Iran faces new wave of protests as economic crisis deepens

Iran is facing a new wave of protests driven by soaring inflation, the dramatic devaluation of the country’s currency, the rial, and deepening poverty. Unlike the 2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests, which were sparked by social repression and began in Iran’s peripheral regions of Kurdistan and Balochistan, this round of protests erupted in Tehran and was initiated by shopkeepers of the main bazaar—historically influential actors who played a decisive role in the 1979 revolution that brought down Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
 
Despite the resignation of the governor of Iran’s central bank, Mohammad Reza Farzin, demonstrations have continued for a fifth consecutive day and are rapidly spreading to major cities, including Isfahan, Shiraz, and Kermanshah, as well as to universities across the country. According to figures attributed to Saderat Bank, more than 70 percent of Iranians now live below the poverty line. Iran’s middle class has effectively disappeared, leaving behind a polarized society dominated by a large impoverished majority and a small, extremely wealthy elite.
 
The country’s social fabric is fraying, its economy is in free fall, and its political institutions are steadily falling as well. In an effort to contain the unrest, authorities declared Wednesday a public holiday—officially citing cold weather—and replaced the head of the central bank. For now, the government appears to be exercising restraint to limit international backlash. However, as protests expand and slogans evolve from “Death to inflation” to explicitly political chants such as “Death to the Islamic Republic” and “Death to the dictator,” a harsher crackdown appears increasingly likely.
 
Historically, repression has not deterred popular mobilization in Iran. As casualties rise, demonstrators are expected to continue taking to the streets, prolonging an already intense confrontation between society and the state.
 
Alternatives
 
Mass movements inevitably generate leadership, yet many of Iran’s most prominent figures remain imprisoned or silenced. Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi is held in Evin Prison, while influential cultural figures such as rapper Toomaj Salehi and actress Taraneh Alidoosti, along with labor unions and Kurdish organizations such Kurdistan Teachers’ Union, have emerged as key voices within the country.
 
By contrast, diaspora-based main Persian opposition groups have largely failed to unite and, in recent years, have often played a divisive role—most notably during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement. Personality-centered factions such as the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), monarchists, and fragmented left-wing parties have been unable to form a coherent coalition.

Reza Pahlavi, the son of the former Shah, lacks leadership and organizational capacities, and broad popular support inside Iran. His rhetoric has frequently been criticized for authoritarian and exclusionary undertones. During the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests, he promoted the slogan “Man, Nation, Development,” positioning it against the movement’s core feminist and pluralist message. Moreover, his circle has echoed the Shah-era policies toward Kurdistan and Balochistan—regions that bore a disproportionate share of repression during recent uprisings.
 
The MEK, meanwhile, operates more as a tightly controlled, personality-driven organization and is widely rejected by the Iranian public despite maintaining some organizational presence inside the country.
 
Traditional left-wing groups in the diaspora remain deeply fragmented and have failed to articulate a unified political vision or program for Iran’s future.
 
Ethnic forces, geopolitical risks
 
Among the most organized and militarily capable opposition forces are Kurdish and Baloch groups. Kurdish parties have established a coordination framework involving six organizations, while Baloch activists have recently formed the Front of Balochistan People’s Activists, bringing together several armed and political factions. Despite their organizational strength, these groups have not yet been able to lead a nationwide movement or build a broad national front against the regime. They also remain largely overlooked by international media and policymakers.
 
Without sustained international support and engagement, the prospects for meaningful regime change remain limited. Iran is a vast, multiethnic country composed of at least six major groups: Kurds, Persians, Balochs, Azeris, Ahwazi Arabs, and Turkmens. If the regime collapses, the risk of internal conflict is significant—particularly among Persian-dominated factions in Tehran, as current disputes on social media already suggest.
 
External interference poses an additional threat. Turkey could seek to support Azeri groups against Kurdish forces, while Gulf states or Iraq may attempt to influence Ahwazi Arab movements in Iran’s oil- and gas-rich southwest.
 
Meanwhile, global powers such as China, and the United States are competing for influence over strategic infrastructure, including the port of Chabahar in Balochistan.
 
An uncertain endgame
 
From the perspective of human rights defenders, there is growing concern that Iran’s crisis could end not in democratic transition but in a coup d’état or a negotiated deal between Western governments and figures from within the current regime, including former President Hassan Rouhani.
 
While the immediate outcome remains uncertain, one conclusion is increasingly clear: the Islamic Republic has lost its social and political legitimacy. Its collapse may not be imminent, but it is no longer a question of if—only when.
 
Taimoor Aliassi is the Executive-Director of Kurdistan Human Rights Association-Geneva (KMMK-G).  

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.