Iranian Kurds with a long history of national struggle are among the key players that could help form an alternative to the Iranian regime. However, they must address several challenges before they can be taken seriously by Iranian Kurds, Iran's non-Kurdish opposition, and Iran’s external adversaries.
The contemporary political history of Iranian Kurds can be traced to the establishment of the Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad in 1945. The republic was born out of the power vacuum in Iran during the Second World War.
Iran was invaded during this period by Allied powers. The Soviet Union took control of areas in the north while Britain seized areas in the south.
The struggles of founding a state
Iranian Kurds got their first taste of statehood and self-rule during the republic. The Kurdish language was used in administration and publications, and students were taught in Kurdish. The republic even established schools for girls.
Some nationalistic elements found in all parts of Kurdistan were derived from the 1945 republic, including the Kurdish flag, the national anthem, and Peshmerga forces.
The republic collapsed soon after Iran convinced the Soviets to withdraw in exchange for an oil concession in the south. The president of the republic, Qazi Mohammad, was executed by the Shah’s regime and became an icon of Kurdish nationalism in all parts of Kurdistan.
Iranian Kurdistan during the 1945 republic had only one party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI). Mustafa Barzani of Iraqi Kurdistan, along with his forces, went to Mahabad and served as a military general. Inspired by the experience of the republic, Barzani established the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq in 1946.
To this day, city streets, schools, and mosques in Erbil and Sulaimani are named after Qazi Mohammad.
Territory controlled by the republic was limited to a collection of cities of present day western Azerbaijan and Sanandaj province, not including Ilam and Kermanshah. This geographic limitation had a substantial impact on the rise of Kurdish nationalism in 1979.
The Islamic Revolution
The KDPI, which had been in exile in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1946, returned to Iran just a few months before the success of the 1979 Iranian revolution, which overthrew the Shah.
Again a political vacuum opened up in Iran and the KDPI took control of cities in Iranian Kurdistan. But this time it was not the only Kurdish party. Komala, a leftist party, had also emerged and obtained considerable popularity in Sanandaj province.
Again, the KDPI, and now Komala, lacked sufficient strength in Kermanshah province. In Ilam they were nonexistent.
During the early years of the revolution, Islamic forces under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini spread their hegemony by oppressing all groups across the country. KDPI and Komala managed to stand against the Islamic Republic through a long bloody armed resistance that lasted throughout the 1980s.
The military defeat of Iranian Kurds by the Islamic Republic was almost certain, as Kurds make up just 10 percent of Iran’s population. And deprived of manpower in Kermanshah and Ilam provinces, the Kurdish forces could only muster 5 percent of Iran’s total population.
Weaponry was also a problem. The KDPI and Komala carried only light arms against the regime’s heavy weapons.
Internal Kurdish struggles
Beside these major limitations, the KDPI and Komala also fought one another for several years. Komala viewed the KDPI as a bourgeois party, while the KDIP saw its hegemony challenged by Komala. They were however united in their opposition to the US, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. By this time, Komala and the KDPI had been pushed back into Iraqi Kurdistan to await the next power vacuum.
From 1991 to 2018, the KDPI and Komala experienced several internal splits. The latest, in 2006, saw the KDPI split into two parties. The KDPI, under the leadership of Mustafa Hijri, holds the traditional outlook that the freedom of Iranian Kurds will only come once the Islamic Republic collapses. The new breakaway party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran (KDP-I), has been more open to reforms inside Iran, even making some attempts to negotiate with the regime.
Komala has split twice since 1990. In 2000, Abdullah Mohtadi split from the Komala-Communist Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KCPIK) and established the Komala-Party of Iranian Kurdistan. Later Mohatdi’s party split and Omer Ilxanizadeh established the Komala-Party of Kurdistan.
Mohtadi split from the Komala-Communist Party of Iran because he wanted to replace the party’s regid anti-capitalist view with a softer, social democratic tradition. Other splits occurred mainly over the distribution of power among party leaders. Many of these party leaders from the post-1979 period remain in place. Any leadership centered on personalities makes internal reform difficult, if not impossible.
Looking forward
If regime change occurs in Tehran, Iranian Kurds face a number of challenges. One is that Kurds, as a small share of the population, cannot be the main force of regime change or become an alternative authority.
In January 2018, a coalition made up of five Kurdish opposition parties was formed. At first it looked like a promising development to end conflicts between these parties. However, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (KFLP), a force with ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) established in 2004, was not included in the coalition. The KDPI, KDP-I, and the Komalas (except KCPIK) say the KFLP is not a legitimate party of Iranian Kurds. A conflict between these rival camps is a distinct probability.
This is the same mentality which led to war between Komala and the KDPI in the 1980s. The proper mechanism to judge the legitimacy and weight of each party is surely to allow Iranian Kurds to decide in a free and democratic election.
If having martyrs is the basis of legitimacy, KFLP has had hundreds since 2004. If the financial backing of each party matters, then it is worth noting that all of them lack transparency and are probably more reliant on sources outside Iran.
Party divisions aside, Iranian Kurds still lack the kind of weaponry needed to topple the regime. As it is highly unlikely they will gain access to heavy weapons, these parties should instead reinforce their human capital.
Unfortunately many of these parties have struggled to attract educated, middle and upper class supporters able to convey their message effectively and broaden their appeal beyond the rural villages.
Policies regarding the role of women, too, have been neglected, thereby failing to offer an alternative to the conservatism of the Islamic Republic.
Addressing the dearth of support for their parties in Kermanshah and Ilam provinces is essential to form a unified national geography and population that makes the demand for a Kurdish autonomous or federal region inside Iran relevant.
If the tensions between the US and the Islamic Republic increase, it is possible these parties will attract political and financial support from abroad. Unless internal reforms are made, the opportunity to further the aims of Iran’s Kurds could be squandered.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
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