West of the Euphrates: The renewed potential of a Turkish intervention in northern Syria
Shortly after the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) coalition seized the Tishreen Dam from Islamic State (ISIS) on Saturday they advanced a reported 2km west of the Euphrates River in the midst of clashes with the terrorist group. The dam’s capture is a significant victory. It puts the SDF in a position to further pressure the group’s stronghold Raqqa as well as cut off ISIS members who are to the west of the Euphrates. How far they advance from here will be very telling.
Shortly after this latest battle the Turkish military rejected reports that Turkish tanks had crossed the porous Syrian border near Qamishli to establish a small buffer-zone there. Given the fact that the Syrian Kurdish Peoples Protection Units (YPG) are the prevailing force within the SDF their crossing of the Euphrates has violated Turkey’s “red-line” in Syria, meaning Kurds should not cross the Azaz-Jarablus line. This is the only part of the Syrian border that is left open to Turkey after the YPG successfully kicked ISIS out of Gire Spi (Tal Abyad) over the summer and, in doing so, closed off all of Turkey’s northeastern border to ISIS.
While ISIS maintains a presence in the Syrian border-city of Jarablus the Turks have not yet made any moves against them. They are against the YPG crossing the Euphrates from Kobani to clear out that town and have deterred with tank fire any attempts by them to cross. The Tishreen Dam is much further south and out of range of Turkish artillery fire. If the SDF were to advance on Jarablus they may do so from the south as opposed to over the Euphrates from the east.
Turkey has yet to close off the northwestern border with Syria. More likely than not because it is vital for its continued support to other Islamist groups and Turkmen who are fighting the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. Efforts to close the border could see many supply lines to these groups severed. Something the Russians have been trying to do since they stepped up their bombing of that area following the November 24 downing of their jet by Turkey.
While the Turks and Americans would love to have a non-Kurdish force clear ISIS from the border area they have yet to find one to work with. And while the Turkey has long been hesitant about sending in ground forces on its own an imminent SDF presence coming from the south into the Azaz-Jarablus line could potentially spark a Turkish intervention. Such an intervention would also enable the Turks to set up their long sought after buffer-zone as well as more actively back the Islamist groups it is supporting in Syria, namely the Jaish al-Fatah group who the Russians have been bombing in Idilb and elsewhere for weeks now.
However the main obstacle and deterrent to such an action would be the increased likelihood of further escalating tensions with the Russians and risking another lethally dangerous clash. Which is why any Turkish intervention would likely be very ad-hoc and would see limited numbers of Turkish troops hugging the border, likely advancing a short few miles at best. Its primary motivation for doing so would likely be to save face after many highly publicized Turkish debacles; from the aforementioned jet shoot-down to the recent diplomatic tussle with Iraq over the Turkish troop deployment near Mosul. Having a Kurdish-majority military force advance further along Syria’s frontier with Turkey in light of these debacles would likely prove to be too much for the current government in Ankara, prompting it to act forcefully. How, exactly it will choose to act is really anyone’s guess.
Shortly after this latest battle the Turkish military rejected reports that Turkish tanks had crossed the porous Syrian border near Qamishli to establish a small buffer-zone there. Given the fact that the Syrian Kurdish Peoples Protection Units (YPG) are the prevailing force within the SDF their crossing of the Euphrates has violated Turkey’s “red-line” in Syria, meaning Kurds should not cross the Azaz-Jarablus line. This is the only part of the Syrian border that is left open to Turkey after the YPG successfully kicked ISIS out of Gire Spi (Tal Abyad) over the summer and, in doing so, closed off all of Turkey’s northeastern border to ISIS.
While ISIS maintains a presence in the Syrian border-city of Jarablus the Turks have not yet made any moves against them. They are against the YPG crossing the Euphrates from Kobani to clear out that town and have deterred with tank fire any attempts by them to cross. The Tishreen Dam is much further south and out of range of Turkish artillery fire. If the SDF were to advance on Jarablus they may do so from the south as opposed to over the Euphrates from the east.
Turkey has yet to close off the northwestern border with Syria. More likely than not because it is vital for its continued support to other Islamist groups and Turkmen who are fighting the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. Efforts to close the border could see many supply lines to these groups severed. Something the Russians have been trying to do since they stepped up their bombing of that area following the November 24 downing of their jet by Turkey.
While the Turks and Americans would love to have a non-Kurdish force clear ISIS from the border area they have yet to find one to work with. And while the Turkey has long been hesitant about sending in ground forces on its own an imminent SDF presence coming from the south into the Azaz-Jarablus line could potentially spark a Turkish intervention. Such an intervention would also enable the Turks to set up their long sought after buffer-zone as well as more actively back the Islamist groups it is supporting in Syria, namely the Jaish al-Fatah group who the Russians have been bombing in Idilb and elsewhere for weeks now.
However the main obstacle and deterrent to such an action would be the increased likelihood of further escalating tensions with the Russians and risking another lethally dangerous clash. Which is why any Turkish intervention would likely be very ad-hoc and would see limited numbers of Turkish troops hugging the border, likely advancing a short few miles at best. Its primary motivation for doing so would likely be to save face after many highly publicized Turkish debacles; from the aforementioned jet shoot-down to the recent diplomatic tussle with Iraq over the Turkish troop deployment near Mosul. Having a Kurdish-majority military force advance further along Syria’s frontier with Turkey in light of these debacles would likely prove to be too much for the current government in Ankara, prompting it to act forcefully. How, exactly it will choose to act is really anyone’s guess.