Iran and South Kurdistan’s Referendum on Independence
Since the announcement of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq’s intention to hold a referendum on independence on September 25th, Iran has come out as the most forceful opponent of the project. Although Turkey long held the questionable honor of being opposed to all things Kurdish, much has changed in Ankara and relations with the KRG remain strong. Many thus suspect that Turkish criticisms of the plan to hold a referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan hold more bark than bite these days. Turkey’s leaders, at least behind closed doors, appear ready to accommodate the emergence of a South Kurdistani state.
Iran remains a different story. The obvious explanation for Iran’s stance centers on the demonstration effect that Kurdish independence in Iraq may have for Iran’s own oppressed Kurdish minority. As Arash Karami recently explained in al Monitor, Iranian media outlets have openly discussed Teheran’s fear of the demonstration effect:
A June 20 article in the conservative Mashregh News said the referendum is not just an Iraqi issue. “Some domestic issues for a neighbor, given its links to other areas, cannot be interpreted as solely a domestic issue,” the article read. It said that while Iran has friendly relations with the KRG, such a referendum “at this time will cause political and security instability … because of the international nature of Kurdish issues.” The process of independence for Iraqi Kurdistan, the article said, could impact the situation of Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Syria. This, it argued, could cause additional instability in the region.
In other words, Kurds in Iraq should not aspire to self-determination and freedom because this might cause Kurds elsewhere to dare to aspire to the same. Media outlets in Iran appear oblivious to the possibility that if Kurds there were not the poorest in the country, if they did not account for some fifty per cent of political prisoners in Iran (for a population that makes up only some 9% of the country), if they were not executed by the regime more than any other religious or ethnic minority, and if they were not denied rights that ethnic groups elsewhere enjoy, then there would be little risk of a demonstration effect. The Kurdish and Persian languages come from the same family, after all, giving the resultant ethnic identities a good deal of affinity. It is poor governance and political repression in Iran that make Kurds there a restless group.
There exist other reasons for Iran’s opposition to the referendum and independence of South Kurdistan, of course. Iran backs the Shiite-led government in Baghdad, and what weakens the client displeases the patron.
One of Tehran’s most powerful reasons for opposing Iraqi Kurdish aspirations has to do with the Iraqi Kurds’ sympathies for and ties with the West, the United States and Israel, however. Iraqi Kurdistan lies right on Iran’s western border. It should therefore come as no surprise that the Ayatolahs react with alarm to the prospect of a pro-Western state arising right beside them. A South Kurdistani state could host American or other Western military bases and activities that could, in certain scenarios, harm Iranian interests.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei therefore stated this week, while meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al Abadi, that “The Islamic Republic of Iran as a neighbor [to Iraq] is opposed to some murmurs to holding referendum to separate part Iraq and considers those who call for this issue as opposed to the independence and identity of Iraq.” Ali Awni, a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq leadership, responded that “Since he [Khamenei] considers himself entitled to express his opinion about the situation in Kurdistan, then they should also give the same right to other nations, that we, too in Kurdistan are [entitled] to talk about the fate of the eastern Kurdistan, meaning Iran.” Awni added that “This referendum is taking place outside Iran, and therefore it is necessary for the officials of Iran and the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic to not interfere in the [internal] affairs of other countries, mind their business, and take care of their own country.”
No one ever “minds their own business” if they have the power and motive to interfere in other’s affairs, of course. Although Iran’s power should not be overestimated (five of the seven much ballyhooed ground-to-ground missiles it launched into Syria last week completely missed their targets, for instance), the people of South Kurdistan should gird themselves for a fair bit of Iranian meddling during the next several months.
If Iran meddles too much, of course, Kurds in Iraq could take Ali Awni’s comments to heart and increase their own meddling in Iran. Although weaker than Iran, South Kurdistanis retain a much stronger motive and will to see the referendum through than Iran has in preventing it.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.