Proposed Sunni ‘Sahwa’ militia not good for Kurds

Elements in the Iraqi parliament are working to pass legislation on the formation of a force under the name Sahwa which will be similar to the Hashd al-Shaabi paramilitias.

The name is not new and is reminiscent of Nouri al-Maliki’s support for the Sahwa, the so-called “Sunni Awakening” who were armed with the aim of fighting al-Qaeda. The leader of Maliki’s Sahwa was killed and the group was sidelined in 2013. Some members joined ISIS and others fled to the Kurdistan Region, fearing the Shiite forces.

Current efforts to form a new Sahwa force are different from the past because the group will be established in all disputed areas.

In the event an agreement is reached for the return of Peshmerga forces to disputed areas, then the Kurdish force will have to interact with this new militia, which not only takes orders from Baghdad, but also stakes a claim for these areas.

The Hashd al-Shaabi were said to be incapable of fighting the Peshmerga after the Kurdish force took control of disputed territories from ISIS because those regions are not traditionally Shiite.

This, however, proved to be an incorrect assumption. 

Hashd al-Shaabi absorbed and formed alliances with Mosul’s Sunni Arabs, the Christians of the Nineveh Plains, and the Yezidis of Shingal.

If the plan to reform the Sahwa in disputed areas succeeds, the project will be of great use to Baghdad and a dangerous for Erbil.

Although the motion in parliament bears the signatures of 12 Iraqi lawmakers, it appears to be designed by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. It is clear that Iraq’s Sunni Arabs were the reason behind instability in the new Iraq because they felt they were being sidelined, first by the Shiites and also by the Kurds.

Post-ISIS, the question of Kurdish independence was expected to pose a danger to the survival of Iraq as a country. But Baghdad neutralized this danger. The challenge currently is how to make Sunni Arabs feel that they also have rights in order to prevent conditions that might give rise to new ISIS-like groups in the country. The formation of Sahwa is one of the tools by which the Iraqi government can achieve this.

The United States will consider the formation of another Sahwa group as positive, because they will not consist of Shiites and might not be close to Iran. Such a group will bring about a balance with respect to the Shiite Iranian hegemony over Iraq’s armed forces.

This creation of this group will also send a message to regional Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states that Sunnis have returned to Baghdad and Iran’s influence is declining.

The world will have a nice perception of Iraq in which the Sunnis will not be seen as marginalized and will encourage investment in Iraq.

This is the ideal promise that the group holds. But the situation looks very different for the Kurds.

The Peshmerga, army and federal police forces are mandated under the constitution. But the Hashd al-Shaabi forces, directly, are not. The Sahwa group will be viewed as another militia force.

If an agreement is reached in the future on the return of Peshmerga forces to disputed areas, the Peshmerga will have to deal with the Iraqi army and federal police forces, on the one hand. On the other hand, they will face a constant danger of confrontation with a militia force that also claims these areas — further complicating the implementation of Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution.