Kurdish independence and the role of Kurdish leaders and intellectuals
By Huseyin Tunc
Amid the massive turmoil in the region, the voice of the Kurds has started to be heard. Today, not only are the Kurds appreciated as a force that can potentially eradicate the threat of the Islamic State (ISIS), they are also a potential ally that could be an example to the entire region for democracy, human rights, women’s empowerment, and respect for all ethnic and religious groups.
Publicized for their bravery and unified by the wickedness of ISIS, today the Kurds stand at a propitious juncture: they strive to challenge the status quo and transcend their abject position vis-à-vis their oppressors, be they Turks, Arabs or Persians.
But despite a sense of unity, there are still fractions within the Kurds. However, does that necessarily have to instigate disunity again?
The Kurds in Iraq, under President Barzani’s leadership, favor an independent Kurdish state, while the Kurds close to the ideology of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) -- mainly in Turkey and Syria -- gave up their claim for statehood and now favor democratizing their oppressors. They believe in emancipation not through having their own nation-state, but through democratizing the countries where they live. Both approaches have appealing reasons and justifying circumstances. Nonetheless, both strive for the same goal: to emancipate the Kurds.
Barzani intensified his diplomatic efforts in the US to open up the way for Kurdish independence, a will he had frankly expressed on many occasions. While the idea of an independent Kurdish nation may now be appealing to a bunch of Western bureaucrats, Western countries still tend to practice excess caution, fearing threats to regional and international stability. Likewise, in Turkey, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) recently scored a victory in the general elections, obtaining more than 13 percent of the vote, including from many parts of Turkey. HDP is now anticipated to launch an intense diplomatic and political crusade to emancipate the Kurds and democratize the country. In other words, for the Kurds, a diplomatic era has just begun. Their diplomatic failure or success will equally determine the outcomes for Kurds in terms of failures and successes.
This is not an easy task: Barzani has to persuade the unwavering Western world -- primarily the United States -- to redraw the map of the Middle East and change the malignant stance the West has held unchallenged in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the HDP needs to transform an entrenched Turkish governing structure and obsolete mindset for a peaceful and just coexistence.
Puolo Fieri, the renowned Brazilian educator, explicated well how the oppressed transform first themselves and then their oppressors. The Kurds in Turkey were able to transform themselves due to their political struggle in the last decades. Thanks to them, the Turkish parliament will have the highest number of women’s seats since the establishment of the Turkish nation -- seats for forgotten ethnic and religious groups, sects and different socio-economic classes. This is only the start of a process to transform their oppressors as well.
However, at this very critical juncture, what is not serving the Kurds is the binary treatment of Kurdish intellectuals and leaders and their conspicuous stand to fanaticize either independence or integration.
But this only serves to again disunite Kurds. Skepticism may well be evidence of a healthy and independent mindset, but fanaticism is not.
At this critical turn, what would serve the long-subjugated Kurds is ardent support of Kurdish independence for Iraqi Kurdistan. Equally, and at the same time, there should be the same support for the PKK’s and HDP’s strategy to emancipate Kurds through integration and democratization.
Emancipated Kurds in Turkey and Syria and an independent Iraqi Kurdistan will serve each other and the Kurds overall. The Kurdish intellectuals and leaders have a pivotal role to play in fostering unity among Kurds, rather than fomenting the seeds of disunity, even if this is not deliberate.
*Huseyin Tunc is a graduate of conflict resolution at Columbia University in New York. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.