Friends of the Kurdistan Region across the world have been scrambling to urge dialogue. In London, APPG Chairman Jack Lopresti secured a high profile question to Prime Minister Theresa May which boosts awareness of the delicate situation while her Foreign Secretary was quizzed in great detail by foreign policy experts.
These interrogations reveal the legacy of history, the limits of British foreign policy, honestly admitted dilemmas between stability and justice, and significant sympathy for the Kurds. They provide a useful platform for defending and promoting Kurdish interests and aspirations in the most difficult circumstances for a generation.
Conservative MP, Jack Lopresti who has visited Kurdistan three times since 2015, asked: 'Last month I was in the Kurdistan region of Iraq...where I saw people’s enthusiasm for independence and a fresh dialogue with Baghdad. The subsequent military actions against the Peshmerga by Iranian-backed militia and the Iraqi army are wholly unjust and completely unacceptable. Will the Prime Minister accept that the Peshmerga and the Kurdistan region, to whom we owe so much both for resisting Daesh when the Iraqi army dumped their weapons and ran and for helping to keep our own streets safe, remain vital to our security? Will she do all she can to encourage a resolution based on full respect for the Iraqi constitution and the democratic will of the Kurdish people?'
The Prime Minister gave a carefully phrased diplomatic answer, which put the issue in the context of the continuing fight against Daesh: '[He] raises a particular point about Iraq and the Kurdistan region. The Government have always been clear that any political process towards independence should be agreed with the Government of Iraq. We want political reconciliation in Iraq and we have been urging all parties to promote calm, to pursue dialogue and to take this issue forward through dialogue.'
The influential Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) had the luxury of more time to examine the issues. Conservative MP Royston Smith told the Foreign Secretary that 'recent events in Kurdistan, particularly over the weekend, were alarming. The referendum held in September was popular with Kurds, but we might perhaps concede it was premature and could even have been considered provocative. I know that you were in contact with Iraqis and Kurds over the weekend to try to urge restraint and de-escalation....Do you agree that Kurds should have a state of their own?
Johnson reminded the FAC that the British were disappointed that the referendum went ahead as 'we tried to stop it and we lobbied against it.' As for independence his starting point was 'no' although he added that 'I am a great admirer of the Kurdish people and their ambitions and what they are achieving. When you go to Erbil, it is fantastic. It is unlike, or could be, very different from many other places in that vicinity. It could be democratic, liberal and pluralist. It is an astonishing thing. It is a nation already but it is an astonishing polity in the making.'
Video from UK Parliament recorded on November 1, 2017. Subject: Oral evidence from the Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson
He also said: 'What exactly is the relationship between that Kurdish polity and the federal Iraqi structure? That is the question. It is our view that, for all sorts of reasons, it is much better to keep Iraq together. That is what we are telling our Kurdish friends and Baghdad. The important thing is for Mr Abadi and Mr Nechirvan Barzani now to negotiate.
Smith pushed the point about independence: 'The Peshmerga were very helpful in pushing out Daesh when the Iraqis were forced out of Kirkuk and elsewhere. We were helping to arm the Peshmerga. We are allies with the Iraqis, the Peshmerga and the Kurds. Do you see a difficulty in trying to negotiate a course between those two factions? They are more than factions because there are factions within the Kurds anyway. Those two—the Iraqis and the Kurds—especially on those borders and those arguments that have been well rehearsed, do you see a complication there? How do expect to navigate that?'
Johnson replied: 'We have an old friendship with the Kurds. I pay tribute to what they did in fighting Daesh; I saw it myself. We owe a great debt to the Peshmerga for their bravery and sacrifice. What they are doing is on behalf of all of us. That is why instinctively we are so supportive of the Kurds and their aspirations—the KRG, I should say.'
He then described the strategic conundrum for British foreign policy: the worry about 'what happens if an independent Kurdistan leads to the break-up of Iraq. We fear we would then have effectively a Sunni chunk running from Iraq into Syria over an indistinguishable border; you would have a great deal of Iranian influence; and it would be very bad news. It would be something that was not in the interests of long-term stability in the region.'
On this, he concluded that 'the interesting thing about Nechirvan Barzani, whom I know well, is that he is a gradualist in his approach. He has a vision for his country but he does not want to do it overnight. He can see a way of doing this over time, of not busting loose from the Iraqi structure. I think that is what we should encourage because the downsides are very considerable. He has in Baghdad at the moment, in Mr Abadi, the best possible partner that he could. I have a great deal of admiration for Mr Abadi. I think that they can work together to sort this out and that is what the UK will be encouraging.'
Labour's Ian Austin posed a tough question about possible foreign policy choices: 'I understand how much Britain has invested in a strong and unified Iraq, and I understand why you want to support Abadi, for fear of something worse, but if the choice is—as it appears to be—between a strong and unified Iraq acting as an Iranian puppet, which is what appears to be happening, and a more independent, more autonomous, pro-Western Kurdistan acting as a counterweight to the Iranians’ influence in the region, wouldn’t the morally and strategically sensible policy be to support the latter?'
Johnson acknowledged that some take that view as did Masoud Barzani's advisers and sought to be clear about how he is 'very much attracted to what is going on in Kurdistan and to the possibilities of that country. Given some of the difficult nature of the wider region, Kurdistan could be a beacon, an oasis and an extraordinary place. At the moment, we think that the risk of it establishing its own independence now, forthwith, would be very considerable in terms of Iranian impingement and the general destabilisation of Iraq.'
FAC Chairman Tom Tugendhat immediately grasped the historical pedigree of this statement and shot back 'So you echo the thoughts of the Colonial Secretary of 1920.' Johnson referred to the three vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra and opined that 'we all know the historical result. Alas, I think that any undoing of that now could have serious destabilising consequences. If I may say so, when our Kurdish friends say that they are under threat or that the Iraqi army is attacking them, we are with them in trying to restrain Baghdad, to appeal for common sense and calm. Actually, I am cautiously optimistic about the way things are going. Erbil is rattled by some of the way in which Baghdad is behaving, but things could be a lot worse.'
The British-Kurdish MP Nadhim Zahawi argued that 'Prime Minister Barzani...should be encouraged to maintain the unity of Kurdistan and then to start serious negotiations with Prime Minister Abadi, including on security at the borders, of course, and all the other things, to settle the big questions or challenges that led the Kurdish nation to the frustrations that precipitated the 25 September referendum, that is, power sharing, revenue sharing, and article 140 on Kirkuk and disputed territories? The State Department is encouraging, saying that the disputed territories remain disputed. Could we play a bigger role with Washington and the UN to facilitate that political settlement, which will deliver a stable and prosperous Iraq? Some of the regional forces may want to see it destabilised again and divide the will of Kurd against Kurd, or Kurd against Turkman or Sunnis, Arabs and Shi’ite.
Johnson totally agreed: 'When we talk to our friends in the region they say, “Please convene a summit, get everybody around the table, knock heads together.” Let’s see how we go. What we are saying at the moment is that we want them to do the talking. In the end, they have to sort it out. It is for Erbil and Baghdad to do a deal. They have not done a deal for ages. Now is the time.'
The timing of previous British diplomatic demarches was also scrutinised by FAC members who wanted a timeline of when the UK began to urge the Kurds to defer the referendum. Johnson was not immediately sure of the exact date. Labour's Mike Gapes asked if the UK had not really take it seriously until September, to which the Foreign Secretary replied that 'we took it very seriously and in real time...when it was well possible for the Kurds, for Masoud Barzani, to disengage.' The issue of whether the US and the UK came to the referendum too late to make a difference has now been superseded by the intemperate Iraqi reaction to the referendum but remains an interesting point for later dissection.
Last updated at 8:21 p.m. to add video of the oral evidence from the Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson
