ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), once a formidable political movement to reckon with, has been lurching from one crisis to the next since its charismatic leader Jalal Talabani took office in Baghdad in 2005 as president of the new Iraq.
Things began to change rapidly for the PUK after the 2005 general elections, with many loyalists accusing Talabani -- or as they euphemistically call him Mam Jalal (Uncle Jalal) -- of abandoning the party in Kurdistan for a glamorous post in Baghdad.
The recent clash within the PUK, with its two influential deputies breaking with Mam Jalal's familial power center, is only one in a series of consequences of the new circumstances that the PUK found itself in since 2005.
Soon after Talabani became the Iraqi president, following a strategic pact with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), a large portion of the PUK left the party with the group's enormously influential deputy Nawshirwan Mustafa, who later founded the defiant Change Movement (Gorran) and became an arch rival of both the PUK and the KDP.
PUK's internal tensions became even more apparent after Talabani suffered a serious stroke in late 2012 that left him almost paralyzed. He has not been able to speak publicly since he recovered from the stroke months later.
In the absence of an obvious alternative, the PUK rather reluctantly postponed the question of leadership for the party after Talabani.
Following a consensus, the party decided to back Fuad Massoum, a founding member of the PUK, to fill the presidential post in Baghdad and introduce Talabani's youngest son, Qubad, as the new deputy prime minister in Kurdistan.
Critics within the PUK accused Talabani's inner circle -- in particular the former first lady Hero Ibrahim Ahmed, of concentrating power in the hands of the immediate family while the party's two deputies, Kosrat Rasoul and Barham Salih, were left out with declining powers.
Both Rasoul and Salih have served as prime ministers of the Kurdistan Region and enjoy their own different power bases, although critics would say neither of the two has what it takes to replace Talabani in the party hierarchy.
Rasoul, a famous Peshmerga commander of the 1980s is from Erbil. He has considerable influence among party members in the Kurdish capital, to the extent that some commentators say the PUK voters in Erbil would choose Rasoul over the party if they had to.
But Rasoul lacks any larger support among PUK ranks in Sulaimani where the party's stronghold lies. He is considered too "simple" intellectually by many party members in Sulaimani -- which is called the cultural capital of Kurdistan -- to be able to lead the new generation of PUK supporters.
So, clearly, Rasoul could not lead the party in Sulaimani where PUK has its real power base, even if he was granted the leadership. And of course his illness has added to his disadvantage to replace Talabani. Since the mid-90s, Rasoul is suffering from a Parkinson-like syndrome which has made it extremely difficult for him to speak consistently, although he has never publicly spoken about his illness.
Barham Salih, on the other hand, is from Sulaimani and has a PhD in statistics and computers. That would automatically make him a viable candidate for the post. But ironically enough, he has never been a Peshmerga, which consequently deprives him of the support from PUK's military commanders who have all great positions in the party.
At 55, Salih is young, ambitious and admired by PUK's younger voters in Sulaimani, and to some extent even in Erbil. Perhaps this is exactly why the Talabani inner circle did not back him to replace Mam Jalal in Baghdad and instead favored the old, 78-year-old party official, Fuad Maasoum. An ambitious young deputy who becomes the president in Iraq will undoubtedly expand his influence within the party.
But quite obviously, while Salih and Rasoul individually lack the needed powers to mount pressure on the party's top layers, together they have sufficient support to destabilize the PUK hierarchy.
It is too soon to predict any long-term consequences of the recent rift, but quite clearly the Talabani inner circle cannot afford to ignore the two deputies for long, while an election is expected less than a year from now with the defiant Change Movement already taking the bulk of PUK voters.
Things began to change rapidly for the PUK after the 2005 general elections, with many loyalists accusing Talabani -- or as they euphemistically call him Mam Jalal (Uncle Jalal) -- of abandoning the party in Kurdistan for a glamorous post in Baghdad.
The recent clash within the PUK, with its two influential deputies breaking with Mam Jalal's familial power center, is only one in a series of consequences of the new circumstances that the PUK found itself in since 2005.
Soon after Talabani became the Iraqi president, following a strategic pact with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), a large portion of the PUK left the party with the group's enormously influential deputy Nawshirwan Mustafa, who later founded the defiant Change Movement (Gorran) and became an arch rival of both the PUK and the KDP.
PUK's internal tensions became even more apparent after Talabani suffered a serious stroke in late 2012 that left him almost paralyzed. He has not been able to speak publicly since he recovered from the stroke months later.
In the absence of an obvious alternative, the PUK rather reluctantly postponed the question of leadership for the party after Talabani.
Following a consensus, the party decided to back Fuad Massoum, a founding member of the PUK, to fill the presidential post in Baghdad and introduce Talabani's youngest son, Qubad, as the new deputy prime minister in Kurdistan.
Critics within the PUK accused Talabani's inner circle -- in particular the former first lady Hero Ibrahim Ahmed, of concentrating power in the hands of the immediate family while the party's two deputies, Kosrat Rasoul and Barham Salih, were left out with declining powers.
Both Rasoul and Salih have served as prime ministers of the Kurdistan Region and enjoy their own different power bases, although critics would say neither of the two has what it takes to replace Talabani in the party hierarchy.
Rasoul, a famous Peshmerga commander of the 1980s is from Erbil. He has considerable influence among party members in the Kurdish capital, to the extent that some commentators say the PUK voters in Erbil would choose Rasoul over the party if they had to.
But Rasoul lacks any larger support among PUK ranks in Sulaimani where the party's stronghold lies. He is considered too "simple" intellectually by many party members in Sulaimani -- which is called the cultural capital of Kurdistan -- to be able to lead the new generation of PUK supporters.
So, clearly, Rasoul could not lead the party in Sulaimani where PUK has its real power base, even if he was granted the leadership. And of course his illness has added to his disadvantage to replace Talabani. Since the mid-90s, Rasoul is suffering from a Parkinson-like syndrome which has made it extremely difficult for him to speak consistently, although he has never publicly spoken about his illness.
Barham Salih, on the other hand, is from Sulaimani and has a PhD in statistics and computers. That would automatically make him a viable candidate for the post. But ironically enough, he has never been a Peshmerga, which consequently deprives him of the support from PUK's military commanders who have all great positions in the party.
At 55, Salih is young, ambitious and admired by PUK's younger voters in Sulaimani, and to some extent even in Erbil. Perhaps this is exactly why the Talabani inner circle did not back him to replace Mam Jalal in Baghdad and instead favored the old, 78-year-old party official, Fuad Maasoum. An ambitious young deputy who becomes the president in Iraq will undoubtedly expand his influence within the party.
But quite obviously, while Salih and Rasoul individually lack the needed powers to mount pressure on the party's top layers, together they have sufficient support to destabilize the PUK hierarchy.
It is too soon to predict any long-term consequences of the recent rift, but quite clearly the Talabani inner circle cannot afford to ignore the two deputies for long, while an election is expected less than a year from now with the defiant Change Movement already taking the bulk of PUK voters.
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