When Syrian regime forces withdrew from the Kurdish-majority areas in July of 2012 to fully focus on fighting the newly formed Free Syrian Army (FSA), many Syrians (including Kurds) had a firm conviction that the six decade rule of the Baathist regime was drawing to a close, but that was not the case.
For the first time, the Kurds of Syria gained momentum in the wake of the 2011 Syrian civil war. They formed their own military units and announced an autonomous entity called the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) - also known as Rojava.
Furthermore, as Syria plunged into a deadly war, Rojava flourished in stark comparison. In addition, its three disjointed cantons (Jazira, Kobane, and Afrin) served as safe havens that provided shelter and protection to Syrians fleeing war atrocities.
The situation has drastically changed since as Syria - whose seat at the Arab League was suspended in November 2011over the violent crackdown on protests - has been re-admitted to the Arab fold when on May 19th Syrian President Bashar al-Assad strode into the Arab League summit held in Saudi Arabia.
Up to early February, Syria's re-integration into the region was unthinkable but the earthquake that hit the north of the country on February 6th paved the way for political normalization with Damascus. This has emboldened Damascus to the detriment of the Kurds.
In Damascus, the general perception is that Arab countries could benefit Syria and help ameliorate the effects of the US imposed sanctions (Caesar Act) that has crippled the country since 2020. However, to fully recover Syria's position, and restore its pivotal role on the regional and international arenas, Assad still has a couple of issues at home to address.
Rojava (or the Syrian Jazira as it is officially called) is replete with natural and underground resources without which Syria cannot recover its economic health. Besides oil and gas, Jazira is one of Syria's richest granaries.
Yet, the symbolic presence of the 900 US military personnel is a stumbling stone in that way. The US administration states Syria does not "merit" such rehabilitation. Ridiculously, reports of recent secret and direct US negotiations with Syrian officials in Muscat, capital of Oman, erode the credibility of the announced position towards Assad.
Backed by Russia, the defiant Assad who has never lost his legitimacy as a president lays claim to the whole of the country. Rojava is not an exception to the rule.
With limited options, the Kurds look with unease at the re-admission of Syria to the region. Relatedly, they were not inactive in the face of this erratic development. Though officially not confirmed, reports suggested that Mazloum Abdi, General Commander of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) had sought the mediation of United Arab Emirates (UAE) to bring them closer to the Syrian regime.
Reports of Abdi's visit to the UAE could be substantiated on the basis that the country nurtures unrivalled relations with Damascus. Previously, this mediating role was played by Russia. The UAE could have more empathy with the Kurds as well as influence on Assad as the country has been the driving force behind Syria's re- admission to the Arab fold.
Notably, from 2012 up to the battle of Kobane (2014-2015), the Syrian regime and the Kurds were on relatively good terms. Regrettably, the formation of the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (Islamic State) made matters worse. Syrian officials have since accused the SDF of being US agents. Nonetheless, the Kurds did not burn their bridges.
Periodic (largely security) meetings have always occurred between the two sides. The AANES and SDF - that control nearly 25 percent of Syria - have always reiterated they harbor no secessionist agenda on Syrian soil. Nonetheless, they maintain Rojava keep its own peculiarity. Damascus interprets the matter differently. Nothing seems to have emerged out of that.
Much worse, the Kurds' fear increased with the re-election of the incumbent Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan for a new five years term. Erdogan's re-election was met with anxiety in Rojava. With variances, the Kurds could make a common enemy between Ankara and Damascus.
From August 2016 up to October 2019, Turkish armed forces and their proxy Syrian National Army (SNA) mounted three ground invasions into north and northeast Syria. These were: "Operation Euphrates Shield" (2016) in the localities of Jarablus and al-Bab in far-eastern Aleppo, "Operation Olive Branch" (2018) in Afrin in northwest Aleppo, and "Operation Peace Spring" (2019) in both Gire Spi (Tal Abyad) and Sari Kani (Ras al-Ain) in Raqqa and Hasaka respectively.
The last operation was halted when Turkey and Russia signed the Sochi agreement (October 22, 2019), which - among others - entailed Syrian regime forces replace the SDF in border areas they had abandoned in mid-2012. The Kurds have always been a compromising card between Turkey and Syria.
Ironically, while Syrian regime forces have fledged their muscles under Russian aerial protection, and while the de facto situation in the opposition-held areas is maintained by Turkey, it is only the Kurds who remain vulnerable to attack. The Kurds say the US pays lip service to their cause.
Geopolitically, the developing situation of the war in Ukraine, the rising challenge (to the US) by China, the re-admission of Syria to the region, and the re-election of Erdogan - who seems in love with Russia and deviates from NATO - could relegate Syria to a position of zero priority for the US, the SDF's main supporter and life preserver. This could give way to Assad to dominate the Syrian scene.
In a sense, Rojava is unique. However, it is a hundred - to- one shot to retain such a uniqueness as Damascus looks the other way, and as long as the U.S. mission in the region remains restricted to "incur a lasting defeat" on ISIS.
It is in the Middle East more than any other place in the world where history could and often repeats itself.
Lazghine Ya'qoube is a translator and researcher focusing on the modern history of Mesopotamia, with a special focus on Yazidi and Assyrian affairs in Turkey, Syria and Iraq.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.