Will the ceasefire normalize vessel transit through the Strait of Hormuz?

As US and Iranian delegations meet in Islamabad to cement a two-week ceasefire that took effect on April 8 after six weeks of war, the Strait of Hormuz remains largely paralyzed. Daily transits stand at just three to five ships - far below the pre-war norm of 95 to 105 - threatening a global economy that depends on the chokepoint for roughly one-fifth of its energy supply.

According to data from Kpler, which monitors ship traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, only four ships passed through on each day of the ceasefire period, all of them dry cargo vessels. As of the evening of April 9, 2026, no oil tankers had transited the strait.

During the 38 days of war, a total of 203 ships passed through the waterway. By comparison, 3,704 ships transited the strait during the same 38-day period a year earlier.

The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz for global trade and energy transport rests on two main factors. First, it serves as a critical route for exporting oil and gas to Asia, Europe, and the rest of the world. Second, it functions as a major gateway for importing goods, raw materials, and other products into Gulf and broader Middle Eastern markets.

In a normal year such as 2025, the total trade value of ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz is estimated at about $766 billion. Oil and gas tankers account for roughly $589 billion of that figure, as around 21 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products, along with 4.5 billion cubic feet of gas, typically move through the strait each day.

All eyes are now on negotiations in Islamabad to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. However, even if an agreement is reached, shipping traffic is unlikely to quickly return to pre-war levels.

The Strait of Hormuz: a $606 billion trade corridor

According to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Oxford Maritime Monitoring, 2,295 ships passed through the strait in January 2026, rising to 2,658 in February. Traffic then dropped sharply to just 158 ships in March 2026. In the first seven days of April, only 45 ships transited the waterway. Altogether, during the 38 days of war, only 203 ships passed through, including 80 oil tankers.

Comparing this period with the same timeframe last year highlights the scale of disruption and the losses caused by reduced traffic - particularly from halted oil and gas shipments.

On a typical day, about 97 ships pass through the strait, including 56 oil tankers and LNG carriers. During the war, however, the daily average fell to roughly five ships, with only two oil and gas vessels.

Estimating losses from oil and gas transport alone, those 56 vessels would normally carry around 21 million barrels of oil and 4.5 billion cubic feet of LNG per day - equivalent to roughly $2.4 billion daily, assuming $77 per barrel of oil and $10 per million British thermal units of gas.

Over the 38 days of conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, total losses from disrupted transit through the Strait of Hormuz exceeded $80 billion, including about $62 billion from oil and gas shipments alone.

Table: 38-day crisis period (March 1 - April 8, 2026): Economic impact estimates for all vessel types

Will conditions in the Strait of Hormuz return to normal?

In reality, maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to return to pre-February 28, 2026 levels - or even to levels seen during the early phase of the 1980 Iran–Iraq War - for two main reasons.

First, Iran has proposed charging ships a $2 million transit fee as an optional payment included in its reported 10-point demands. This condition conflicts with international law, which guarantees free passage through straits used for international navigation. Iran has also proposed allocating $1 million of the fee to Oman, a suggestion Muscat has rejected.

Moreover, Iran remains under U.S. economic sanctions, and the global financial system is largely dollar-based. Even if countries exporting or importing goods wished to pay such fees, they would risk exposure to U.S. sanctions, making payments impractical. A dual system - where some ships pass for free while others pay - could also disrupt maritime operations and increase corruption risks.

Second, similar risks emerged at the beginning of the 1980 Iran-Iraq War. Even when both sides pledged not to target shipping, companies hesitated to resume operations due to safety concerns. Confidence returned only after the United States provided security guarantees and allowed vessels to sail under the US flag - arrangements that were largely respected during the eight-year conflict.

The core objective of the April 8 ceasefire between the United States and Iran was to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. That has not yet occurred, and the waterway remains effectively closed to normal traffic.

Even if an agreement is reached in Islamabad, conditions are unlikely to return to pre-war levels. This time, the United States is directly involved in the conflict, and there is no widely accepted guarantor capable of assuring shipping companies and insurers that the waterway is safe for transporting oil, goods, and other cargo.