The city of Manbij in northern Syria has become a focal point of attention recently since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened another military incursion.
The multiethnic city lies 40 kilometers from the Turkish border in the north and has turned into a competing framework for different local, regional and global actors in pursuit of their own interests. Ankara seeks to include Manbij in its “safe zone” 30km into Syria.
Article Eight of the 10-point Sochi agreement of 2019 specifically mentions Manbij (along with Tal Rifaat) stipulating ''all YPG [People’s Protection Units] and their weapons be removed.''
Strategically important, Manbij lies at the intersection of the M4 highway which strategically connects Aleppo to Raqqa, up to The Turkish border in the north.
With an Arab majority, Kurds, Armenians Turkmens, Circassians and Chechens also live in the city and its outskirts.
During the uproar sweeping Syria, the city was first controlled by moderate Syrian groups in July 2012 after expelling Syrian regime forces. In January 2014, it fell to the then expanding Islamic State (ISIS).
After grueling battles that lasted for months, Kurdish and Arab fighters of the newly established Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) dislodged the caliphate in August 2016. Since then, it is run by a civil administration and the Manbij Military Council - an affiliate of the SDF.
However, Manbij is desired by Erdogan as one of the two alleged targets (besides Tal Rifaat in northern Aleppo) of the imminent, though temporarily shelved, Turkish military operation into northern Syria.
To deter Turkish forces from advancing southwards, US troops were sent to Manbij in March 2017.
The Turkish rush for Manbij has its foundations in a promise and an understanding with the US.
On the very same day Turkey and factions of the Free Syrian Amy (FSA) announced the liberation of Jarablus (August 24, 2017) as part of Operation Euphrates Shield, then US Vice President Joe Biden who was visiting Ankara said in a press conference that Kurdish forces must leave Manbij to the east of the Euphrates River.
Though Biden’s remarks were aimed at reconciling Washington and Ankara, they were still perceived as a US promise.
Turkish armed forces along with Syrian proxies have already launched military incursions into northern Syria. These were Operation Euphrates Shield (2016), covering Jarablus and its surroundings, Operation Olive Branch (2018) in Afrin, and Operation Peace Spring (2019) in Gire Spi (Tal Abyad) and Sari Kani (Ras al-Ain).
Through Operation Euphrates Shield, Turkey succeeded in bisecting the Kurdish enclaves in western Euphrates (Afrin and Manbij) which the Kurdish forces were seeking to connect to the area under their control. Now, Turkey wants Kurdish-led forces be removed to the east of River Euphrates.
The other version of the story tells that any loss of the city of Manbij will disrupt the political landscape of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.
Manbij continues to be one of the disputed and simmering points that contributed to deteriorating US-Turkey relations.
In June 2018 an understanding was reached between then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusolgu on a roadmap to a solution.
Accordingly, independent U.S. and Turkish patrols were carried out. However, Turkish troops remained restricted to areas held by Turkish forces north of the Sajur River at the outskirts of the city.
The Sajur River is the de facto frontline between Turkish-controlled and the SDF-held areas.
Time and again Ankara accused Washington of being slow in implementing the agreement. The city has now turned into a bargaining chip for the U.S. to ease relations with Turkey.
In January 2019, four Americans who were on a foot patrol were killed in a suicide bombing in Manbij.
Later in the year, the U.S. troops withdrew from Manbij following an abrupt announcement made by President Donald Trump.
To pre-empt a potential Turkish invasion of the city, Syrian regime forces were deployed to a number of villages in the north.
Since then the fate of the city remains uncertain, arousing fears of a possible return of the Syrian regime to the city.
Economically, Manbij is Rojava's primary gateway for trade to areas held by the regime forces and those of the Euphrates Shield.
For the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), Manbij is vital as an indispensable economic artery that feeds the area with all basic day–to-day life needs.
Without Manbij, trade with the Syrian regime would be done through other means, but options are few and may deny Rojava financial resources.
From a Turkish point of view, controlling Manbij would pave the way for thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently in northern Aleppo and refugees living in Turkey to resettle.
Politically, any Turkish takeover of the city would not bring about any immediate damages to Rojava, however, it would weaken the position of the AANES in any future talks with Russia and the regime for securing a solution.
In the territorial sense of the word, the loss of further swathes of lands would be disruptive and divisive and could erode belief in the Autonomous Administration as a viable one.
In the current context, it is unlikely that Erdogan would move troops to the south without the approval of his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. This would make Manbij part of a territorial swap deal more likely in return for a territorial concession in Idlib.
With the Syrian crisis since 2011 been a simmering sticking point in the US-Turkish relations, the fate of Manbij will either fix or further damage them.
Lazghine Ya'qoube is a translator and researcher focusing on the modern history of Mesopotamia, with a special focus on Yazidi and Assyrian affairs in Turkey, Syria and Iraq.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw