Turkey Enters the Syrian Quagmire
On August 24th Turkey sent at least a dozen tanks, special forces and over a thousand allied Syrian Sunni rebel fighters (including some jihadi groups) into Syria. President Erdogan’s stated aim for Operation “Euphrates Shield” is to “remove terrorists” from the area around Jarablus, the Islamic State’s (ISIS) last important foothold for smuggling supplies and recruits in from Turkey. Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated that “We are determined to clear Daesh [ISIS] from the border.” Daesh, in any case, appeared at the time of this writing to be rapidly melting away from Jarablus rather than engaging against Turkish forces.
ISIS has held the area around Jarablus for a couple of years. Until now, their presence on the border never seemed a major priority for Ankara, despite endless American calls for them to act. Rather, the timing of the operation clearly has more to do with Syrian Kurdish advances against ISIS. As the jihadist “state” collapses in both Iraq and Syria, Ankara wishes to prevent the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its People’s Protection Units (YPG) and multi-ethnic Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from capturing the entire border from Afrin to Jazirah.
Linking up the majority Kurdish cantons of Jazirah and Kobane with Afrin in the West would provide the Syrian Kurds a more viable potential state. Since the PYD enjoys an organic relationship with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, Ankara views any PYD gains in Syria with alarm. Turkey’s leaders have thus spoken more frankly than in the past about the goals of their current incursion, with President Erdogan saying that “No one can view the Syria problem independent from Turkey’s internal affairs. Syria is the reason why Turkey is exposed to Islamic State and PYD terror — Turkey will take steps for its own security.”
Never mind that the PYD never fired a shot at Turkey – they even assisted Turkish troops when they need to relocate the tomb of Suleyman Shah (a revered founder of the Ottoman dynasty) out of Syria a year and a half ago. Those were different times. Today, Foreign Minister Cavusoglu demanded that “YPG elements must move to the east of the Euphrates. If they fail to do so, we will do what’s necessary.” These are the same YPG/SDF forces that just liberated Manbij from ISIS (a bit to the southwest of Jarablus), of course, that now Turkey insists should clear out.
As Vice-President Joe Biden made clear, Washington supports Ankara’s demand for the withdrawal of SDF forces: Kurdish forces “must move back across the Euphrates River,” Biden said. “They cannot, will not, under any circumstance get American support if they do not keep that commitment.” While many Kurds will undoubtedly view this as an American betrayal, the U.S.-supported SDF operations against Manbij and surrounding areas included such an American promise to Turkey from the beginning.
Hopefully the Americans are not so thick as to really mean it. Truly cutting off ISIS from its supply lines and recruits requires cutting them off from Turkey. If Turkey controls Jarablus, then the border has just moved south, closer to Raqqah. The best way to make sure that ISIS does not maintain smuggling routes into Turkey is to place Syrian Kurds in between the jihadis and Ankara. If these Kurds and their multi-ethnic SDF allies need to come up with a new acronym and new uniforms to stay in Manbij, that’s fine (your humble columnist votes for “Western Euphrates Protection Forces”, or WEPF).
Turkey’s overt military presence in Syria thickens the quagmire in other ways as well. If Turkish forces remain in Syria (and this is by no means guaranteed – the tanks and special forces may have just temporarily entered the country to help their Syrian rebel proxies capture Jarablus - the potential for big problems skyrockets. PYD leader Saleh Muslim already tweeted a response to the incursion: “Turkey is in Syrian Quagmire. Will be defeated as Daish. Türkiye Suriye Batağında çok şey kaybedecektir” [“Turkey will lose a lot in the Syrian swamp”].
The potential for PYD guerrilla actions against Turkish forces thus seems high if they stay in Syria. The Assad regime will likewise look for ways to respond, ways that probably include untraceable car bombs and such. Turkey will remain unable to engage the Assad regime directly due to its backing from Russia. It may nonetheless try to use its presence around Jarablus (should it remain there) to pressure Assad into moving more forcefully against the PYD (in return for a Turkish withdrawal). Meanwhile ISIS may send in its suicide bombers as before.
In short, it seems nothing good can come of Ankara’s intervention in Syria – not for Turkey, not for those who oppose ISIS, not for the Kurds and not for Syrians in general.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.