There is Hope Left Before Kurdistan Submits
Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki cut the Kurdistan Region’s budget share in February 2014. But this didn’t immediately affect peoples’ living conditions because of individuals’ high income rate, abundant job opportunities, and peoples’ savings.
In addition, there was much cash in private and government banks as well as Iraqi bank branches in the Kurdistan Region. The KRG used the cash, which is why the budget cut didn’t take immediate effect.
At that time, Baghdad had not passed its oil and gas laws. In accordance with a political agreement reached between Erbil and Baghdad in 2007, the Kurdistan Region had independent of Baghdad made preparations for the exploration and exportation of oil.
That is why the Kurdistan Region immediately started to export its oil after the budget cut. The cut didn’t immediately affect the region for these reasons, including high oil prices at the time.
The Kurdistan Region finally faced economic crunch because of the complexities and implications of internal problems and ISIS war as well as falling oil prices. The economic crisis affected the government, people, companies and businessmen altogether.
Peoples’ resilience and rising oil prices helped the Kurdistan Region overcome these problems. Employees were expected to receive their full salaries and projects were also expected to resume as a result. But the implications of October 16 events took the Kurdistan Region many steps back, which even led to military and political failures.
Since October 16 — from the intention of Baghdad to make the Kurds come to their knees to what goes no now — Kurdistan passed the dangers that were planned. Kurdistan is about to rise up. But this too is a transitional stage. The scenarios have not ended yet.
Rather, the way rivalries were done has merely changed. Previously, Baghdad wanted to enforce its agenda by force. Now it is trying to do it softly by controlling the income source of the people of Kurdistan under the guise of the constitution without finding an alternative for the livelihoods of the people of Kurdistan.
On October 16, Baghdad seized control of large areas and revenue sources that Erbil had needed to because of crises. It has now been four months since Baghdad has retaken these revenue sources from Erbil in the name of implementing the constitution without implementing the other constitutional clause that obligates him to provide for peoples’ livelihood.
There is high international pressure on Baghdad to give the Kurdistan Region its share from the overall budget. But Baghdad is playing with time under different excuses and has not committed to the Kurdistan Region’s constitutional rights and entitlements. Contrary to the expectations of the people of Kurdistan, Baghdad is busy seizing the other income sources from Kurdistan.
What can we do if Baghdad manages to seize control of the rest of the Kurdistan Region’s income sources and refuses to send Kurdistan its budget share under different excuses?
In such a case, the Kurdistan Region can do two things. First, Kurdistan can resort to the federal court, which is the constitutional way. Second, it can resort to the international community.
In 2014, then PM Nouri al-Maliki cut Kurdistan’s budget share without consulting the parliament and without getting the approval of the council of ministers. The Kurdistan Region then resorted to the constitution and the federal court labeled Maliki’s decision unconstitutional and called for it to be revoked.
But Maliki didn’t abide by the federal court and continued the policy of making the people of Kurdistan hungry. The Kurdistan Region finally resorted to the United States and its friends in the international community, but these international pressures bore no fruit.
Baghdad wants to seize control of all the income sources of the Kurdistan Region and not send its budget share. If this is case, the Kurdistan Region can turn the same two ways: to the federal court and to the international community.
But the question is what Kurdistan should do in case those produce no result. Nowadays, unlike in 2014, there are fewer job opportunities and lower individual income rates. Moreover, the KRG doesn’t have access to peoples or banks’ cash it had before and cannot do the kind of investment it did in the oil sector before.
The goal of Baghdad is to reverse the economic growth that happened between 2003 and 2014 in Kurdistan and then politically invest in the economic collapse that follows.
The question is whether the Kurdistan Region has the ability to pass this phase without submitting to Baghdad, especially now that we have an economic crisis, political problems and rivalries which will further deepen the economic crisis. This certainly is difficult, but not impossible.
The imperative thing to do currently is improve peoples’ living conditions. The KRG should regain its confidence so it can provide salaries to its employees for one year.
And this requires political will and brave decisions to regulate revenue sources, retake the debt lent to some officials and ghost companies, and taking rent for the public properties used by the private sector, such as the farms built illegally and the lands given to private universities in Duhok, Erbil and Sulaimani. The money made from these sources can account for yearly salaries of Kurdistan Region employees.
In addition, there was much cash in private and government banks as well as Iraqi bank branches in the Kurdistan Region. The KRG used the cash, which is why the budget cut didn’t take immediate effect.
At that time, Baghdad had not passed its oil and gas laws. In accordance with a political agreement reached between Erbil and Baghdad in 2007, the Kurdistan Region had independent of Baghdad made preparations for the exploration and exportation of oil.
That is why the Kurdistan Region immediately started to export its oil after the budget cut. The cut didn’t immediately affect the region for these reasons, including high oil prices at the time.
The Kurdistan Region finally faced economic crunch because of the complexities and implications of internal problems and ISIS war as well as falling oil prices. The economic crisis affected the government, people, companies and businessmen altogether.
Peoples’ resilience and rising oil prices helped the Kurdistan Region overcome these problems. Employees were expected to receive their full salaries and projects were also expected to resume as a result. But the implications of October 16 events took the Kurdistan Region many steps back, which even led to military and political failures.
Since October 16 — from the intention of Baghdad to make the Kurds come to their knees to what goes no now — Kurdistan passed the dangers that were planned. Kurdistan is about to rise up. But this too is a transitional stage. The scenarios have not ended yet.
Rather, the way rivalries were done has merely changed. Previously, Baghdad wanted to enforce its agenda by force. Now it is trying to do it softly by controlling the income source of the people of Kurdistan under the guise of the constitution without finding an alternative for the livelihoods of the people of Kurdistan.
On October 16, Baghdad seized control of large areas and revenue sources that Erbil had needed to because of crises. It has now been four months since Baghdad has retaken these revenue sources from Erbil in the name of implementing the constitution without implementing the other constitutional clause that obligates him to provide for peoples’ livelihood.
There is high international pressure on Baghdad to give the Kurdistan Region its share from the overall budget. But Baghdad is playing with time under different excuses and has not committed to the Kurdistan Region’s constitutional rights and entitlements. Contrary to the expectations of the people of Kurdistan, Baghdad is busy seizing the other income sources from Kurdistan.
What can we do if Baghdad manages to seize control of the rest of the Kurdistan Region’s income sources and refuses to send Kurdistan its budget share under different excuses?
In such a case, the Kurdistan Region can do two things. First, Kurdistan can resort to the federal court, which is the constitutional way. Second, it can resort to the international community.
In 2014, then PM Nouri al-Maliki cut Kurdistan’s budget share without consulting the parliament and without getting the approval of the council of ministers. The Kurdistan Region then resorted to the constitution and the federal court labeled Maliki’s decision unconstitutional and called for it to be revoked.
But Maliki didn’t abide by the federal court and continued the policy of making the people of Kurdistan hungry. The Kurdistan Region finally resorted to the United States and its friends in the international community, but these international pressures bore no fruit.
Baghdad wants to seize control of all the income sources of the Kurdistan Region and not send its budget share. If this is case, the Kurdistan Region can turn the same two ways: to the federal court and to the international community.
But the question is what Kurdistan should do in case those produce no result. Nowadays, unlike in 2014, there are fewer job opportunities and lower individual income rates. Moreover, the KRG doesn’t have access to peoples or banks’ cash it had before and cannot do the kind of investment it did in the oil sector before.
The goal of Baghdad is to reverse the economic growth that happened between 2003 and 2014 in Kurdistan and then politically invest in the economic collapse that follows.
The question is whether the Kurdistan Region has the ability to pass this phase without submitting to Baghdad, especially now that we have an economic crisis, political problems and rivalries which will further deepen the economic crisis. This certainly is difficult, but not impossible.
The developments and events happening in the region are all interrelated. There is still hope, and this hope is tied to the status and position of the PKK. Future equations will change and the Kurdistan Region will have more leverage if Afrin doesn’t fall. The Kurdistan Region should play the long game and not submit to Baghdad.
The imperative thing to do currently is improve peoples’ living conditions. The KRG should regain its confidence so it can provide salaries to its employees for one year.
And this requires political will and brave decisions to regulate revenue sources, retake the debt lent to some officials and ghost companies, and taking rent for the public properties used by the private sector, such as the farms built illegally and the lands given to private universities in Duhok, Erbil and Sulaimani. The money made from these sources can account for yearly salaries of Kurdistan Region employees.
Arif Qurbany is a Kurdish political analyst and observer. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.