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As I write this, reports of Iraqi and Hashd al Shaabi military movements just south of Kirkuk continue to circulate. While Kurdistan Regional Government officials began sounding alarms and contacting their friends, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi denied any intention to attack Kurdish positions. U.S. Special Envoy for the Coalition Against ISIS, Brett McGurk, tweeted that the Iraqi troops and Shiite militias were simply redeploying from Hawija to Anbar.
Mr. McGurk’s tweet should not reassure anyone. This is the same man who enthusiastically backed Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki even as he gutted Iraq’s institutions and denied the Kurds and Sunni Arabs their rights under the constitution. Just as Mr. McGurk seems to have believed anything and everything Maliki told him, the same Mr. McGurk seems likely to swallow any nice-sounding words coming from Haider al-Abadi.
As if to directly contradict the narrative of “no bad intentions from Baghdad,” Prime Minister Abadi on Friday supposedly dispatched President Fuad Masum to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leadership in Sulaimani. President Masum bore a letter of six demands from Baghdad: the Kurds, the letter said, must hand over control of the oil fields around Kirkuk, a major military base (K1) and the airport, hand over all ISIS militants held by the Peshmerga, allow the return of the Iraqi army to all places where they were stationed before ISIS, and remove Kirkuk Governor Najmaldin Karim from his position. They were given 48 hours to comply (the deadline for which had not yet expired at the time this column was written).
The specific nature, timing and tone of the demands suggests that the military movements a few kilometers south of Kirkuk are not some regular redeployment to Anbar, but intended as a threat to, at the very least, back up Baghdad’s list of six demands made upon the PUK. At the worst, the six demands (which no self-respecting Kurdistani could accede to) are designed to elicit a ‘no’ from the Kurds and thereby justify the launch of Baghdad’s military campaign against them.
Policymakers in Washington may have a short window of opportunity to head off impending conflict. A simple statement to the effect of “America will fully back any of its partners in Iraq who face military aggression from others” would do the trick. Such a statement might sound neutral, but would in effect clearly warn Baghdad, Iran’s militias in Iraq, and even Turkey and Iran itself not to attack the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Since we know that the Kurds will not initiate a military campaign against anyone, including Baghdad, such a public statement would provide the KRG with some long overdue American recognition for all they have done for Washington since 2003.
For too long, the United States has been reactive in its policies and unable to focus on the larger picture. Tunnel vision regarding the campaign against ISIS seems to prevent the Americans from seeing the larger contest playing itself out in the region, between Iran and its Shiite clients, Turkey and its Islamist allies in the region, Israel and some Western-backed Arab states.
In this context, officials in Washington need to take a breath and seriously re-examine old policies continuing on little more than their own inertia. Now that ISIS is largely destroyed, what more does Washington think it can realistically achieve by aligning itself so closely with Haider al-Abadi in Baghdad? Do the policy wonks of the State Department truly believe they can pry Baghdad out of Iran’s orbit?
By the same token, are officials in Washington going to continue seeing Turkey as the ally they want rather than the regime that actually now exists? Or have they, with the arrest of two of their consulate employees in Turkey and the resulting visa-spat, finally begun to understand the new face of Ankara?
When it comes to Iran, will Washington up its game just a little bit? American policymakers could start by realizing that if Washington revokes the nuclear deal it will make America look like the aggressor, removing any chances of Europe, China and Russia again supporting the kind of sanctions needed to isolate Iran. A much craftier American policy would instead keep the nuclear deal and simultaneously find other ways to contain, constrain and counter Iranian ambitions in the region. One of the best options for the Americans to do so can be found in Kurdistan.
Finally supporting the Kurds’ political ambitions would also be the right thing to do. After too many years of watching the government in Baghdad ride roughshod over a constitution that was meant to unite Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq, it’s time for Washington to finally dump a commitment to the “One Iraq Policy.” An Iraq made up of willing partners died after Nuri al-Maliki so alienated Sunnis that they welcomed ISIS, and after he and his successor so alienated Kurds they finally held their referendum. The results of that referendum were clear: 93% voted to leave Iraq.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
Mr. McGurk’s tweet should not reassure anyone. This is the same man who enthusiastically backed Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki even as he gutted Iraq’s institutions and denied the Kurds and Sunni Arabs their rights under the constitution. Just as Mr. McGurk seems to have believed anything and everything Maliki told him, the same Mr. McGurk seems likely to swallow any nice-sounding words coming from Haider al-Abadi.
As if to directly contradict the narrative of “no bad intentions from Baghdad,” Prime Minister Abadi on Friday supposedly dispatched President Fuad Masum to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leadership in Sulaimani. President Masum bore a letter of six demands from Baghdad: the Kurds, the letter said, must hand over control of the oil fields around Kirkuk, a major military base (K1) and the airport, hand over all ISIS militants held by the Peshmerga, allow the return of the Iraqi army to all places where they were stationed before ISIS, and remove Kirkuk Governor Najmaldin Karim from his position. They were given 48 hours to comply (the deadline for which had not yet expired at the time this column was written).
The specific nature, timing and tone of the demands suggests that the military movements a few kilometers south of Kirkuk are not some regular redeployment to Anbar, but intended as a threat to, at the very least, back up Baghdad’s list of six demands made upon the PUK. At the worst, the six demands (which no self-respecting Kurdistani could accede to) are designed to elicit a ‘no’ from the Kurds and thereby justify the launch of Baghdad’s military campaign against them.
Policymakers in Washington may have a short window of opportunity to head off impending conflict. A simple statement to the effect of “America will fully back any of its partners in Iraq who face military aggression from others” would do the trick. Such a statement might sound neutral, but would in effect clearly warn Baghdad, Iran’s militias in Iraq, and even Turkey and Iran itself not to attack the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Since we know that the Kurds will not initiate a military campaign against anyone, including Baghdad, such a public statement would provide the KRG with some long overdue American recognition for all they have done for Washington since 2003.
For too long, the United States has been reactive in its policies and unable to focus on the larger picture. Tunnel vision regarding the campaign against ISIS seems to prevent the Americans from seeing the larger contest playing itself out in the region, between Iran and its Shiite clients, Turkey and its Islamist allies in the region, Israel and some Western-backed Arab states.
In this context, officials in Washington need to take a breath and seriously re-examine old policies continuing on little more than their own inertia. Now that ISIS is largely destroyed, what more does Washington think it can realistically achieve by aligning itself so closely with Haider al-Abadi in Baghdad? Do the policy wonks of the State Department truly believe they can pry Baghdad out of Iran’s orbit?
By the same token, are officials in Washington going to continue seeing Turkey as the ally they want rather than the regime that actually now exists? Or have they, with the arrest of two of their consulate employees in Turkey and the resulting visa-spat, finally begun to understand the new face of Ankara?
When it comes to Iran, will Washington up its game just a little bit? American policymakers could start by realizing that if Washington revokes the nuclear deal it will make America look like the aggressor, removing any chances of Europe, China and Russia again supporting the kind of sanctions needed to isolate Iran. A much craftier American policy would instead keep the nuclear deal and simultaneously find other ways to contain, constrain and counter Iranian ambitions in the region. One of the best options for the Americans to do so can be found in Kurdistan.
Finally supporting the Kurds’ political ambitions would also be the right thing to do. After too many years of watching the government in Baghdad ride roughshod over a constitution that was meant to unite Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq, it’s time for Washington to finally dump a commitment to the “One Iraq Policy.” An Iraq made up of willing partners died after Nuri al-Maliki so alienated Sunnis that they welcomed ISIS, and after he and his successor so alienated Kurds they finally held their referendum. The results of that referendum were clear: 93% voted to leave Iraq.
David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
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