The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced the final preliminary results of Iraq’s recent election on October 16, opening the door for appeals. In total, losing parties and candidates filed 1,436 appeals, which resulted in the manual recount of 4,324 stations. IHEC announced on November 8 that they had completed the recount of these stations with all results matching the previous counts, and no change in the outcome. They subsequently sent the results of their work to the Electoral Judicial Commission for their final decision.
The political scene became complicated after announcing the preliminary results on October 16, revealing that many traditional parties lost large chunks of their seats, while others made significant gains. As a result, some warmly welcomed the election results, while blocs that lost out cried foul.
The losing Kurdish and Sunni political parties accepted the election results and declared their adherence to their right to appeal, barely concealing their doubts about the outcome of the election. In contrast, the losing Shiite forces represented by the political forces affiliated with the Coordination Framework mobilized their bases to organize demonstrations and sit-ins at the gates of the Green Zone, condemning the results and demanding a manual recount.
The protest escalated to violence and confrontation between the protestors and the security forces on the ground, resulting in tents being set on fire and a field commander of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) killed on November 4. The situation took a more dangerous course when the residence of the Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi was targeted with rocket-loaded drones on November 7; an investigation into who was behind the attack has been launched by the government.
The Iraqi political landscape is divided between rival political forces, especially the Shiites. Some of these forces have weapons and can drag the political process towards the brink of collapse as soon as an armed conflict erupts. The previous days have witnessed several turning points that could have led to a significant armed clash, had it not been for the intervention of the political leaders to defuse the crisis and resort to the language of dialogue instead of violence.
It is worth noting that these events drew the attention of the international community once again to Iraq, and its political process. The international and regional community, led by the United Nations Security Council, condemned the assassination attempt against the prime minister. The political leaders run the risk of international interference once again if they continue down the path of escalation, rather than accepting the results of the democratic election process.
Power imbalance within the Shiites
The announcement of the election results revealed an imbalance of power within the vicinity of the ruling majority. In particular, the conventional forces represented in the Coordination Framework. Some of these forces lost a large number of their seats; for example, the Al-Fatih Alliance declined from 48 to 17 seats, including AAH declining from 15 to 6, and the Al-Hikma Movement from 19 to two seats.
On the other hand, the Sadrist movement's seats jumped from 54 to 74, and the State of Law from 25 to 34. New political parties emerged, such as Imtidad, who represented the October protest movement and won 11 seats. Ishraqat Kanon won 6 seats, in addition to the Tasmeem Alliance’s 5 seats, as well as a large number of independents.
Despite the changes mentioned above, the traditional political parties are seeking to deal with the new scene in the same order as before. They imagine that the Shiite majority must be represented by the same forces in the next government, forgetting that the same equation no longer works. Sadrists are now a heavyweight that cannot be ignored. Some parties present within the Coordination Framework were wiped out; others have their number of seats reduced to levels that no longer can be justified to influence the subsequent government formation.
Traditionally, the Shiite majority has been seen as the Sadrists, State of Law, Hikma, Fatih, and others. However, with the new election results, the Shiite majority could be several combinations, such as the Sadrist movement and the emerging forces from Imtidad, Ishraqat Kanon, and some independents, who represent more than 100 seats out of 182 Shiite seats. Or, it could be represented by the Sadrist movement and the State of Law totalling 108 seats. To be represented by the Sadrist movement, Al-Fatih, the coalition of state forces and some independents, would push their total to exceed 110 seats. Another combination could be all the winning parties and independents, excluding the Sadrist movement, which would push their total to 108 seats.
However, it should be emphasized here that it is tough to form a Shiite majority bloc without the Sadrist movement because some winners from the October movement and some of the independents will never enter into coalition with the Coordination Framework forces. Therefore, the formation of the Shiite majority must include the Sadrist movement, and they will be leading the way in one way or another.
Indeed, the Shiite majority and the government majority are two completely different concepts. The first means the majority of the Shiites are represented in the government, and would be the nucleus of the government and the political force that constitutes it. The second means a government represented by the winners of the election: Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds.
At the same time, the majority government means that some political parties need to be in opposition. A group of political forces, such as Imtidad, Hikma, the New Generation, the Kurdish Islamist parties and some independents have announced that they will not participate in any government and will not be part of the largest bloc. Other parties can be excluded even if they wish to join the government and, that way, there will be an effective opposition.
Therefore, the formation of the majority government must proceed, but with partial consensus and not total consensus. This partial consensus will create a pro-government parliament consisting of 200-230 members and an opposition that could range between 80-100 members.
Negotiations to form the next government
The marathon of negotiations to form a government did not begin in the corridors of political dialogue as soon as the preliminary results were announced. The political parties are waiting for the final results to be announced and approved by the Federal Court. Until then, no formal announcement of the largest bloc is expected.
The winning parties are waiting for the announcement of the final results to cross from the preparatory stage into more serious negotiations to draw a roadmap for forming the government and distributing positions.
A well-informed source stated that the political forces objecting to the election results had received promises that there would be a review of the appeals, and some changes might occur because of them. It is no secret that some of them hold hopes for an increase in their seats at the expense of the winners, particularly the independents.
In other words, the political stalemate remains in place until after the results are announced. At which point, serious dialogue will occur to form the largest bloc, see parliament open its first session, elect the speaker and deputies, and elect the president of the republic, nominating the prime minister.
The Sadrists and the Formation of the Largest Bloc
The leader of the Sadrist movement Muqtada al-Sadr broke the tradition of his party's negotiations with other partners by personally taking part in these meetings. When he visited Baghdad on November 4, he wanted to resolve coalition formation quickly. The Sadrists are convinced that they can form the largest Shiite and Iraqi bloc without some parties within the Coordination Framework. At the same time, they know that the Coordination Framework can not form the majority as they do not have the numbers needed.
The recent Sadrist tactics are marred by ambiguity and lethargy compared to the size of the responsibility entrusted to them. They have stopped official meetings with other partners for now, while they must intensify efforts to reassure partners and ensure that they stay the course.
At the same time, the Sadrist leader made significant changes in the political structure and replaced the negotiating team at the most sensitive time, handing over the reins to leading figures close to him despite being far away and not involved in close contact with the partners. Observers believe that the change could lead to a chill in relations or stall in dealings with partners until the new team is known. Most political parties do not know the new leaders personally, and are not familiar with their working methods.
The primary responsibility lies with the Sadrist Movement in starting the movement towards forming the largest bloc and proceeding to save the political process amid the fears of other forces that the Sadrists will dominate the political scene. Therefore, the Sadrists must provide the necessary reassurances to the political partners related to the next stage, and manage the need to absorb the influential political parties within the Shiite house while maintaining the presence of opposition in Parliament.
The failure of the political parties to complete the electoral process by forming a new government and adopting a new program could lead Iraq into a dark tunnel, whose end will be the collapse of the political process. The Iraqi people will not tolerate their antics. They expect jobs, security, and services; they may well not trust them any longer and come back to the streets in a much stronger manner than what was seen in October 2019. The international community might not be willing to stick its neck out to support the democratic process again, only to see the Iraqi leaders squander its results; they could well put Iraq into international isolation.
