The Kurdistan Region’s ruling parties — the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) — have demonstrated their regional influence by playing active and constructive roles in Turkey’s peace process and in efforts to prevent the Iran war from spreading to the Kurdish Region.
Yet paradoxically, the two parties have failed to translate their regional role into domestic political progress, as they remain unable to form a government following the October 2024 elections. At this critical stage, Ankara could help bridge differences and facilitate the formation of a new Kurdish cabinet.
The formation of a government would strengthen the Kurdistan Region’s position vis-à-vis Baghdad and contribute to Turkey’s goal of building a Kurdish-Turkish partnership in the Middle East.
A paradox of the Kurds: Domestically vulnerable, regionally influential
The fact that the KDP and PUK are long-established parties with years of governing experience has somewhat mitigated the negative effects of the delayed government formation process. However, this does not mean the Kurdistan Region has avoided political limbo in the absence of a new cabinet.
At a time of growing regional turbulence, a strong and inclusive government formed by both parties would make the Kurdistan Region more resilient to regional tensions. It would also strengthen the hands of Erbil and Sulaimani in dealing with Baghdad on issues such as the budget, energy, militia attacks, and air defense needs.
There is also a growing perception that Baghdad is instrumentalizing the rifts between the KDP and PUK. Holding new elections would likely impose further economic burdens and could result in another stalemate. Both parties therefore need to make mutual concessions while prioritizing the interests of the Kurdistan Region.
As months of negotiations over government formation continue, both the KDP and PUK have contributed to Turkey’s peace process through mediation efforts. Kurdish leaders’ talks with the warring parties — Iran and the United States — have also helped prevent the conflict from spilling into the Kurdistan Region, particularly by keeping Iranian Kurdish groups from becoming involved. However, the regional momentum gained by the Kurds has not translated into internal political progress.
Ankara’s peace process strengthens ties with Kurds across the region
Turkey’s peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has positively impacted Ankara’s relations not only with Kurds inside Turkey but also with Kurdish actors across the region. As reflected in Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s recent visit to Istanbul and his meetings with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and senior Turkish officials, Ankara-KDP ties are built on shared concerns over preventing regional escalation, as well as deep economic, energy, security, and diplomatic cooperation developed over years of mutual trust.
Beyond its close relationship with the KDP, Turkey has also made significant efforts over the past two years to repair its previously strained ties with the PUK over the PKK issue. Ankara and Sulaimani have taken reciprocal confidence-building steps, including the PUK’s hosting of a PKK disarmament ceremony in Sulaimani, Turkey’s lifting of flight restrictions to the city, and the PUK’s inclusion of the Ankara-backed Iraqi Turkmen Front in Kirkuk’s rotational governorship model.
While pursuing reconciliation with Kurds domestically through the peace process, Turkey has also entered a period of reduced tensions with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria. Turkey’s improving ties with Kurdish actors, combined with the KDP and PUK’s mediation roles and their shared anti-war stance, create space for Ankara to help bring the two Kurdish parties closer together.
Kurdistan Region’s unity and stability serve Turkey’s regional vision
Ankara has long advocated resolving regional issues through regional actors, an approach aimed at reducing external intervention and addressing problems at their roots. In this context, Turkey’s potential role as a mediator between the KDP and PUK could produce significant results for all sides, much like the support both parties have provided to Ankara’s peace process.
Greater stability, security, and unity in both Erbil and Sulaimani would also be crucial for the successful implementation of the PKK’s disarmament process. The momentum generated by the peace process between Ankara and the Kurds — as well as between the KDP and the SDF — should extend to relations between the KDP and PUK. High-level meetings mediated by Turkey in Ankara, Erbil, and Sulaimani could help build trust between the two parties.
Ultimately, Turkey, the KDP, and the PUK possess sufficient experience, diplomatic channels, and mutual understanding to recognize that a long-term Turkish-Kurdish partnership is both mutually beneficial and increasingly becoming a regional reality. To advance this vision, the KDP and PUK — the two historic and indispensable parties of the Kurdistan Region — must prioritize unity over polarization.
Sohan Aydogan (previously published as Shokhan Sherzad Qader) is a Turkish/Iraqi academician and researcher based in Ankara. She is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations of the University of Salahaddin, in the Kurdistan Region. She holds a PhD from Soran University in Erbil with a thesis on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Her works focus on Turkish foreign policy, KRG, Iraq, and the Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.