On February 29, 2020, the United States revealed it had reached a peace agreement with the Taliban, paving the way for the end of its nineteen-year quagmire in Afghanistan. While many details have yet to be revealed, the terms of the agreement call for a gradual reduction of US troops over a period of several months. In return, the Taliban will cease its support for terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.
At face value, the deal appears to be the best possible outcome for the United States. After all, the complete and utter destruction of the Taliban was never a concrete objective of US foreign policy when it invaded the country in 2001. At the forefront, the United States’ ultimate objective was to prevent terrorist organizations using Afghanistan as a base to launch attacks against its interests. Indeed, the agreement between the two parties aims to do just that.
Despite the optimism channeled by the Trump administration, the US-Taliban agreement in Doha raises more questions than answers. The deal does not guarantee peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government but opens a pathway for intra-Afghan talks. The Taliban has historically excluded the Afghan government from discussions with the United States, disregarding the Kabul administration as a mere puppet.
There are also several fundamental disagreements that may pose serious challenges for intra-Afghan peace. Today, Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic with a president and bicameral legislature. This contrasts with the goals of the Taliban, who have long sought to return Afghanistan to an Islamic emirate. The Taliban also rejects Afghanistan’s constitution, believing it to be contrary to Sharia law.
The biggest challenges to intra-Afghan peace will surround the role of women. The Afghan constitution gives all Afghans freedom of speech and allows for women’s rights and education. Articles 83-84 guarantee representative positions for two women from each Afghan province. Today, women make up nearly one-third of Afghanistan’s parliament. Women are included in Afghanistan’s military, police, medical, and education sectors. Additionally, women oversee the country’s newly established Ministry of Women’s Affairs and Human Rights Council.
A US withdrawal from Afghanistan may also escalate an already tumultuous battle for influence between Pakistan and India. On the surface, Pakistan has taken key roles in negotiations between the United States, the Afghan government, and the Taliban after increased pressure from the Trump administration. Meanwhile, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s attitude toward Pakistan has sharply declined since he took office in 2014, directly blaming the state for facilitating violence in Afghanistan and sabotaging peace efforts with the Taliban for its own interests.
In an August 2017 speech, President Donald Trump said: “The United States can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban, and others that pose a threat to the region and beyond.” The bold statement was quickly followed by requests for India take on a more proactive role in Afghanistan’s economic development and stability. Previous US administrations have spoken out against Pakistan. However, the Trump administration’s rhetoric further divides an already hostile region by placing its faith in Pakistan’s greatest rival.
India is Afghanistan’s largest export partner, while Pakistan is a distant second. New Delhi has contributed more than $2 billion in economic assistance and even more in infrastructure projects. The new Afghan Parliament building was built by India’s Central Public Works Department. Afghanistan is a central player in India’s efforts to bolster its standing in the region and contain Pakistan’s aid for Islamic militants in India and Kashmir.
While the US-Taliban agreement may be enough for the United States to achieve its primary objectives in Afghanistan, it is wishful thinking to suggest the violence will end.
Timothy Griffin holds a graduate degree in political science from Missouri State University. He is a US army veteran with eight years’ experience in counterterrorism and military intelligence.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
