Sign In / Up

Add contribution as a guest

Your email will not be displayed publicly
Benefit of signing in/signing up to personalize comment

Comment as a guest

Your email will not be displayed publicly
Benefit of signing in/signing up to personalize comment


Not a member Register   Forgot Password
or connect using





Alleged deal for ISIS’s withdrawal in Tabqa is not unprecedented in Syria

By Paul Iddon 4/5/2017
A Syrian Democratic Fighter walks near the Euphrates river near Tabqa, Syria, in April 2017. Photo: AFP
A Syrian Democratic Fighter walks near the Euphrates river near Tabqa, Syria, in April 2017. Photo: AFP
The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) vehemently denied on Thursday a report from the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights conflict monitor which claimed they permitted the Islamic State (ISIS) to withdraw from Tabqa as part of a deal. However, previously negotiated tactical withdrawals between ISIS and its adversaries suggest that such a deal would not be wholly unprecedented.

“I take the SDF at their word when they say they haven't negotiated a deal with ISIS in Tabqa,” said Kyle Orton, a Middle East analyst and Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society think tank in the UK. 

Last August, when the SDF had ISIS surrounded in Manbij, they offered to facilitate an ISIS withdrawal in a 48 hour timeframe with their “individual weapons.”

ISIS ignored that offer.  

“In Manbij the coalition and the SDF did allow ISIS to pull out eventually,” Orton said. “But that was a hellacious fight in Manbij and even cost the SDF a lot of foreign fighters, who tend to be well-protected.”

Russia and the Syrian regime suggested last year that the US-backed Iraqi offensive on Mosul intentionally left the city's west side open so ISIS could withdraw its forces en masse across the border into Syria and swamp regime forces there – particularly in Deir Ezzor, where an isolated garrison of Syrian soldiers could have been overrun. Iranian-backed Iraqi Shiite Hashd al-Shaabi units were subsequently deployed there to hinder any attempted ISIS withdrawal. 

Orton sees “no evidence” that Turkey negotiated an ISIS withdrawal from Jarablus during the opening phase of its — now concluded — Euphrates Shield Operation last August. 

“Jarablus was a tactical withdrawal,” he said, “It's standard ISIS practice to withdraw from urban zones when faced with overwhelming firepower. 

“Other times they stay and fight on because they need a political victory within a military defeat,” he elaborated. “In Fallujah that meant dragging it out long enough for Iran's proxy militias to commit sectarian atrocities. In Jarabulus it meant pulling out so Turkey could have a frontline with the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] — which inevitably led to clashes.”

In al-Bab earlier this year, ISIS were unlikely to have accepted any Turkish offer to relocate their forces from that city unmolested rather than fight. Ankara would no doubt have preferred an option wherein ISIS instead fought the SDF/YPG in nearby Manbij over putting their own soldiers and Syrian proxy fighters on the line digging the militants out.

Instead the Turks likely concluded, correctly and logically, that ISIS were determined to slug it out on the defensive against them in their entrenched positions in al-Bab rather than risk becoming much more exposed and vulnerable by venturing out into the open, to assault the SDF in Manbij, and risk quickly losing a lot of fighters and weapons to coalition airstrikes – as they did in their costly siege on Kobani. 

One battle Orton cites, wherein ISIS did agree to a negotiated withdrawal, was the first battle of Palmyra back in March 2016 against a Russian-backed Syrian regime ground offensive. 

“ISIS’s retreat from Palmyra in March 2016 is a classic case of Assad and those who support him using ISIS for their own ends, particularly to defeat the more general Syrian rebellion,” Orton reasoned. “The withdrawal of ISIS was coordinated with Assad to allow the Russians to have a victory at that time as a capstone to their intervention, which had overwhelmingly focused on the mainstream rebels as part of an attempt to force a binary choice, either the dictatorship in Damascus or a terrorist takeover of Syria. 

“This binary choice, Assad calculated, would make it more likely that the international community would acquiesce to his continued rule, and maybe even assist it.

“The Palmyra operation was a political move, not a military one, designed to switch the narrative to one where the pro-Assad coalition was a partner against terrorism, rather than terrorism’s enabler.” 

Orton says that particular deal “was between an ISIS official and someone from the regime's Mukhabarat [intelliegence]. It was written up in an internal ISIS document.” 

It was also, he added, simply another example of collusion between Assad and ISIS, in its current and previous forms. 

“The Assad regime has a relationship with the Islamic State movement going back to at least 2002 when the regime helped ISIS assassinate an American diplomat in Jordan and set up the “ratlines” that brought the foreign fighters into Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003,” Orton recounted. 

“Without Assad’s military-intelligence service facilitating ISIS's recruitment of foreign fighters, who were disproportionately suicide bombers, and providing other kinds of support, including a hinterland, hundreds of Western soldiers and thousands of Iraqi civilians would be alive today, and ISIS would be far weaker,” he said.

Orton added that Assad “left ISIS alone” as ISIS was “publicly building up its caliphate.” 

In the meantime the Syrian dictator was “blitzing other insurgent groups. In some areas, Aleppo City and Marea are well-known cases, ISIS and Assad worked in tandem to attack the rebels. Their strategic goal being the same, namely the elimination of the ‘grey-zone’ between the regime and the jihadists.” 

Unlike the regime, the SDF/YPG do not have any history of such collusion with the militants. It would not be unprecedented, however, for them to offer ISIS negotiated tactical withdrawals in certain areas — secure in the knowledge that they will confront those militants elsewhere in their rapidly shrinking caliphate at a later date.


Dutchman | 5/5/2017
This is a good analysis, containing many recent historical facts. But I do have one remark. Maybe it would have been wise to let IS escape from highly populated places like West Mosul or dangerous places like the Tabqa dam, in order to kill them in the desert. Assad and Putin and Putin should stop acting as if they did the big fight against IS. Without the SDF and the US-led coalition IS would have taken Deir Ezzor, as well as the rest of Syria.
Gina | 5/5/2017
ISIS was not around in 2002 and 2003. Orton or the editor should be careful with their terminology.
FAUthman | 5/5/2017
Making a deal with ISIS to get out of the Tabqa dam, is probably the only way you could prevent ISIS from blowing up the dam!
Mark | 5/5/2017
It's not only morally the right thing as it will spare the total distruction of the town and the dam but it is a good military strategy as well, it's not as if they have a peace agreement. Russia/Assad and the Turkish backed jihadi rebeles are doing the exact same thing on a much larger scale, also Turkey did the same thing in Al-Bab allowing hundreda of ISIL fighters to exit, so why is this all of a sudden news if SDF deploys this tactic?
Kurdo | 5/5/2017
Orton is like jihadi julian, a krypto-muslim. Never trust a muslim.

Be Part of Your Rudaw!

Share your stories, photos and videos with Rudaw, and quite possibly the world.

What You Say

Afrin is now Turkish soil | 2/18/2018 12:43:43 PM
Sweet... three less terrorists returning to Europe! Begs the question why YPG decides to keep it quite for over a week. Hiding is immense losses...
Ares | 2/18/2018 12:44:25 PM
Condolences to their countries and families. Barbaric turkish government should be hold responsible for these tragedies and war crimes commited...
Two volunteers from Europe die defending Afrin
| 11 hours ago | (2)
Alex | 2/18/2018 9:06:49 AM
In my opinion they can stay as much as they need we kurdish people like American people but also we need to highlight America let kurdish people down...
How long will the United States stay in Rojava?
| 16 hours ago | (1)
Jay | 2/13/2018 3:25:58 PM
Those stupid Kurds spent all their savings going to Mecca and the money is gone to corrupt Saudis thinking they will go to Jennah, I feel sorry for...
Nachirvan Barazani | 2/18/2018 6:16:28 AM
Why can't they fly to Baghdad first then to Mecca ?
Baghdad okays international flights for Kurdistan’s pilgrims
| 13/2/2018 | (4)
The Kurdish Painbter | 2/16/2018 8:31:27 PM
Bravo, great poet, noble Kurd, hailing the fighting heroes of Afrin, your next pioem will be our epopey celebrating the birth of the Kurdish state.
Hejar | 2/18/2018 4:29:59 AM
The fight the YPG is putting up against Turkish terrorists and invaders is nothing short of glory. Turkey has clearly shown that they are the true...
Kurdish poet writes of pride in ‘lions of Afringrad’
| 16/2/2018 | (3)

Elsewhere on Rudaw

Demand for Iranian goods rises in Kurdistan Region as prices fall 30% 3 hours ago |

Demand for Iranian goods rises in Kurdistan Region as prices fall 30%

Consumers benefit, but rial dealers feel the more
Afrin speaks out: YPG is only force that has proved its worth 4 hours ago |

Afrin speaks out: YPG is only force that has proved its worth

The weapons given to the Syrian opposition are more
Kurdish security officer killed in Kirkuk amid wave of assassinations 5 hours ago |

Kurdish security officer killed in Kirkuk amid wave of assassinations

The officer was killed in his car outside his home more
0.625 seconds