ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - Kataib Hezbollah – an Iran-aligned Iraqi Shia paramilitary group – is facing growing political pressure amid Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s push against economic interests allegedly linked to armed factions, as former comrades – including Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali – back his campaign to bring weapons under state control.
Baghdad has cancelled commercial contracts suspected of benefiting armed groups and moved to cut intermediary companies out of defense procurement. Kataib Hezbollah has responded by questioning the prime minister's wealth and his family's business interests, while refusing to commit to surrendering its own weapons.
Armed groups have wielded considerable influence in Iraq since the 2003 US-led invasion. Many subsequently gained political representation and access to state resources, leaving successive governments struggling to consolidate all weapons under their authority.
The current confrontation therefore concerns more than disarmament; it challenges the very core of economic and political power of armed factions themselves.
Former comrades back disarmament
Sadiqoun lawmaker Ahmed al-Mousawi, whose bloc is affiliated with the leader of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Qais al-Khazali, challenged paramilitary groups during a November 3 interview with al-Ahd television, affiliated with Khazali.
"The factions that say they are resistance - who are they resisting?" he asked. Mousawi criticized factions that had accused Asaib Ahl al-Haq of abandoning resistance for political and financial gains, arguing that a strong state was more effective than separate armed groups.
"If your thinking is so limited that you want to confine yourself to a faction whose capabilities amount to 10 rockets, why don't we become a state and possess an arsenal like that of the Islamic Republic?" he asked. Mousawi did not explicitly name Kataib Hezbollah.
Two days later, Deputy Prime Minister Laith al-Khazali, the brother of Asaib Ahl al-Haq's leader, publicly supported Zaidi. "Restricting weapons to the state is a constitutional principle that is not open to debate," he told al-Iraqiya television of the state-owned Iraqi News Agency (INA), adding that the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework had unanimously endorsed the principle.
Influential Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has also endorsed state control of weapons.
In May, he ordered his Saraya al-Salam militia to separate from his political movement and integrate into government institutions. Iraqi security officials confirmed in June that the transfer process had begun. On September 30, Sadr also dissolved the Promised Day Brigade, an anti-US armed formation he established years earlier.
Sadr's position adds weight to the government's campaign, despite his movement being a rival of the Coordination Framework rather than part of its ruling alliance. He has also called for security forces to operate exclusively under the government's authority following the coalition withdrawal.
The shift extends to Kataib Imam Ali, formerly led by Shibil al-Zaidi. On October 1, Services Alliance spokesperson Husam al-Rubaie argued that the withdrawal of foreign forces had removed a principal justification for independent arms.
"Resistance is a state of societal rejection, not a profession or a means of achieving political gains," he told al-Dijlah television, owned by prime minister Zaidi, urging fighters to join official security institutions.
Iraq's Supreme Judicial Council acknowledged the divide in June, thanking Sadr's movement, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Imam Ali for agreeing to the principle of weapons under state control and urging other resistance factions to follow.
But acceptance of the principle doesn’t necessarily translate to immediate disarmament and compliance nor the dismantling of a faction's command structure.
These public positions do not establish that every group has completed disarmament, but they leave Kataib Hezbollah increasingly at odds with several former partners.
Economic pressure and counter-accusations
Last week, Zaidi directed the Defense Industries Commission to contract directly with manufacturers rather than intermediary companies.
London-based, Saudi-owned Asharq Al-Awsat, citing unnamed sources, reported that some intermediaries were linked to armed factions and profited from defense contracts. Rudaw could not independently verify those claims.
Zaidi subsequently cancelled three contracts at Mosul International Airport involving passenger counters, parking and taxis. Authorities suspected links to armed groups but did not publicly name the factions. Kataib Hezbollah denied controlling airport contracts.
The dispute has also reached the small town of Jurf al-Sakhar, also known as Jurf al-Nasr, in Babil province, just 60 kilometers southwest of Baghdad, where Kataib Hezbollah maintains a powerful presence. Its predominantly Sunni residents have long been unable to return after the area was retaken from the Islamic State (ISIS).
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) attaches strategic importance to Jurf al-Sakhr. Media outlets close to the IRGC say the preservation of the area under Iran-backed groups is directly linked to Iran’s national security.
On Monday, multiple Iraqi media simultaneously reported they had obtained secret documents from the ministry of interior of a purported intelligence report alleging oil smuggling and the tapping of pipelines there.
Babil Governor Ali Turki disputed the account after visiting one cited location, saying it was an old fuel station used by security forces. Rudaw could not authenticate the report or verify its conclusions.
The funds at stake can be considerable. A 2021 Chatham House study documented how networks tied to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), other armed groups and political parties profited from contracts, checkpoints and border crossings. Carnegie researchers also described armed factions' continuing influence around the Shalamcheh crossing with Iran. These findings establish a broader pattern of economic power, as opposed to proof that Kataib Hezbollah owns any of the companies targeted by Zaidi.
Meanwhile, Kataib Hezbollah security chief Abu Mujahid al-Assaf alleged on November 7 that Zaidi had accumulated nearly 21 trillion dinars ($14 billion), questioning whether the wealth came from government food and military catering contracts. No publicly available financial evidence has substantiated that figure.
On Sunday, Huquq MP Saud al-Saadi, from Kataib Hezbollah's political wing, submitted parliamentary questions about the prime minister's financial disclosures and possible conflicts of interest.
Another Huquq lawmaker, Mona Sawadi al-Mohammadawi, subsequently requested official information about al-Oweis General Trading Company and its contracts to supply Iraq's food ration program.
The prime minister's office said in May that he had submitted his financial disclosure to the Integrity Commission, but did not publish the value of his holdings. Parliamentary questions do not establish that the alleged wealth exists or that wrongdoing occurred.
The allegations followed Assaf's November 3 claim that Iraqi crude was being sold to the UAE's ADNOC at a $47-per-barrel discount, with the prime minister's brother among alleged beneficiaries. The accusation and the claimed profits have not been independently verified.
Disputed negotiations
A November 5 report by Iraqi newspaper Al-Mada, citing unnamed sources, alleged that Zaidi had taken direct control of negotiations previously handled by a Coordination Framework committee and rejected Kataib Hezbollah demands for appointments and influence over state institutions.
The newspaper claimed the faction sought five deputy ministerial posts, 32 director-general positions and roles involving border crossings and security institutions. Rudaw could not verify the allegations. Assaf has denied that Kataib Hezbollah requested any government positions.
Kataib Hezbollah says it is still waiting for a copy of an agreement reached between resistance factions and a Coordination Framework committee and insists it remains committed to its own undertakings, without accepting an unconditional surrender of weapons.
It is not alone in disputing the government's interpretation.
On Saturday, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada confirmed signing a document it termed the "Sovereignty Agreement" but denied having announced or signed any commitment concerning its weapons. Its position complicates claims that a united resistance front has accepted disarmament.
Harakat al-Nujaba has also opposed unconditional disarmament, arguing that Iraq remains vulnerable to outside threats. The disagreements therefore point to its growing political isolation from some former partners, rather than a complete break within the wider Iran-aligned camp.
Pressure, but no guarantee of compliance
Iraqi media reported, citing anonymous political sources, that National Wisdom Movement leader Ammar al-Hakim and Islamic Supreme Council head Humam Hamoudi were attempting to mediate between the government and Kataib Hezbollah. Rudaw could not independently confirm those talks.
Zaidi nevertheless warned during a Sunday visit to Anbar that weapons outside state authority used to threaten security or extort citizens would face the "full force of the law."
An arrest warrant dated July 5 against Hussein al-Hamidawi, identified by Iraqi media as the son of Kataib Hezbollah leader Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, also resurfaced amid the confrontation. The warrant, involving allegations of threats and violence, is not a new arrest or proof of guilt.
History suggests enforcement will be difficult.
In June 2020, then-prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi's forces arrested 14 Kataib Hezbollah members suspected of preparing attacks against US targets.
Armed faction members were deployed near Baghdad's Green Zone, and 13 suspects were released within days. In 2021, the arrest of PMF commander Qasim Musleh likewise prompted armed mobilization; he was released less than two weeks later after authorities cited insufficient evidence.
Under Zaidi, the August arrest of Harakat al-Nujaba-linked intelligence official Abbas al-Yaqoubi provoked an angry factional response. The PMF announced his release two days later following a judicial decision. There is no established evidence that militia pressure, rather than the court's decision, caused his release.
Kataib Hezbollah remains an influential armed and political force, and other factions have also resisted full disarmament. Yet, support for Zaidi's plan from Sadr, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and former paramilitary allies leaves the group with a narrower circle of publicly supportive partners.
The question that now stands is whether Baghdad can turn that political opening into lasting control over armed groups without provoking another confrontation.
