New world, old challenges facing the Kurdistan Region
By Dr. Azad Aslan and Cewad Qadir
Chaotic scenes in Afghanistan, particularly of Kabul airport, following the withdrawal of United States and NATO troops sent shockwaves across the Middle East, including the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Will the sudden departure of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan be emulated in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region? Undoubtedly this question has caused concern for both Kurdistan Region political elites and the public at large.
Here, in this short article, we will not dwell much on this particular question, rather we aim to expose some of the fundamental structural challenges that the Kurdistan Region faces during new global conditions in the aftermath of the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan and the Arab Spring upheavals. We also modestly attempt to propose solutions and ideas on how to engage with these issues.
Iraq is not Afghanistan
To elaborate on the reasons and factors that led to the US decision to retreat from Afghanistan is outside the scope of this article. It is sufficient, however, to underline that the US withdrew from Afghanistan due to its shifting national and global interests and strategic objectives. Comparing the conditions in Afghanistan with those of Iraq is not only a simplification of the circumstances in these two Middle Eastern countries, but it will also provide shallow perceptions of global power struggles that have been ongoing since the collapse of the former Soviet Union.
Iraq, its Kurdistan Region in particular, and the Middle East in general are highly strategic regions both for the US and the European Union (EU + Great Britain). Complete withdrawal from the region would most likely create a political and military void that may easily be filled by regional (Turkey and Iran) and other semi-global powers (Russia and China). Neither the US nor the EU is willing to leave this highly strategic region for these emerging international forces.
At the same time, the US strategic concern is increasingly shifting towards containing China, with the concentration of attention on the Asia Pacific. This strategic shift, however, should not be interpreted as the US withdrawal from the Middle East. The US power - more clearly so with the Obama administration - aimed to install stability and peace in the Middle East by establishing manageable balance between Shiites and Sunnis. It was primarily for this reason that the Obama administration entered into negotiations with Iran over its nuclear activities. By bringing Iran into the international order and thus reducing its destabilizing policies in the region through its proxies, the US hoped for certain stability to prevail. This policy, however, failed as the region passed through upheavals, following the Arab Spring, and the destabilizing counter policies of regional (Iran and Turkey) and other international powers (Russia and China).
At present, it appears that the US no longer sees the viability of this policy of balance in the region and, gradually, is shifting towards restructuring the region in growing collaboration with the EU and the UK. As the US focuses on containing China, the EU may steadily take greater responsibility in the Middle East. In more classical terms, the Middle East will likely become the zone of influence of the EU with continued US support.
Here is where radical political alterations in the region may take place in the near future. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, policy differences between the US and the EU have occurred almost regularly. The United States, ever since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, has particularly focused on “nation-building” policies in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan in order to establish stability, security and integration of these states into the international order. Such a nation-building policy has failed, more or less completely, and seems no longer to be a policy objective within the US political and intellectual establishment, at least for the time being.
The EU, on the other hand, in the post-Soviet era, followed a policy based on formation of “nation-states” by disintegrating the then existing multi-ethnic political entities in the Balkan region and helped the formation of new nation-states and their integration into the EU. The EU will most likely pursue the Balkanization model in the Middle East in the long run. The coming decades may, therefore, witness restructuring of the Middle East and realization of this model, which will probably be bloodier than in the case of the Balkans due to the possible involvement of various regional and global powers and their conflicting interests.
The neo-Mercantilist era
The US-designed Bretton Wood system of international monetary management, which was established in the aftermath of the Second World War, is being increasingly challenged by China and other actors. This, combined with China’s own mercantilist and trade policies, have worked to weaken US-backed globalism and presented a shift from a Bretton Wood liberal economic order towards a neo-mercantilist system throughout the world. In a neo-mercantilist world, struggles over world resources, markets and areas of influences will be much sharper and callous. Situated in a geostrategic region with rich natural resources and trade routes, the Middle East continues to be prone to global competition and struggles. Under such large-scale political conditions, the implementation of the Balkan model in the Middle East by the EU in alliance with the US, in order to keep the region as their zone of influence, may provide a glimpse of what could await this region.
Ongoing and long-term global power struggles and their impact on the Middle East will inevitably produce consequences for the Kurdish national question in the region in general and in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in particular. Here we solely concentrate on the Kurdistan Region. Within the framework of the abovementioned global power struggles, the Kurdistan Region’s political elite face a number of challenging issues that require delicate policy-making and implementation.
Broadly looking at the KRI, we identify the following issues as fundamental and challenging for the survival and further development of the Kurdistan Region in this turbulent part of the world: The KRI’s relation with Iraq, or rather the KRI’s place within Iraq in the post-referendum era; the KRI’s relation with neighboring countries, mainly Iran and Turkey; the issue of corruption and nepotism that is increasingly eroding the very fabric of Kurdish society; the military presence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Kurdistan’s mountainous region; and last but not least, the issue of generational power transition within the ruling political elite.
The abovementioned issues are closely interrelated and each has serious impacts on the others. The KRI is encouraged to pursue combined and integrated polices and solutions to these delicate and challenging problems.
A new Iraq
Following the historic independence referendum in 2017, the KRI faced existential threats. Thanks to the Peshmerga forces’ stiff resistance and active diplomacy, this threat was eventually averted. Since then the KRI has sought to reconstruct new relations with Iraq’s political leadership. As independence is no more an urgent question, under the given political conditions, what kind of relations should the KRI rebuild with Iraq?
We believe that the KRI should continue to construct a proper federal structure or confederalism with Iraq in which the sovereign rights of Kurdistan are respected by properly implementing the Iraqi constitution. Iraqi political elites should by now realize that a stable and sovereign Iraq is only viable by their genuine cooperation with the Kurdistan Region. An Iraq that enjoys full sovereignty, free from regional powers’ interference; an Iraq that is stable, prosperous and able to deal with its own internal affairs properly, i.e., to effectively deal with corruption, nepotism and poor public services; and an Iraq that takes its place within the international community; for all these reasons, it is categorically imperative for Iraq to reconstruct its relations with the KRI based on mutual interests and mutually recognized sovereign rights. A Kurdistan with full sovereign rights in turn strengthens Iraq’s full sovereignty.
Kurdistan Region’s political actors, particularly Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani is encouraged to pursue this delicate policy of constructing new relations with Iraq’s leadership and promote this policy through public relations and available media outlets to reach wider Iraqi audiences. The regional and global political conditions of today are comparatively more favorable than in 2005 when the country’s constitution was being approved. Both the US and the EU will likely support such a policy in order to prepare the ground for a stable and secure Iraq. The recent visits of French President Emmanuel Macron and the EU’s High Representative Josep Borrell to Iraq and Kurdistan are a clear message in this direction.
Both Kurdish and Iraqi political actors of the post-Saddam era have more experience now than before to rebuild a new Iraq in genuine terms. Distribution of budgets, implementation of article 140, hydrocarbon law, and exploitation and sale of natural resources are the main disputes that now can be seriously discussed and resolved. Failure to resolve these issues with the KRI and the continued instability in Iraq in the long run will cause disintegration of the country into smaller ethnic and religious political entities, which Iraq is determined to avoid. This gives the KRI large bargaining powers with the federal government in Baghdad.
Troubling neighbors
Kurdistan Region also needs to manage its relations with its neighbors, mainly Turkey and Iran. Both countries offer serious opportunities but also challenges. The KRI needs to develop and maintain a balanced approach to both countries. Turkey is a key trade partner, and most importantly, provides a lifeline as the KRI exports its crude oil through its northern neighbor. This mutually beneficial trade and oil-based relation with Turkey, however, is not free from problems.
Turkey’s approach to the KRI is ambiguous due to its own Kurdish national question. Turkey has deep-rooted fears that a sovereign Kurdish political entity in Iraq may work as a model and trigger its own restive Kurdish population. While Turkey continues its trade and diplomatic relations with the KRI, at the same time under the pretext of PKK’s armed presence, it has infiltrated inside the Kurdistan Region and established numerous military bases in the bordering corners. This military presence, in the long run, is a latent threat to the stability and prosperity of the Kurdistan Region.
Iran, on the other hand, also has trade relations with the KRI, albeit not in the same volume of Turkey. It is generally acknowledged that Iran tries to expand its trade and investment activities in the Kurdistan Region to balance Turkey’s sway. Iran’s influence over the Iraqi central government and on Iraq’s political actors can be both an opportunity as well as a long-term threat. For the KRI to be able to construct proper relations with Iraq, Iran’s influence is crucial. The point is whether Iran wishes to see a fully sovereign Iraq and Kurdistan Region. Through its control and manipulation of militia forces in Iraq, Tehran has so far played a destabilizing role in Iraqi affairs. Therefore, opening Kurdistan Region’s emerging market to the Islamic Republic should be conditioned on the KRI’s improved relations with Iraqi leaders, a process which Tehran can support and help realize. If Iraq’s central government resolves its lingering issues with the KRI and starts to construct a fully functioning Iraqi state and supports a sovereign Kurdistan Region, the KRI then could issue necessary regulations for Iran to expand its trade, investment and cultural activities in the Kurdistan Region. As Iran continues to suffer from economic sanctions and rising unemployment, the KRI may provide opportunities for Iran, particularly for Iranian Kurds to seek employment in the Kurdistan Region.
PKK - a strategic burden
PKK’s military presence and activities in the Kurdistan Region are a serious challenge for the KRI. The PKK as an armed force has no legal place within the political establishment of the KRI, and therefore, jeopardizes the sovereignty of the Kurdistan Region. With the post-Saddam Iraqi constitution, the KRI became a sovereign political entity in control of its own territory. No sovereign power allows a foreign military force to operate within its territory without its consent. By de facto allowing the PKK to operate militarily and maintain bases in the Kurdistan Region, the KRI delegitimizes its own sovereignty.
Apart from the crucial issue of sovereignty, the PKK’s presence provides a pretext for Turkey to freely operate in the Kurdistan Region without triggering international reactions. Regardless of PKK’s political objectives, ideology, and its ethnic origin, the KRI should treat PKK as a foreign military force that needs to be removed from the region, whether through political settlement or by force. A delicate policy should be devised and authorized by the Kurdistan parliament as the sole sovereign authority in the Kurdistan Region. The KRI’s policy vis-à-vis the PKK since 2005 has been shallow, factional, and pragmatist. Failure to take a sovereign attitude against the PKK, the KRI is risking its very existence or at least its meaning of existence in the long run.
Transition of generational power
Transition of power from ailing to younger generations within the Kurdish political establishment needs to be managed properly at this current turbulent period. Intra-party struggles will unquestionably weaken the KRI and its bargaining force vis-à-vis Iraq, neighboring countries, and global powers. The recent intra-party feud within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is clearly illustrative of this.
Corruption and nepotism
Finally, the chronic social and political issues of corruption and nepotism in the Kurdistan Region pose a serious challenge to the existing Kurdish political establishment which can result in losing the trust of their people. Further erosion of this trust is a fundamental threat both to the current political elites and to the stability and prosperity of the Kurdistan Region. In the absence of experienced opposition leaders, it is categorically imperative for the ruling elites to attune to the grievances of people and embark upon real and genuine reforms to earn larger public trust. The Kurdish ruling factions should not fail to observe that their real strength comes from public support and the confidence of their people.
To conclude, the KRI should pay profound and serious attention to the abovementioned challenges. To deal with them, it needs to develop coherent and integrated policies. The KRI should prepare for chaotic and turbulent periods that lie ahead through strengthening its institutions, its democratic values and, most importantly, through boosting the confidence of the people of the Kurdistan Region.
Dr. Azad Aslan holds a PhD in history from the University of Royal Holloway in London.
Cewad Qadir is former chief editor at the weekly Kurdish Globe.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
Chaotic scenes in Afghanistan, particularly of Kabul airport, following the withdrawal of United States and NATO troops sent shockwaves across the Middle East, including the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Will the sudden departure of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan be emulated in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region? Undoubtedly this question has caused concern for both Kurdistan Region political elites and the public at large.
Here, in this short article, we will not dwell much on this particular question, rather we aim to expose some of the fundamental structural challenges that the Kurdistan Region faces during new global conditions in the aftermath of the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan and the Arab Spring upheavals. We also modestly attempt to propose solutions and ideas on how to engage with these issues.
Iraq is not Afghanistan
To elaborate on the reasons and factors that led to the US decision to retreat from Afghanistan is outside the scope of this article. It is sufficient, however, to underline that the US withdrew from Afghanistan due to its shifting national and global interests and strategic objectives. Comparing the conditions in Afghanistan with those of Iraq is not only a simplification of the circumstances in these two Middle Eastern countries, but it will also provide shallow perceptions of global power struggles that have been ongoing since the collapse of the former Soviet Union.
Iraq, its Kurdistan Region in particular, and the Middle East in general are highly strategic regions both for the US and the European Union (EU + Great Britain). Complete withdrawal from the region would most likely create a political and military void that may easily be filled by regional (Turkey and Iran) and other semi-global powers (Russia and China). Neither the US nor the EU is willing to leave this highly strategic region for these emerging international forces.
At the same time, the US strategic concern is increasingly shifting towards containing China, with the concentration of attention on the Asia Pacific. This strategic shift, however, should not be interpreted as the US withdrawal from the Middle East. The US power - more clearly so with the Obama administration - aimed to install stability and peace in the Middle East by establishing manageable balance between Shiites and Sunnis. It was primarily for this reason that the Obama administration entered into negotiations with Iran over its nuclear activities. By bringing Iran into the international order and thus reducing its destabilizing policies in the region through its proxies, the US hoped for certain stability to prevail. This policy, however, failed as the region passed through upheavals, following the Arab Spring, and the destabilizing counter policies of regional (Iran and Turkey) and other international powers (Russia and China).
At present, it appears that the US no longer sees the viability of this policy of balance in the region and, gradually, is shifting towards restructuring the region in growing collaboration with the EU and the UK. As the US focuses on containing China, the EU may steadily take greater responsibility in the Middle East. In more classical terms, the Middle East will likely become the zone of influence of the EU with continued US support.
Here is where radical political alterations in the region may take place in the near future. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, policy differences between the US and the EU have occurred almost regularly. The United States, ever since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, has particularly focused on “nation-building” policies in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan in order to establish stability, security and integration of these states into the international order. Such a nation-building policy has failed, more or less completely, and seems no longer to be a policy objective within the US political and intellectual establishment, at least for the time being.
The EU, on the other hand, in the post-Soviet era, followed a policy based on formation of “nation-states” by disintegrating the then existing multi-ethnic political entities in the Balkan region and helped the formation of new nation-states and their integration into the EU. The EU will most likely pursue the Balkanization model in the Middle East in the long run. The coming decades may, therefore, witness restructuring of the Middle East and realization of this model, which will probably be bloodier than in the case of the Balkans due to the possible involvement of various regional and global powers and their conflicting interests.
The neo-Mercantilist era
The US-designed Bretton Wood system of international monetary management, which was established in the aftermath of the Second World War, is being increasingly challenged by China and other actors. This, combined with China’s own mercantilist and trade policies, have worked to weaken US-backed globalism and presented a shift from a Bretton Wood liberal economic order towards a neo-mercantilist system throughout the world. In a neo-mercantilist world, struggles over world resources, markets and areas of influences will be much sharper and callous. Situated in a geostrategic region with rich natural resources and trade routes, the Middle East continues to be prone to global competition and struggles. Under such large-scale political conditions, the implementation of the Balkan model in the Middle East by the EU in alliance with the US, in order to keep the region as their zone of influence, may provide a glimpse of what could await this region.
Ongoing and long-term global power struggles and their impact on the Middle East will inevitably produce consequences for the Kurdish national question in the region in general and in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in particular. Here we solely concentrate on the Kurdistan Region. Within the framework of the abovementioned global power struggles, the Kurdistan Region’s political elite face a number of challenging issues that require delicate policy-making and implementation.
Broadly looking at the KRI, we identify the following issues as fundamental and challenging for the survival and further development of the Kurdistan Region in this turbulent part of the world: The KRI’s relation with Iraq, or rather the KRI’s place within Iraq in the post-referendum era; the KRI’s relation with neighboring countries, mainly Iran and Turkey; the issue of corruption and nepotism that is increasingly eroding the very fabric of Kurdish society; the military presence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Kurdistan’s mountainous region; and last but not least, the issue of generational power transition within the ruling political elite.
The abovementioned issues are closely interrelated and each has serious impacts on the others. The KRI is encouraged to pursue combined and integrated polices and solutions to these delicate and challenging problems.
A new Iraq
Following the historic independence referendum in 2017, the KRI faced existential threats. Thanks to the Peshmerga forces’ stiff resistance and active diplomacy, this threat was eventually averted. Since then the KRI has sought to reconstruct new relations with Iraq’s political leadership. As independence is no more an urgent question, under the given political conditions, what kind of relations should the KRI rebuild with Iraq?
We believe that the KRI should continue to construct a proper federal structure or confederalism with Iraq in which the sovereign rights of Kurdistan are respected by properly implementing the Iraqi constitution. Iraqi political elites should by now realize that a stable and sovereign Iraq is only viable by their genuine cooperation with the Kurdistan Region. An Iraq that enjoys full sovereignty, free from regional powers’ interference; an Iraq that is stable, prosperous and able to deal with its own internal affairs properly, i.e., to effectively deal with corruption, nepotism and poor public services; and an Iraq that takes its place within the international community; for all these reasons, it is categorically imperative for Iraq to reconstruct its relations with the KRI based on mutual interests and mutually recognized sovereign rights. A Kurdistan with full sovereign rights in turn strengthens Iraq’s full sovereignty.
Kurdistan Region’s political actors, particularly Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani is encouraged to pursue this delicate policy of constructing new relations with Iraq’s leadership and promote this policy through public relations and available media outlets to reach wider Iraqi audiences. The regional and global political conditions of today are comparatively more favorable than in 2005 when the country’s constitution was being approved. Both the US and the EU will likely support such a policy in order to prepare the ground for a stable and secure Iraq. The recent visits of French President Emmanuel Macron and the EU’s High Representative Josep Borrell to Iraq and Kurdistan are a clear message in this direction.
Both Kurdish and Iraqi political actors of the post-Saddam era have more experience now than before to rebuild a new Iraq in genuine terms. Distribution of budgets, implementation of article 140, hydrocarbon law, and exploitation and sale of natural resources are the main disputes that now can be seriously discussed and resolved. Failure to resolve these issues with the KRI and the continued instability in Iraq in the long run will cause disintegration of the country into smaller ethnic and religious political entities, which Iraq is determined to avoid. This gives the KRI large bargaining powers with the federal government in Baghdad.
Troubling neighbors
Kurdistan Region also needs to manage its relations with its neighbors, mainly Turkey and Iran. Both countries offer serious opportunities but also challenges. The KRI needs to develop and maintain a balanced approach to both countries. Turkey is a key trade partner, and most importantly, provides a lifeline as the KRI exports its crude oil through its northern neighbor. This mutually beneficial trade and oil-based relation with Turkey, however, is not free from problems.
Turkey’s approach to the KRI is ambiguous due to its own Kurdish national question. Turkey has deep-rooted fears that a sovereign Kurdish political entity in Iraq may work as a model and trigger its own restive Kurdish population. While Turkey continues its trade and diplomatic relations with the KRI, at the same time under the pretext of PKK’s armed presence, it has infiltrated inside the Kurdistan Region and established numerous military bases in the bordering corners. This military presence, in the long run, is a latent threat to the stability and prosperity of the Kurdistan Region.
Iran, on the other hand, also has trade relations with the KRI, albeit not in the same volume of Turkey. It is generally acknowledged that Iran tries to expand its trade and investment activities in the Kurdistan Region to balance Turkey’s sway. Iran’s influence over the Iraqi central government and on Iraq’s political actors can be both an opportunity as well as a long-term threat. For the KRI to be able to construct proper relations with Iraq, Iran’s influence is crucial. The point is whether Iran wishes to see a fully sovereign Iraq and Kurdistan Region. Through its control and manipulation of militia forces in Iraq, Tehran has so far played a destabilizing role in Iraqi affairs. Therefore, opening Kurdistan Region’s emerging market to the Islamic Republic should be conditioned on the KRI’s improved relations with Iraqi leaders, a process which Tehran can support and help realize. If Iraq’s central government resolves its lingering issues with the KRI and starts to construct a fully functioning Iraqi state and supports a sovereign Kurdistan Region, the KRI then could issue necessary regulations for Iran to expand its trade, investment and cultural activities in the Kurdistan Region. As Iran continues to suffer from economic sanctions and rising unemployment, the KRI may provide opportunities for Iran, particularly for Iranian Kurds to seek employment in the Kurdistan Region.
PKK - a strategic burden
PKK’s military presence and activities in the Kurdistan Region are a serious challenge for the KRI. The PKK as an armed force has no legal place within the political establishment of the KRI, and therefore, jeopardizes the sovereignty of the Kurdistan Region. With the post-Saddam Iraqi constitution, the KRI became a sovereign political entity in control of its own territory. No sovereign power allows a foreign military force to operate within its territory without its consent. By de facto allowing the PKK to operate militarily and maintain bases in the Kurdistan Region, the KRI delegitimizes its own sovereignty.
Apart from the crucial issue of sovereignty, the PKK’s presence provides a pretext for Turkey to freely operate in the Kurdistan Region without triggering international reactions. Regardless of PKK’s political objectives, ideology, and its ethnic origin, the KRI should treat PKK as a foreign military force that needs to be removed from the region, whether through political settlement or by force. A delicate policy should be devised and authorized by the Kurdistan parliament as the sole sovereign authority in the Kurdistan Region. The KRI’s policy vis-à-vis the PKK since 2005 has been shallow, factional, and pragmatist. Failure to take a sovereign attitude against the PKK, the KRI is risking its very existence or at least its meaning of existence in the long run.
Transition of generational power
Transition of power from ailing to younger generations within the Kurdish political establishment needs to be managed properly at this current turbulent period. Intra-party struggles will unquestionably weaken the KRI and its bargaining force vis-à-vis Iraq, neighboring countries, and global powers. The recent intra-party feud within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is clearly illustrative of this.
Corruption and nepotism
Finally, the chronic social and political issues of corruption and nepotism in the Kurdistan Region pose a serious challenge to the existing Kurdish political establishment which can result in losing the trust of their people. Further erosion of this trust is a fundamental threat both to the current political elites and to the stability and prosperity of the Kurdistan Region. In the absence of experienced opposition leaders, it is categorically imperative for the ruling elites to attune to the grievances of people and embark upon real and genuine reforms to earn larger public trust. The Kurdish ruling factions should not fail to observe that their real strength comes from public support and the confidence of their people.
To conclude, the KRI should pay profound and serious attention to the abovementioned challenges. To deal with them, it needs to develop coherent and integrated policies. The KRI should prepare for chaotic and turbulent periods that lie ahead through strengthening its institutions, its democratic values and, most importantly, through boosting the confidence of the people of the Kurdistan Region.
Dr. Azad Aslan holds a PhD in history from the University of Royal Holloway in London.
Cewad Qadir is former chief editor at the weekly Kurdish Globe.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.