Analysis: Troubles ahead for Baghdad's unity government
ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - Confirmation of the final ministerial nominees has given Iraq a complete government for the first time since 2010, a delayed development for which the United States and other allies had been pressing.
They see a unified government, with representatives of all Iraq’s three major communities - Shia, Sunni and Kurds - as vital to stabilizing the fractured country and confronting the threat from Islamic State. Many states in the anti-ISIS coalition regard the establishment of a functioning government as a condition for helping the Iraqi military.
John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, singled out the appointment of defence and interior ministers to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s government as a particularly “positive step”.
However, analysts believe these same appointments on Saturday could actually exacerbate tensions, as well as signal an even greater influence of Iran in Baghdad’s affairs.
The Iraqi Parliament’s approved Muhammad Salim al-Ghaban as interior minister and Khaled al-Obaydi as defense minister, two potentially divisive figures who will hold the two key security portfolios. They were posts that Nouri al-Maliki, the outgoing prime minister, had kept for himself.
These candidates were chosen as a compromise after weeks of heated debate over the critical posts.
Al-Ghaban is a member of the powerful Shia Badr Organization, a political movement with one of the strongest militias in the country. Badr’s firebrand leader, Hadi al-Ameri, was originally up for the position, but he was forcefully rejected by a wide variety of Iraqi and international actors including the United States, who see him as a dangerous ideologue beholden to Iran.
New defense minister Al-Obaydi, by contrast, is a moderate Sunni from Mosul and former general in Saddam Hussein’s army. He is very close to Vice President Usama al-Nujaifi and his brother Atheel, the governor of Nineveh province, both of whom are members of the Mutahidun political bloc. The Mutahidun advocate stronger federal independence for a Sunni federal state.
Yet the appearance of balance across sectarian lines is misleading.
Prime Minister Abadi, who hails from the same Shia political party as al-Maliki, will have the final say on many military matters, giving him broader controls over defense forces than the minister himself. This might place the government closer than ever to Shia militia groups.
“There is no difference in substance having al-Ghaban instead of al-Ameri,” says Kirk Sowell, the editor of Inside Iraqi Politics newsletter. “The optics are better, but in substance there is no difference. Every person in this organization obeys Ameri, who works for Iran, and now controls Iraq's national police force.”
The prime minister’s first foreign trip since the full cabinet was confirmed will be to Iran on October 20 for talks on Baghdad's battle against ISIS.
Al-Abadi needs the Badr Organization both because of their military prowess and their popularity.
The Badr Organization was created in 1982 by exiled Shia Iraqis living in Iran, opponents of Saddam Hussein who were funded and trained by their host. Since their return to Iraq in 2003, the group stands foremost among the Shia militias, who have played a major role in fighting ISIS since several divisions of the Iraqi army crumbled in June. After this spectacular failure, Badr and other militias command more loyalty amongst Iraq’s majority Shia population than does the military.
Appointing a Badr member was politically expedient for al-Abadi, especially after ISIS forces killed Badr parliamentarian Ahmad al-Khafaji in a suicide bombing at a checkpoint in Baghdad last week.
Although al-Abadi was reluctant to offer the Badr Organization a top security portfolio, a compromise was necessary to reassure international partners that Iraq could build a government.
“Al-Abadi used a charm offensive to achieve a general consensus…The priority was to fill the positions and demonstrate unity to the outside world,” says Dlawer Ala-Aldeen, head of the Middle East Research Institute in Erbil.
By filling the positions, Abadi marked a departure from al-Maliki’s practice of ‘deputizing’ for absent ministers or vacant positions, which allowed him to concentrate the power of key ministries (including defense and interior) in his own hands.
Ala-Aldeen insists that having Badr run the interior ministry rather than defense ministry was crucial. Having them command the police was far from ideal: the last time a Badr member held the interior post was in 2005-2006, in the lead up to full-scale sectarian civil war. At the time Badr death squads acted with impunity and were accused of murdering thousands of Sunnis.
But the current arrangement is the lesser of two evils, preventing the “nightmare scenario” of having a Badr member command Iraq’s army and air force.
“For the U.S. strategy, it was more important for the task of rebuilding the military to be out of the hands of militias, and away from direct influence of Iran,” he said.
Iraq’s first complete government in four years will now be tested by a series of crises: a war against a ISIS at the gates of Baghdad; a treasury depleted by years of war and mismanagement; and a conflict with the Kurdistan Regional Government, which issued a series of demands in Baghdad including more autonomy and $8 billion of unpaid budget transfers.
The Kurdish bloc, having withdrawn from government for weeks, rejoined the cabinet by confirming several new positions on Saturday, including longtime foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari as finance minister.
“The Iraqi PM cannot now blame the Kurds for not being forthcoming. Serious discussions must begin in earnest,” Ala-Aldeen says. “Mr. Zebari’s presence in the finance ministry will contribute to reducing tensions and will ensure engagement, but it’s too early to see how effective any of the Kurdish ministers will be in solving the KRG-Baghdad crisis.”
As finance minister, Mr. Zebari will face an uphill battle. He has little authority of his own, deriving power from the prime minister’s good will, the cooperation of the cabinet and the resources available to him.
At the moment, these resources are severely limited. Al-Maliki wrecked the country’s finances before departing as Prime Minister, and the costs of war—on top of lost revenue from the lowest oil prices in years—are plunging the country into deficit.
“The government has been portrayed as fragmented and weak,” Ala-Aldeen says. “Now there are no excuses for various political groups not to play more active role in making the government work.”
They see a unified government, with representatives of all Iraq’s three major communities - Shia, Sunni and Kurds - as vital to stabilizing the fractured country and confronting the threat from Islamic State. Many states in the anti-ISIS coalition regard the establishment of a functioning government as a condition for helping the Iraqi military.
John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, singled out the appointment of defence and interior ministers to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s government as a particularly “positive step”.
However, analysts believe these same appointments on Saturday could actually exacerbate tensions, as well as signal an even greater influence of Iran in Baghdad’s affairs.
The Iraqi Parliament’s approved Muhammad Salim al-Ghaban as interior minister and Khaled al-Obaydi as defense minister, two potentially divisive figures who will hold the two key security portfolios. They were posts that Nouri al-Maliki, the outgoing prime minister, had kept for himself.
These candidates were chosen as a compromise after weeks of heated debate over the critical posts.
Al-Ghaban is a member of the powerful Shia Badr Organization, a political movement with one of the strongest militias in the country. Badr’s firebrand leader, Hadi al-Ameri, was originally up for the position, but he was forcefully rejected by a wide variety of Iraqi and international actors including the United States, who see him as a dangerous ideologue beholden to Iran.
New defense minister Al-Obaydi, by contrast, is a moderate Sunni from Mosul and former general in Saddam Hussein’s army. He is very close to Vice President Usama al-Nujaifi and his brother Atheel, the governor of Nineveh province, both of whom are members of the Mutahidun political bloc. The Mutahidun advocate stronger federal independence for a Sunni federal state.
Yet the appearance of balance across sectarian lines is misleading.
Prime Minister Abadi, who hails from the same Shia political party as al-Maliki, will have the final say on many military matters, giving him broader controls over defense forces than the minister himself. This might place the government closer than ever to Shia militia groups.
“There is no difference in substance having al-Ghaban instead of al-Ameri,” says Kirk Sowell, the editor of Inside Iraqi Politics newsletter. “The optics are better, but in substance there is no difference. Every person in this organization obeys Ameri, who works for Iran, and now controls Iraq's national police force.”
The prime minister’s first foreign trip since the full cabinet was confirmed will be to Iran on October 20 for talks on Baghdad's battle against ISIS.
Al-Abadi needs the Badr Organization both because of their military prowess and their popularity.
The Badr Organization was created in 1982 by exiled Shia Iraqis living in Iran, opponents of Saddam Hussein who were funded and trained by their host. Since their return to Iraq in 2003, the group stands foremost among the Shia militias, who have played a major role in fighting ISIS since several divisions of the Iraqi army crumbled in June. After this spectacular failure, Badr and other militias command more loyalty amongst Iraq’s majority Shia population than does the military.
Appointing a Badr member was politically expedient for al-Abadi, especially after ISIS forces killed Badr parliamentarian Ahmad al-Khafaji in a suicide bombing at a checkpoint in Baghdad last week.
Although al-Abadi was reluctant to offer the Badr Organization a top security portfolio, a compromise was necessary to reassure international partners that Iraq could build a government.
“Al-Abadi used a charm offensive to achieve a general consensus…The priority was to fill the positions and demonstrate unity to the outside world,” says Dlawer Ala-Aldeen, head of the Middle East Research Institute in Erbil.
By filling the positions, Abadi marked a departure from al-Maliki’s practice of ‘deputizing’ for absent ministers or vacant positions, which allowed him to concentrate the power of key ministries (including defense and interior) in his own hands.
Ala-Aldeen insists that having Badr run the interior ministry rather than defense ministry was crucial. Having them command the police was far from ideal: the last time a Badr member held the interior post was in 2005-2006, in the lead up to full-scale sectarian civil war. At the time Badr death squads acted with impunity and were accused of murdering thousands of Sunnis.
But the current arrangement is the lesser of two evils, preventing the “nightmare scenario” of having a Badr member command Iraq’s army and air force.
“For the U.S. strategy, it was more important for the task of rebuilding the military to be out of the hands of militias, and away from direct influence of Iran,” he said.
Iraq’s first complete government in four years will now be tested by a series of crises: a war against a ISIS at the gates of Baghdad; a treasury depleted by years of war and mismanagement; and a conflict with the Kurdistan Regional Government, which issued a series of demands in Baghdad including more autonomy and $8 billion of unpaid budget transfers.
The Kurdish bloc, having withdrawn from government for weeks, rejoined the cabinet by confirming several new positions on Saturday, including longtime foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari as finance minister.
“The Iraqi PM cannot now blame the Kurds for not being forthcoming. Serious discussions must begin in earnest,” Ala-Aldeen says. “Mr. Zebari’s presence in the finance ministry will contribute to reducing tensions and will ensure engagement, but it’s too early to see how effective any of the Kurdish ministers will be in solving the KRG-Baghdad crisis.”
As finance minister, Mr. Zebari will face an uphill battle. He has little authority of his own, deriving power from the prime minister’s good will, the cooperation of the cabinet and the resources available to him.
At the moment, these resources are severely limited. Al-Maliki wrecked the country’s finances before departing as Prime Minister, and the costs of war—on top of lost revenue from the lowest oil prices in years—are plunging the country into deficit.
“The government has been portrayed as fragmented and weak,” Ala-Aldeen says. “Now there are no excuses for various political groups not to play more active role in making the government work.”