Since the 2005 elections, Iraq's Shiite factions have faced major disputes over the selection of the federal prime minister. This is largely because the financial power granted to the office increases year after year, particularly the spending authority, which has recently exceeded 9.3 trillion Iraqi dinars (around $7.15 billion) annually.
In the years following Iraq's first election, the budget allocated to the Federal Council of Ministers was financially smaller than that of the Presidency and roughly half of what was allocated to the parliament. Today, however, the budget and spending authority given to the Council of Ministers is incomparable to the Presidency and is 36 times greater than that of the parliament per year.
In 2005, total expenditures for the Presidency were 70 billion dinars, the parliament spent 69.7 billion, and the Council of Ministers spent 66.6 billion. Two decades later, in 2025, the Presidency's spending decreased to 52.4 billion dinars, the parliament reached 628 billion, but the Council of Ministers surpassed 9.3 trillion dinars.
According to Article 76 of the Iraqi Constitution, the legal timeframe for nominating a prime minister is 15 days following the election of the President. Sunday is the final deadline for the largest parliamentary bloc to submit its candidate's name to the President. However, Iraq's ruling Shiite Coordination Framework has yet to determine a candidate. Settling on an individual means designating someone with the authority to spend 9 to 10 trillion dinars annually for a four-year term.
Iraq's annual revenue and expenditure under six prime ministers
Since 2003, six prime ministers have led the Iraqi government for varying terms; Nouri al-Maliki served the longest, while Adil Abdul-Mahdi and Mustafa al-Kadhimi served the shortest. During Ayad Allawi’s tenure under the provisional government, there was no parliament-approved budget.
Oil accounts for 90 percent of Iraq's total revenue and public budget. Oil sales are tied to export routes, global prices per barrel, and international crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused a sharp collapse in oil prices.
The figures reveal massive fluctuations in revenue compared to expenditures, with the latter seeing unprecedented increases year by year.
In the early years (2004-2005) under Ibrahim al-Jaafari, total annual state spending was 22 trillion dinars, including the Kurdistan Region’s share. During Maliki’s first term, spending doubled to 50 trillion. Between 2011 and 2014 in Maliki’s second term, annual spending averaged 84 trillion dinars. Under Abadi, spending dropped to 68 trillion dinars annually, and the Kurdistan Region’s share was not spent.
During the four years under Abdul-Mahdi and Kadhimi, when the Kurdistan Region's budget was cut and only small portions of salaries were sent, expenditures rose again. Under Abdul-Mahdi, annual spending averaged 93 trillion dinars, and under Kadhimi, it reached 109 trillion.
Currently, under Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, expenditures have soared, with Iraq's annual general budget averaging 165 trillion dinars. This represents a six-fold increase in spending in less than two decades. During the same period, Iraq's population nearly doubled—from 28 million to 47 million—yet annual spending jumped from 22 trillion to 165 trillion dinars.
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Expenditures of the Council of Ministers, Council of Representatives, and Presidency (2004-2025)
Expenditures in Iraq fluctuate based on revenue levels rather than actual necessity. If revenue is high, spending follows. However, among the three powers, the Council of Ministers' spending has seen a vertical climb—from just 67 billion in 2005 to 9.3 trillion in 2025—while the Presidency's spending dropped from 70 billion to under 45 billion.
Actually, these expenditures are largely for salaries rather than investment. The Council of Ministers' spending, which exceeded 10.6 trillion dinars ($8 billion) in 2024, is double the entire national budget of a country like Syria, which has over 26 million people.
While these figures include independent commissions attached to the Council of Ministers, a 10 trillion dinar expenditure is striking. This post has the power to create either unity or division within Iraq and its foreign relations.
Institutions funded under this 9-10 trillion dinar umbrella include: the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, the prime minister’s office, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a 12,000-strong Special Force, the Shiite and Sunni Endowment Divans, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, various religious colleges, the National Investment Commission, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Military Industrialization Board, and the Martyrs and Political Prisoners Foundations.
According to the three-year budget law (2023-2025), 11.8 trillion dinars is allocated annually for the Council of Ministers' operating and investment costs. The highest allocations go to the Council’s Presidency (1.2 trillion), the Shiite Endowment (1.5 trillion), and the PMF (3.7 trillion). These three entities account for more than half of the total expenditure, mostly utilized for salaries.
Beyond the internal Shiite struggle—between civil and military wings—two global and regional powers, the United States and Iran, have continuously influenced the selection of Iraq's prime minister since the fall of dictator Saddam Hussein. They seek a candidate who aligns with their interests. Visits by the commander of Iran’s Quds Force to Baghdad and US pressure regarding dollar transfers to Iraq are part of this context.
Currently, the Council of Ministers spends 9 to 10 trillion dinars annually. Therefore, becoming prime minister means securing the authority over 10 trillion dinars a year. To put this in perspective, this is nearly double the 2025 budget of new Syria, which stands at approximately $3.4 billion (52.6 trillion Syrian pounds) for a population of over 20 million.
Finally, the past two decades show that the longer a prime minister stays in power, the greater their political influence. Sudani, like his predecessor, Maliki, seeks a second term, while Maliki aims for a third term for himself or a close associate. If the appointee is a recurring figure, they will become a hegemonic leader among Iraq's Shiites; if a new name emerges, they will represent a new charismatic leader for the next election within the Coordination Framework.
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