US diplomat says NATO-like alliance with Gulf is ‘logical’ step after Iran war
WASHINGTON D.C. - A former US diplomat said Monday a “NATO-like alliance” between Washington and Gulf countries after the war with Iran would be the “logical next step” in deepening security and economic ties.
“What I see is a NATO-like alliance between the Gulf, Arab countries, and the United States, because that's the logical next step in the maturation of our security and economic relationship,” Ambassador Joey Hood, a career diplomat and former U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia told Rudaw.
Hood clarified that the Trump administration’s objective of "regime change" is focused primarily on forcing a shift in Tehran's behavior rather than a traditional overthrow. Reflecting on the current military pressure, Hood noted that the White House is seeking to break a decades-long cycle of regional destabilization, asserting that "if you have some of the same actors who have now learned that they're going to have to change tactics... then that is fundamentally regime change."
Hood characterized Iran’s regional strategy as a "hostage situation," utilizing militia proxies to ensure neighboring states remain too unstable to pose a threat. He argued that the era of Iraq attempting to balance these competing loyalties is reaching an unsustainable end.
"Iraq has other challenges that it needs to address. It needs to decide whether it's going to be a security partner fully of the United States and the Gulf countries, or if it's going to be a security partner of the regime in Tehran. It cannot be both at the same time," Hood stated, adding that Iranian-backed groups are currently "on the back foot" following significant tactical losses across the Levant.
Despite the ongoing volatility, Hood pointed to the Kurdistan Region as a resilient "model for the Middle East.
"Your development and your partnerships do serve as a model for the region. So if we can help the region develop, that's good for Iraq, and it's good for the Middle East in general,” he said.
The following is a transcript of the full interview with Joey Hood:
Rudaw: Given your experience in Baghdad and your work on Iranian affairs, do you believe Operation Epic Fury can achieve its objectives through air power alone, or does the logic of this conflict ultimately require a sustained ground presence to ensure meaningful regime change?
Joey Hood: Well, let me send my greetings to your audience right now in the Kurdistan region and throughout Iraq and throughout the rest of the region. I hope everyone has a peaceful springtime. I would say that we have to be careful in recognizing that what President Trump means when he talks about regime change is a change in the regime's behavior. You know, he's talked about wanting to play a role in the selection of the next Supreme Leader. That didn't happen, but ultimately, as he talked about just this morning, when he said that the regime has changed because he's dealing with different people, they are saying different things. That is the type of change that he is looking for. Because if you had a completely different regime that pursued the same expansionist revolutionary policies threatening neighbors all around, including Iraq, that wouldn't have achieved any objective at all. But if you have some of the same actors who have now learned that they're going to have to change tactics as they deal with the region and the United States and the rest of the world, then that is fundamentally regime change.
If I'm not mistaken, you’ve previously described the Kurdistan Region as a ‘model’ for the Middle East, yet places like Erbil and US partners in the Gulf have borne significant Iranian retaliation. After the war ends, do you expect Washington to increase its strategic focus on Kurdistan and the region, or could US priorities shift elsewhere and reduce its security commitment?
No, I think the United States and partners in the region, including in the Kurdistan Region, Iraq the Gulf, will find strengthened partnerships, because we've seen the results of what we've been able to do, especially with the Gulf Arabs since 1945 when King AbdulAziz and Bin Saud and President Roosevelt first met on the deck of the United States ship Quincy, when they decided to establish a security partnership that has endured more than 80 years now, and that saw that provided the security and the stability for economic development, the likes of which we've have been unprecedented. And I think you can say that also for the Kurdistan Region, even though life is not perfect, you've seen stability, you've seen economic growth, you've seen things that were just not possible 40 years ago, 50 years ago, 60 years ago. Why? Because of that strong partnership between the United States, your regional government, and the government in Baghdad, and so I think those governments are going to be looking for ways to make the security and economic partnerships even more mature at a new level.
Do you anticipate the emergence of a new regional security architecture or alliance system aligned with the United States after the war?
Yeah, what I've been talking about is what I see is a NATO-like alliance between the Gulf, Arab countries, and the United States, because that's the logical next step in the maturation of our security and economic relationship. And there's no reason why that shouldn't happen. These countries are not the same as they were in 1945, so we shouldn't be relying on the same architecture that we had at that time. So now, if you have a NATO like Alliance, which some of the individual countries have been pushing for at different levels, at different times, if you have it now applying to the entire Gulf Cooperation Council with the United States, so that any attack on any member in any way would be seen as an attack on all, and elicit a response from all Well, it would be virtually impossible. Would be suicidal for a regime like the one in Tehran or under the bad old days of Saddam Hussein. If a leader like that were to come back, it would be absolutely suicidal for them to try to attack any of the countries of the GCC, now that wouldn't include Iraq in the beginning, because Iraq has other challenges that it needs to address. It needs to decide whether it's going to be a security partner fully of the United States and the Gulf countries, or if it's going to be a security partner of the regime in Tehran. It cannot be both at the same time, and for years, it's been trying to be both.
When we speak about Iraq, we know that there's a government, and at the same time, we have some powerful people behind the scenes, and they're doing whatever they want to do. They even have militia groups with lots of power. They are in business, in the economy, and so on. So, from your perspective, and during the years that you worked in Iraq and at the State Department, who is in charge in Baghdad? Is it the Iraqis? Or are there some other people who are backed by foreign countries?
I think it's a combination. I think you have Iraqis who are working for the betterment of Iraq, and I think you have Iraqis who are working for the benefit of the regime in Tehran, for this expansionist ideology that they've had since 1979 that has destabilized countries like Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and they've tried to do it elsewhere, maybe with less success than in those countries, but the idea there, as you've described, is to have armed groups that are militias, that are also political parties that are also economic businesses that are also mafias, generally throughout the country, so that the country can't quite get strong enough, can't quite get stable enough to be seen as a threat to Iran. That is its defense strategy. And while it may be understandable from Tehran's perspective, it is totally unacceptable from the perspective of anyone who's a patriot in those countries or the United States who wants to be a partner with those countries.
So, the question is, who has the upper hand? Is it the Iranian-backed groups or the Iraqi government?
Well, I think it's quite clear that the Iranian-backed groups are on the back foot. Now. That's why Hassan Nasrallah no longer exists. That's why the Houthis, although they're talking about it, have remained out of the fight for now. That's why you're seeing, I think, attacks taking place on different locations and personnel that are loyal to Tehran in Iraq. I told people like Falah Fayaz many times years ago that this day was eventually going to come, that these groups were going to push just a little too far, and that the United States and its allies, its partners, would eventually have to respond, and unfortunately, that advice was not heeded. Now, people would tell me also, we don't want a civil war in Iraq. Nobody wants a civil war anywhere. But at the same time, are you willing to give up that much of your own people's security and economic benefit just to have some social peace? I don't think that, that's a long-term. I don't think it's a great investment.
So we talked about how the Kurdistan Region came under attack by even Iran and by the militia groups in Iraq. So how does Washington view that, as the Kurdish leadership has said that they are not part of the war and they stay neutral, but at the same time, we see attacks not only on the US bases or US facilities, but on the Kurdistan Region’s civilian areas. So why would they attack the Kurdistan Region? First and second, how does Washington view that?
That expression of neutrality was very smart, because it lays bare for the world exactly how treacherous this regime is in Iran. They're attacking the Kurdistan Region, not because the region is playing a role in the conflict, not because they're some sort of a threat directly to the regime, but because they've been close partners with the United States. They're not able to defend themselves, maybe as well as some of the bigger countries to the south. And so the regime in Tehran is taking advantage of that by hitting the Kurdistan Region. And Washington sees that for what it is, which is hitting the most vulnerable for no strategic reason, because even if the regime in Tehran were able to somehow destabilize the Kurdistan Region. What would that gain them? Absolutely nothing, but more problems on their border. So they're doing it to try to send a message to you and to us that we're not going to let anybody be in peace as long as they're friends with the United States and not doing what we want them to do. It's a hostage situation, and the Kurdistan Region is resisting that, and we applaud them for that.
Ambassador, you've been engaged with the Kurdish leadership over the years, so in the post war environment, how should the United States deal with the Kurds? Deal with them as a tactical partner and use them for the covert action, or should the US see the Kurds as a central pillar of the new security order after the war, in the region?
It should be a strategic partnership, and I think it will be. I want to join the many, many voices around the world that are condemning the attack on the residents of President Nechirvan Barani in Dahok. This was totally uncalled for. It makes no sense from any strategic point of view, and it's meant to be simply coercion. And I'm glad that no one is accepting that, except perhaps, and it's not surprising, the coalition framework. I saw a statement from them, which seemed to suggest that they were blaming that attack on external powers, as if somehow the United States or some other country decided to do that bombing and then blame it on the Iranians. That's ludicrous, and it belies all the evidence of all those drones and all those missiles, hundreds of them, that the Iranians have thrown at the Kurdistan Region just in the past few weeks. So fortunately, nobody believes that. But what I think everyone here in Washington, Republican, Democrat, Independent, does believe in is a strong partnership with the Kurdistan Region. Because what I said earlier that your development and your partnerships do serve as a model for the region. So if we can help the region develop, that's good for Iraq, and it's good for the Middle East in general.
We see that Israel and the United States are acting decisively against Iran, but at the same time, they are doing it without the consensus of the European partners, even NATO. So how would you see that? Do you think that after the war ends, the United States will think about a new security partnership with the Middle East at the center of this theater, or will they reassess their partnership with European partners?
No, this is one of the reasons why I talked about a new strategic military alliance between the United States and the GCC countries. Because I do think that people are recognizing that the time has come for there to be not just NATO to deal with issues on the European continent, but there needs to be a similar alliance in the Middle East to deal with all the threats, but also take advantage of all the opportunities and provide cover and security and Safety for development to take place uninhibited by threats from revolutionary or fanatical regimes like the ones we've seen in Tehran, one we saw in Baghdad for the years prior to 2003 and in Syria and so on and so on. So I do think there is a strong likelihood that we will see from this president, who, as you know, likes to do things very differently and things that are long lasting, that you will see a strategic military alliance between the GCC countries and the United States, and that will benefit Iraq, and it will benefit the Kurdistan Region.
In your view, what roles are Russia and China playing in this conflict behind the scenes? Are they playing any role? And how do you see that?
Well, we've all seen the reporting about Russia and Iran coordinating and helping each other with drone technology. You've now, unfortunately, been the victim of many of those Shah drones in the Kurdistan Region. So you can see what a partnership with Russia gets a country. It's not good. That's why Russia doesn't have any friends who are doing well economically, doing well politically, with lots of friends and alliances around the world. So I don't think that's the way of the future. I don't think you're going to see suddenly Russia or China steaming into the Gulf and saying, you know, I'm everybody's new partner. Everybody trusts me. We can do this together. I think nobody's going to go for that.
Is that something that Washington is putting into its calculations when they are thinking about the future of that region?
Well, we always have to think about strategic threats. And you know, it's not necessarily the way that Beijing is operating now to try to match us militarily in these partnerships, but they try to move in in different ways, through technology, through business deals, and through oil deals and so forth. Again, I just think that every government, every individual voter, needs to keep in mind what country, what government has been there with them to help them, develop them through, develop their economy, through difficult periods as well as the good periods. That's the United States. That's not China, and that's not Russia.
You've worked on the Middle East, and you quite well know how that the things are working in the Middle East. So, how do you see the calculation here when it comes to the Iran war, and if I'm adding that, is there a high risk of miscalculation here? Do you see that? Did you see any miscalculation? What is it?
No, absolutely. I see the potential for that. And in fact, you know, as you noted in the beginning, I've worked on Iran and the countries surrounding Iran for decades, and so we as diplomats have always been involved in planning with our military colleagues for different potential scenarios. And if you had had me on this show two or three months ago, I would have predicted that there probably would be eventually, a war with Iran, but not because we started it, but because they crossed a red line that they miscalculated on. I think that they were about to do that in 2019 when the United States decided to eliminate Qasem Soleimani. And I think there have been different periods in history when it almost happened. You remember that in 2011, there was a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador here in Washington. Out of well, they weren't planning just to kill him. They were planning to take out an entire restaurant full of people. Had they done that? I think that might have been the beginning of the war right there. So, yes, I think that the regime has a history of miscalculating. They've, frankly, been lucky up until now. Think about the beginning of all this. 1979,1980 they took over our embassy. They took our diplomats hostage for 444 days. That, by itself, could have been a casus belli. So I think this war was probably going to happen one way or another, and President Trump decided I am not going to wait for that miscalculation. I am going to do it now on my own terms, when the regime and its proxies are probably in a weaker position than they've been in decades, maybe since the end of the war with Iraq.
Do you think that the White House and the State Department made the right calculation to do it now?
Well, I think President Trump made the calculation. Let's be clear on that.
Did he do it alone?
Yeah, I don't, I don't think that he's receiving a whole lot of analysis or advice or recommendations from down in the bureaucracy. Certainly, he listens to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, certainly listens to General Dan Caine, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as Secretary of Defense, Pete hegseth and a couple of others. But this government is not working. This administration is not working in the way that is typically done in administration. So, for better or for worse, the president owns this decision one way or the other.
What would make President Trump or what condition is needed to be met for President Trump to declare the final victory and put an end to this war?
Well, clearly, opening the Strait of Hormuz in such a way that allows for oil traffic to go back and forth. That means convincing the insurance companies that it's safe again, not just making it safe, but convincing them that it's safe, because if a ship is perfectly safe going through it, but the insurance companies aren't convinced of that. They won't insure the ships, and the ships won't go. That's something that viewers really need to understand, because there may come a moment when the Strait is secured militarily, but the ships still aren't going, and that's because of the second piece with the insurance companies. Now the US government may also be able to help by providing some of that insurance themselves or political risk insurance, but we'll have to see if that happens. I think that the President, as he said today, and he said many other times, he's looking for a change in the regime's behavior. And some of that we know from the reporting of the 15 points, which may or may not be accurate. It's just media reporting, but we know for sure that for decades we have been trying to contain this regime from destabilizing countries around the region, including and especially Iraq, but also Lebanon, also Syria, also Yemen. This has got to stop; their threats with their missiles and drones have got to stop. And I think that there needs to be some sort of reassurance with regard to their use of nuclear technology. Those are all the things that are going to have to be addressed one way or another. Both Washington and Iran seem to be putting out their maximalist positions right now, but when you boil it down to the essentials for the United States, it's got to be those three things: proxies in the region, missiles and drones and the nuclear program.
So I would go back to my first question, can they achieve this without sending boots on the ground or by negotiation, as another option that President Trump has to make that happen?
Right, one thing that is different about President Trump? There are many things that are different. People spend many, many hours talking about that, but one thing that we don't talk about often enough is the fact that he is willing to talk with anyone at any time. Whereas previous Presidents have said, well, we need a process. We need them to deserve talking to me, we need to wait until the right moment. President Trump says, Let's do this. And so that's what he says he's doing right now, probably through intermediaries like Pakistan and, and others, as we've seen in the past, the United States and Iran rarely talk directly to each other. So that part is, is normal.
Which way is the better way?
You mean directly or through intermediaries?
President Trump's policy or the other President's policy?
No, I will. I think my advice is always…
I am going to say this, I recall Secretary Rubio said that with other administrations for some situations like that, you need months of deliberation and bargaining and having interagency meetings to make a decision, but with this President, you can make it in one or two hours, right?
And that means he then owns the decision all by himself, whether it goes well or doesn't. So that's a political risk, but it's one he's been willing to take many times. I think it is important to have a president who is willing to cut through the preparation time and preconditions to be able to talk with an adversary. That's the essence of diplomacy, actually. Now, whether this is going to succeed or not, my point is that we have seen the willingness to enter into and conduct negotiations, but whether that's going to succeed or not, without further pressure, such as the introduction of ground forces into Iran, remains to be seen. I do think that the President has a history of looking for leverage points where he can and probably hasn't made a decision right now whether he is actually going to use ground forces, but he wants to have the options available in the region, and that is also sending a message to the regime, this could get much, much worse, in addition to hitting Some of the strategic targets that he has talked about
We've heard from Iran that they demand US withdrawal for any future agreement with this administration. So, in your view, how should Washington approach to that demands, given its long-standing commitment to the regional security and their security partnership in the Middle East?
Ignore it. They just have to ignore it, because that's ridiculous. It's, It's Iran, it's the, it's the Iranian government stating its long-term goal, which is regional dominance. So if you just leave United States, sure, we won't need proxies anymore. We won't need all these missiles and all this other stuff anymore, maybe because we'll have the field free to ourselves. That's not going to happen, nor would any of our partners in the region want that to happen. So that needs to be ignored in that sense. But coming back to what I said earlier about a strategic military alliance, I actually think that could be very reassuring to a rational regime in Tehran, because it it guarantees stability, just as we've seen between the former Soviet Union and Western Europe, there was no war, and I think in large part that was because the Soviet Union knew that an attack on one meant an attack and a response from all and that they weren't able to stand
So, what is the right path to follow from now on, weaken the regime and leave them until they regain whatever they had in the past, or finish the job?
Well, I think there's been a lot of reporting about how the Gulf Arab governments are encouraging Washington quietly to finish the job. Because what's more dangerous than the Tehran of a couple of months ago is a Tehran that is weakened but angry and looking for revenge. And as we know from their history over the past 40 years, they can be patient. They make their plans, they wait for the right moment, and then they strike. So Washington and all of our partners need to make sure that that's not possible. So I think the regime needs to understand that we could come back in at any moment, that with the help and the support of our partners, and so they're not going to get that security guarantee from us that they say that they want, but they may be able to get an understanding that this military alliance is going to be so strong and so stable that if you attack it, it'll be ten times worse than it was for you just now, therefore don't attack it, and if you don't attack it, then you're not going to be attacked either. That could work.
And this is my last question. Do you think of finishing the job? How long does it take, and can they do it without sending the boots on the ground? Is it feasible?
“What I see is a NATO-like alliance between the Gulf, Arab countries, and the United States, because that's the logical next step in the maturation of our security and economic relationship,” Ambassador Joey Hood, a career diplomat and former U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia told Rudaw.
Hood clarified that the Trump administration’s objective of "regime change" is focused primarily on forcing a shift in Tehran's behavior rather than a traditional overthrow. Reflecting on the current military pressure, Hood noted that the White House is seeking to break a decades-long cycle of regional destabilization, asserting that "if you have some of the same actors who have now learned that they're going to have to change tactics... then that is fundamentally regime change."
Hood characterized Iran’s regional strategy as a "hostage situation," utilizing militia proxies to ensure neighboring states remain too unstable to pose a threat. He argued that the era of Iraq attempting to balance these competing loyalties is reaching an unsustainable end.
"Iraq has other challenges that it needs to address. It needs to decide whether it's going to be a security partner fully of the United States and the Gulf countries, or if it's going to be a security partner of the regime in Tehran. It cannot be both at the same time," Hood stated, adding that Iranian-backed groups are currently "on the back foot" following significant tactical losses across the Levant.
Despite the ongoing volatility, Hood pointed to the Kurdistan Region as a resilient "model for the Middle East.
"Your development and your partnerships do serve as a model for the region. So if we can help the region develop, that's good for Iraq, and it's good for the Middle East in general,” he said.
The following is a transcript of the full interview with Joey Hood:
Rudaw: Given your experience in Baghdad and your work on Iranian affairs, do you believe Operation Epic Fury can achieve its objectives through air power alone, or does the logic of this conflict ultimately require a sustained ground presence to ensure meaningful regime change?
Joey Hood: Well, let me send my greetings to your audience right now in the Kurdistan region and throughout Iraq and throughout the rest of the region. I hope everyone has a peaceful springtime. I would say that we have to be careful in recognizing that what President Trump means when he talks about regime change is a change in the regime's behavior. You know, he's talked about wanting to play a role in the selection of the next Supreme Leader. That didn't happen, but ultimately, as he talked about just this morning, when he said that the regime has changed because he's dealing with different people, they are saying different things. That is the type of change that he is looking for. Because if you had a completely different regime that pursued the same expansionist revolutionary policies threatening neighbors all around, including Iraq, that wouldn't have achieved any objective at all. But if you have some of the same actors who have now learned that they're going to have to change tactics as they deal with the region and the United States and the rest of the world, then that is fundamentally regime change.
If I'm not mistaken, you’ve previously described the Kurdistan Region as a ‘model’ for the Middle East, yet places like Erbil and US partners in the Gulf have borne significant Iranian retaliation. After the war ends, do you expect Washington to increase its strategic focus on Kurdistan and the region, or could US priorities shift elsewhere and reduce its security commitment?
No, I think the United States and partners in the region, including in the Kurdistan Region, Iraq the Gulf, will find strengthened partnerships, because we've seen the results of what we've been able to do, especially with the Gulf Arabs since 1945 when King AbdulAziz and Bin Saud and President Roosevelt first met on the deck of the United States ship Quincy, when they decided to establish a security partnership that has endured more than 80 years now, and that saw that provided the security and the stability for economic development, the likes of which we've have been unprecedented. And I think you can say that also for the Kurdistan Region, even though life is not perfect, you've seen stability, you've seen economic growth, you've seen things that were just not possible 40 years ago, 50 years ago, 60 years ago. Why? Because of that strong partnership between the United States, your regional government, and the government in Baghdad, and so I think those governments are going to be looking for ways to make the security and economic partnerships even more mature at a new level.
Do you anticipate the emergence of a new regional security architecture or alliance system aligned with the United States after the war?
Yeah, what I've been talking about is what I see is a NATO-like alliance between the Gulf, Arab countries, and the United States, because that's the logical next step in the maturation of our security and economic relationship. And there's no reason why that shouldn't happen. These countries are not the same as they were in 1945, so we shouldn't be relying on the same architecture that we had at that time. So now, if you have a NATO like Alliance, which some of the individual countries have been pushing for at different levels, at different times, if you have it now applying to the entire Gulf Cooperation Council with the United States, so that any attack on any member in any way would be seen as an attack on all, and elicit a response from all Well, it would be virtually impossible. Would be suicidal for a regime like the one in Tehran or under the bad old days of Saddam Hussein. If a leader like that were to come back, it would be absolutely suicidal for them to try to attack any of the countries of the GCC, now that wouldn't include Iraq in the beginning, because Iraq has other challenges that it needs to address. It needs to decide whether it's going to be a security partner fully of the United States and the Gulf countries, or if it's going to be a security partner of the regime in Tehran. It cannot be both at the same time, and for years, it's been trying to be both.
When we speak about Iraq, we know that there's a government, and at the same time, we have some powerful people behind the scenes, and they're doing whatever they want to do. They even have militia groups with lots of power. They are in business, in the economy, and so on. So, from your perspective, and during the years that you worked in Iraq and at the State Department, who is in charge in Baghdad? Is it the Iraqis? Or are there some other people who are backed by foreign countries?
I think it's a combination. I think you have Iraqis who are working for the betterment of Iraq, and I think you have Iraqis who are working for the benefit of the regime in Tehran, for this expansionist ideology that they've had since 1979 that has destabilized countries like Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and they've tried to do it elsewhere, maybe with less success than in those countries, but the idea there, as you've described, is to have armed groups that are militias, that are also political parties that are also economic businesses that are also mafias, generally throughout the country, so that the country can't quite get strong enough, can't quite get stable enough to be seen as a threat to Iran. That is its defense strategy. And while it may be understandable from Tehran's perspective, it is totally unacceptable from the perspective of anyone who's a patriot in those countries or the United States who wants to be a partner with those countries.
So, the question is, who has the upper hand? Is it the Iranian-backed groups or the Iraqi government?
Well, I think it's quite clear that the Iranian-backed groups are on the back foot. Now. That's why Hassan Nasrallah no longer exists. That's why the Houthis, although they're talking about it, have remained out of the fight for now. That's why you're seeing, I think, attacks taking place on different locations and personnel that are loyal to Tehran in Iraq. I told people like Falah Fayaz many times years ago that this day was eventually going to come, that these groups were going to push just a little too far, and that the United States and its allies, its partners, would eventually have to respond, and unfortunately, that advice was not heeded. Now, people would tell me also, we don't want a civil war in Iraq. Nobody wants a civil war anywhere. But at the same time, are you willing to give up that much of your own people's security and economic benefit just to have some social peace? I don't think that, that's a long-term. I don't think it's a great investment.
So we talked about how the Kurdistan Region came under attack by even Iran and by the militia groups in Iraq. So how does Washington view that, as the Kurdish leadership has said that they are not part of the war and they stay neutral, but at the same time, we see attacks not only on the US bases or US facilities, but on the Kurdistan Region’s civilian areas. So why would they attack the Kurdistan Region? First and second, how does Washington view that?
That expression of neutrality was very smart, because it lays bare for the world exactly how treacherous this regime is in Iran. They're attacking the Kurdistan Region, not because the region is playing a role in the conflict, not because they're some sort of a threat directly to the regime, but because they've been close partners with the United States. They're not able to defend themselves, maybe as well as some of the bigger countries to the south. And so the regime in Tehran is taking advantage of that by hitting the Kurdistan Region. And Washington sees that for what it is, which is hitting the most vulnerable for no strategic reason, because even if the regime in Tehran were able to somehow destabilize the Kurdistan Region. What would that gain them? Absolutely nothing, but more problems on their border. So they're doing it to try to send a message to you and to us that we're not going to let anybody be in peace as long as they're friends with the United States and not doing what we want them to do. It's a hostage situation, and the Kurdistan Region is resisting that, and we applaud them for that.
Ambassador, you've been engaged with the Kurdish leadership over the years, so in the post war environment, how should the United States deal with the Kurds? Deal with them as a tactical partner and use them for the covert action, or should the US see the Kurds as a central pillar of the new security order after the war, in the region?
It should be a strategic partnership, and I think it will be. I want to join the many, many voices around the world that are condemning the attack on the residents of President Nechirvan Barani in Dahok. This was totally uncalled for. It makes no sense from any strategic point of view, and it's meant to be simply coercion. And I'm glad that no one is accepting that, except perhaps, and it's not surprising, the coalition framework. I saw a statement from them, which seemed to suggest that they were blaming that attack on external powers, as if somehow the United States or some other country decided to do that bombing and then blame it on the Iranians. That's ludicrous, and it belies all the evidence of all those drones and all those missiles, hundreds of them, that the Iranians have thrown at the Kurdistan Region just in the past few weeks. So fortunately, nobody believes that. But what I think everyone here in Washington, Republican, Democrat, Independent, does believe in is a strong partnership with the Kurdistan Region. Because what I said earlier that your development and your partnerships do serve as a model for the region. So if we can help the region develop, that's good for Iraq, and it's good for the Middle East in general.
We see that Israel and the United States are acting decisively against Iran, but at the same time, they are doing it without the consensus of the European partners, even NATO. So how would you see that? Do you think that after the war ends, the United States will think about a new security partnership with the Middle East at the center of this theater, or will they reassess their partnership with European partners?
No, this is one of the reasons why I talked about a new strategic military alliance between the United States and the GCC countries. Because I do think that people are recognizing that the time has come for there to be not just NATO to deal with issues on the European continent, but there needs to be a similar alliance in the Middle East to deal with all the threats, but also take advantage of all the opportunities and provide cover and security and Safety for development to take place uninhibited by threats from revolutionary or fanatical regimes like the ones we've seen in Tehran, one we saw in Baghdad for the years prior to 2003 and in Syria and so on and so on. So I do think there is a strong likelihood that we will see from this president, who, as you know, likes to do things very differently and things that are long lasting, that you will see a strategic military alliance between the GCC countries and the United States, and that will benefit Iraq, and it will benefit the Kurdistan Region.
In your view, what roles are Russia and China playing in this conflict behind the scenes? Are they playing any role? And how do you see that?
Well, we've all seen the reporting about Russia and Iran coordinating and helping each other with drone technology. You've now, unfortunately, been the victim of many of those Shah drones in the Kurdistan Region. So you can see what a partnership with Russia gets a country. It's not good. That's why Russia doesn't have any friends who are doing well economically, doing well politically, with lots of friends and alliances around the world. So I don't think that's the way of the future. I don't think you're going to see suddenly Russia or China steaming into the Gulf and saying, you know, I'm everybody's new partner. Everybody trusts me. We can do this together. I think nobody's going to go for that.
Is that something that Washington is putting into its calculations when they are thinking about the future of that region?
Well, we always have to think about strategic threats. And you know, it's not necessarily the way that Beijing is operating now to try to match us militarily in these partnerships, but they try to move in in different ways, through technology, through business deals, and through oil deals and so forth. Again, I just think that every government, every individual voter, needs to keep in mind what country, what government has been there with them to help them, develop them through, develop their economy, through difficult periods as well as the good periods. That's the United States. That's not China, and that's not Russia.
You've worked on the Middle East, and you quite well know how that the things are working in the Middle East. So, how do you see the calculation here when it comes to the Iran war, and if I'm adding that, is there a high risk of miscalculation here? Do you see that? Did you see any miscalculation? What is it?
No, absolutely. I see the potential for that. And in fact, you know, as you noted in the beginning, I've worked on Iran and the countries surrounding Iran for decades, and so we as diplomats have always been involved in planning with our military colleagues for different potential scenarios. And if you had had me on this show two or three months ago, I would have predicted that there probably would be eventually, a war with Iran, but not because we started it, but because they crossed a red line that they miscalculated on. I think that they were about to do that in 2019 when the United States decided to eliminate Qasem Soleimani. And I think there have been different periods in history when it almost happened. You remember that in 2011, there was a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador here in Washington. Out of well, they weren't planning just to kill him. They were planning to take out an entire restaurant full of people. Had they done that? I think that might have been the beginning of the war right there. So, yes, I think that the regime has a history of miscalculating. They've, frankly, been lucky up until now. Think about the beginning of all this. 1979,1980 they took over our embassy. They took our diplomats hostage for 444 days. That, by itself, could have been a casus belli. So I think this war was probably going to happen one way or another, and President Trump decided I am not going to wait for that miscalculation. I am going to do it now on my own terms, when the regime and its proxies are probably in a weaker position than they've been in decades, maybe since the end of the war with Iraq.
Do you think that the White House and the State Department made the right calculation to do it now?
Well, I think President Trump made the calculation. Let's be clear on that.
Did he do it alone?
Yeah, I don't, I don't think that he's receiving a whole lot of analysis or advice or recommendations from down in the bureaucracy. Certainly, he listens to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, certainly listens to General Dan Caine, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as Secretary of Defense, Pete hegseth and a couple of others. But this government is not working. This administration is not working in the way that is typically done in administration. So, for better or for worse, the president owns this decision one way or the other.
What would make President Trump or what condition is needed to be met for President Trump to declare the final victory and put an end to this war?
Well, clearly, opening the Strait of Hormuz in such a way that allows for oil traffic to go back and forth. That means convincing the insurance companies that it's safe again, not just making it safe, but convincing them that it's safe, because if a ship is perfectly safe going through it, but the insurance companies aren't convinced of that. They won't insure the ships, and the ships won't go. That's something that viewers really need to understand, because there may come a moment when the Strait is secured militarily, but the ships still aren't going, and that's because of the second piece with the insurance companies. Now the US government may also be able to help by providing some of that insurance themselves or political risk insurance, but we'll have to see if that happens. I think that the President, as he said today, and he said many other times, he's looking for a change in the regime's behavior. And some of that we know from the reporting of the 15 points, which may or may not be accurate. It's just media reporting, but we know for sure that for decades we have been trying to contain this regime from destabilizing countries around the region, including and especially Iraq, but also Lebanon, also Syria, also Yemen. This has got to stop; their threats with their missiles and drones have got to stop. And I think that there needs to be some sort of reassurance with regard to their use of nuclear technology. Those are all the things that are going to have to be addressed one way or another. Both Washington and Iran seem to be putting out their maximalist positions right now, but when you boil it down to the essentials for the United States, it's got to be those three things: proxies in the region, missiles and drones and the nuclear program.
So I would go back to my first question, can they achieve this without sending boots on the ground or by negotiation, as another option that President Trump has to make that happen?
Right, one thing that is different about President Trump? There are many things that are different. People spend many, many hours talking about that, but one thing that we don't talk about often enough is the fact that he is willing to talk with anyone at any time. Whereas previous Presidents have said, well, we need a process. We need them to deserve talking to me, we need to wait until the right moment. President Trump says, Let's do this. And so that's what he says he's doing right now, probably through intermediaries like Pakistan and, and others, as we've seen in the past, the United States and Iran rarely talk directly to each other. So that part is, is normal.
Which way is the better way?
You mean directly or through intermediaries?
President Trump's policy or the other President's policy?
No, I will. I think my advice is always…
I am going to say this, I recall Secretary Rubio said that with other administrations for some situations like that, you need months of deliberation and bargaining and having interagency meetings to make a decision, but with this President, you can make it in one or two hours, right?
And that means he then owns the decision all by himself, whether it goes well or doesn't. So that's a political risk, but it's one he's been willing to take many times. I think it is important to have a president who is willing to cut through the preparation time and preconditions to be able to talk with an adversary. That's the essence of diplomacy, actually. Now, whether this is going to succeed or not, my point is that we have seen the willingness to enter into and conduct negotiations, but whether that's going to succeed or not, without further pressure, such as the introduction of ground forces into Iran, remains to be seen. I do think that the President has a history of looking for leverage points where he can and probably hasn't made a decision right now whether he is actually going to use ground forces, but he wants to have the options available in the region, and that is also sending a message to the regime, this could get much, much worse, in addition to hitting Some of the strategic targets that he has talked about
We've heard from Iran that they demand US withdrawal for any future agreement with this administration. So, in your view, how should Washington approach to that demands, given its long-standing commitment to the regional security and their security partnership in the Middle East?
Ignore it. They just have to ignore it, because that's ridiculous. It's, It's Iran, it's the, it's the Iranian government stating its long-term goal, which is regional dominance. So if you just leave United States, sure, we won't need proxies anymore. We won't need all these missiles and all this other stuff anymore, maybe because we'll have the field free to ourselves. That's not going to happen, nor would any of our partners in the region want that to happen. So that needs to be ignored in that sense. But coming back to what I said earlier about a strategic military alliance, I actually think that could be very reassuring to a rational regime in Tehran, because it it guarantees stability, just as we've seen between the former Soviet Union and Western Europe, there was no war, and I think in large part that was because the Soviet Union knew that an attack on one meant an attack and a response from all and that they weren't able to stand
So, what is the right path to follow from now on, weaken the regime and leave them until they regain whatever they had in the past, or finish the job?
Well, I think there's been a lot of reporting about how the Gulf Arab governments are encouraging Washington quietly to finish the job. Because what's more dangerous than the Tehran of a couple of months ago is a Tehran that is weakened but angry and looking for revenge. And as we know from their history over the past 40 years, they can be patient. They make their plans, they wait for the right moment, and then they strike. So Washington and all of our partners need to make sure that that's not possible. So I think the regime needs to understand that we could come back in at any moment, that with the help and the support of our partners, and so they're not going to get that security guarantee from us that they say that they want, but they may be able to get an understanding that this military alliance is going to be so strong and so stable that if you attack it, it'll be ten times worse than it was for you just now, therefore don't attack it, and if you don't attack it, then you're not going to be attacked either. That could work.
And this is my last question. Do you think of finishing the job? How long does it take, and can they do it without sending the boots on the ground? Is it feasible?
Everything's possible. I mean, you could have regime actors who say, look, I just don't want this to continue any further. I don't want to see the incursion of ground troops. I don't want to see the escalation and the unpredictability that that would bring. Therefore, let's talk seriously. Now, according to President Trump, as of this morning, he is receiving serious messages that he's taking seriously, probably via the intermediaries. So yes, I think it's entirely possible that there could be some arrangement that at least quiets things down, cools things down, so you don't see the drones, you don't see the missiles, you don't see the threats to the strait. It doesn't mean that somehow there's an entirely new regime in Tehran, but at least a period to cool off and to assess and to talk about what a more long-term arrangement with Iran and throughout the region would look like.