al-Sharaa government.

So how do you see the current administration’s policy towards the Middle East and especially Iraq and Syria? Do you think they have a long-term strategic policy towards that region, or they are reacting to the events that are happening on the ground?

Every administration reacts to events on the ground, but every administration also has a long-term view, given the geostrategic transportation position in the Middle East at the center of the world — think of the Dardanelles, think of the Suez Canal, think of the Red Sea, think of what the Houthis are doing to the Red Sea, think of the Strait of Hormuz, think of the oil exports and gas exports from the region, think of the six countries or seven countries that have tried to get nuclear weapons, think of the scourge of terrorism, the mass flood of refugees that the region has generated — it's important for many reasons. What the United States is trying to do is to reduce the cost and size of our commitment while maintaining, through, with and by our partners, a stable, secure, peaceful Middle East. Why can't the Middle East look like South America? There are some problems in South America, the [Nicolas] Maduro government in Venezuela, but there's 30 countries in South America. Most of them, you know, have poor to middling governments, and they have disagreements with each other. But we have nothing like the drama of the Middle East, and we have nothing like the American military presence in the Middle East and South America. So that's our goal, and I think we're working towards it.