Why did the attack on Nechirvan Barzani’s residence ring an alarm bell in Iraq?

The recent drone attack on the residence of Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani in Duhok marks a deeply alarming escalation since the threat level of the militias has entered a new phase with targeting the Kurdish leaders.

In the wake of this attack, the Region’s top Kurdish leader and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) President Masoud Barzani revealed that even his own headquarters had been targeted five times as part of the ongoing assaults.

In fact, these are not isolated incidents or random acts of aggression, but they represent a deliberate and calculated attempt to intimidate and destabilize the most stable, developed and peace-oriented part of Iraq. 

A new threshold for the same coercion policy

Since the outbreak of war between Israel/US and Iran, Kurdish leaders across the Kurdistan Region have consistently championed neutrality, dialogue, and de-escalation. Masoud Barzani, Nechirvan Barzani, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Bafel Talabani and other senior Kurdish figures have been in constant contact with both the US and Iranian side, as well as regional actors at the highest levels. 

Their message has been unambiguous: urging restraint for all parties and ensuring that the Kurdistan Region is not a party to this war, and it should not be treated as one. And yet, despite this principled neutrality, the Region has been targeted by at least 450 attacks perpetrated by Iran and Iran-backed Iraqi militia groups.

The targets of these strikes have been diverse and indiscriminate in their breadth - civilian homes, hotels, Peshmerga bases, coalition forces stationed in the Region, and the consulates of the US and UAE. But the targeting of Kurdish leaders’ residences/headquarters takes this aggression to an entirely new and more dangerous level. 

This threshold demonstrates that the Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq have crossed a red line that even previous cycles of attacks against the Kurdistan Region did not breach. Targeting the residence/headquarters of Kurdish leaders is not a tactical military decision but a political message, designed to intimidate Erbil’s neutrality and peace-maker role, pointing out to the militias long-held and growing impunity.

It is, in essence, an act of political coercion dressed in the language of warfare that follows Baghdad-based efforts to undermine Kurdistan Region's constitutional autonomy through financial and legal ways over the recent years. The symbolism of attacks cannot be overstated: if the home of a regional president is not safe, then nothing and no one in the Region can be considered beyond harm’s way.

Provoking a ‘civil war’ versus holding on Region’s gains

These attacks also expose the profound and deeply troubling limitations of the Iraqi central government in Baghdad. The central government has proven unable to rein them in, since some of the militia groups responsible for these strikes officially fall under the umbrella of the state-funded Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or Hashd al-Shaabi. 

Baghdad cannot credibly claim sovereignty and territorial integrity while tolerating state-affiliated armed actors who operate with near-complete independence and target the leadership of one of Iraq’s own constituent regions. 

Essentially, the unilateral attacks by the militias on a region within the same country also aims to provoke a "civil war" but the Kurdish region’s response has been remarkably wise. 
Kurdish leaders have not retaliated militarily in order not to be dragged into a broader conflict that would serve the interests of those provoking them, focusing on protecting the region’s hard-won stability.

As a matter of fact, the current attacks cannot be attributed solely to the ongoing war since Iran and the militias have previously threatened and attacked civilians, energy infrastructure, and Iranian Kurdish groups in the Kurdistan Region. But the war with Iran made the burden of these attacks unbearable.

Actions to be taken

The Kurdistan Region’s restraint and peaceful posture requires crucial steps to be taken, both internally and externally. The attacks that are increasing in scale every day can no longer be managed through diplomatic statements alone. 

Therefore, the Kurdistan Region should further push its regional and international partners to put more pressure on Baghdad to take decisive, verifiable action against the militia groups responsible for the attacks. This needs actively dismantling the command structures and financing networks that enable these groups. The Iraqi government’s credibility as a sovereign state depends, in part, on its willingness to assert control over armed factions operating under its authority.

Despite all this, the aftermath of the attack on Presideny Barzani’s residence has underlined something quite unique. Condemnations from the US, the UN, Europe, and the Gulf states, as well as Iran and Turkey, underscored the diplomatic impact President Barzani has established beyond Iraq and the region. This diplomatic power no doubt could facilitate the above-mentioned efforts to be taken on the diplomatic levels.

Equally critical is the question of air defense. The current level of protection has proven insufficient in the face of around 450 attacks. The US and its Western allies have longstanding strategic interests in the stability of the Kurdistan Region since it hosts coalition forces, serves as a partner for counterterrorism operations, and represents the most reliable partner in volatile Iraq. Given this reality, the deployment of more effective, comprehensive, and permanent air defense systems in the Kurdistan Region is not merely a humanitarian imperative but a strategic necessity. 

Finally, and perhaps most urgently, this moment demands unity among the Kurdish political parties themselves. The attacks target both Erbil and Sulaimani, regardless of the differing closeness of Kurdish parties with Iran and Iraqi Shiite groups. Unity in the Kurdistan Region will also further serve the protection of co-existence of ethnic/religious communities in the Region such as Turkmens and Christians.

The KDP and PUK have a long and complex history, marked by periods of rivalry as much as cooperation. But the current threat does not discriminate between their political differences. Iran-backed militias do not ask which party flag flies over a building before launching a drone. 

Even if the Iran war ends with a possible deal, in an equation where Iraqi militia groups are not disarmed and disbanded, these groups will continue to pose an existential threat to the Kurdistan Region and lead to a more strained phase in Erbil-Baghdad relations. This challenging period can only be overcome through inter-party cooperation in the Region.

As a result, in this environment, internal Kurdish divisions are a luxury that the region cannot afford. The KDP, PUK and other political parties must set aside their disputes and present a unified political front both inside and outside. Historical achievements of the Kurdistan Region were gained in unity, and can only be preserved jointly. 

Sohan Aydogan (previously published as Shokhan Sherzad Qader) is a Turkish/Iraqi academician and researcher based in Ankara. She is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations of the University of Salahaddin, in the Kurdistan Region. She holds a PhD from Soran University in Erbil with a thesis on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Her works focus on Turkish foreign policy, KRG, Iraq, and the Middle East.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.