Everything in Syria is in a web, US journalist

Sam Dagher was one of very few western journalists,  based in Syria covering the country’s uprising and subsequent civil war. Dagher reported from Damascus  from 2012 to 2014, before he was detained and expelled by the regime for his reports deemed unfavourable to the regime. 

 

Dagher recently published a book on the Assad family's struggles to remain in power, entitled "Assad or We Burn the Country: How one family's lust for power destroyed Syria".  The book highlights key elements of the Syrian uprising and the methods Assad used to remain in power. 

 

Rudaw spoke with Dagher about his new book, how the Assad family has maintained control in Syria, the role of Kurds in the initial uprising, and where he sees the country heading next. 

RUDAW: You have written a book about Bashar al-Assad’s family, and the book has been described by people as a really fascinating read. It explains the Assad family and the role his family has played in the survival of President Bashar al-Assad. When you look at the uprisings in other countries in Egypt, Tunisia, and mostly recently Sudan, and Algeria--you saw popular uprisings leading to the ouster of regimes but this did not happen in Syria. What does you book tell us in this regard? 

Sam Dagher: Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you and the viewers. I think what is different in Syria is [that] this is a family that has been in power for 50 years so far. They have outlasted eight US presidents. Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father, came to power before Saddam Hussein who became the absolute ruler of Iraq. In the 1970s, Hafez al-Assad seized power and since then this family has  distilled this desire to stay in power at any cost, this lust for power, into a manual that they have applied whenever they face challenges both internally or externally. 

 

They have exploited regional rifts, tensions, and geopolitical situations better than any other ruler. Domestically, whenever they faced a challenge under the father then under the son, they went for maximum punishment. The idea is, you scare people immediately and you show them the high price that they will pay if they challenge the regime. So, this is how this family has operated. This is how they have succeeded in remaining in power so far.  

Scholars have argued that if 5-10 percent of your population rises up against you in a steadfast manner for a few weeks or months, your regime will be toppled. So can we say the Assad regime has set a new precedent that popular uprisings can be suppressed and oppressed?

Well, from day one, they went for maximum force when the protests started in Daraa. The security forces on the street had shoot-to-kill orders and these orders were coming directly from the Assad family, from Bashar al-Assad’s brother, cousins, and Bashar himself. As I have shown in my book, according to new evidence that has not been published before, he [Bahsar al-Assad] knew about these shoot-to-kill orders. He endorsed them. So, from the beginning, the idea was to scare people off the street [and] show them the high price of rebellion. 

 

But the problem is once the Syrian people breached that fear barrier and once they are on the streets and once these bullets are not scaring them, then obviously the regime is going to [start] arresting people, torturing people to death. 

In some cases, [the regime] returned the corpses [of activists] to their families after having tortured them to death in prison, and hoping  that it would  serve as a lesson to the community-- but that has not worked. People kept going on the streets. Then [Assad] started using tanks and airplanes. When he could not suppress them, he had to ask Iran and Hezbollah to help him. And when that was not enough, Russia stepped in. So, this is how they operated. They are to stay in power at any cost. Hence, the title of my book--“either he stays in power or the country burns”.

Assad does not have absolute control over the whole Syria as a segment of the country in the north is controlled by the Kurdish forces, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who are US allies. Why didn’t  Assad attack Kurds in the beginning when the uprising started? Based on your interviews with the regime loyalists or officials - what was the rationale behind not attacking the Kurds?

In the beginning, the Kurds were part of this uprising when it was peaceful. We had protesters in Qamishli, chanting the same slogans as the people in Damascus, Homs, and Daraa: freedom, liberation from this regime and dignity because they were all suffering under the same regime –a regime of lies, terror, and fear. 

There is a scene in my book… when one of the main peaceful protest organizers meets with the Kurdish political leader and tells them ‘Why do we not join forces  to have protests in Newroz?’, and the Kurdish leader says, ‘No, find someone else to start because in 2004 we rose up against the regime after the incident in stadium in Qamishli. And the regime answered in bullets and blood and many Kurds died’, the rationale of the Kurdish leader was that ‘You were just on the sidelines and you did not come to our help when we had been slaughtered by the regime. Why should we be working with you?’. 

 

From the beginning I think there was mistrust on both sides but despite this mistrust a lot of Kurds did come out and protest. Some Kurds paid a heavy price. We saw that with the assassination of Mashaal Tammo in the beginning. 

So again it was the same message to the Kurdish population of Syria like “Do not dare rise up against this regime because you will pay a heavy price. 

 

But then, as the pressure increased on the regime, the priority was holding on to the main cities: Damascus and Homs - basically the western half of Syria. Assad was facing challenges on many fronts, so he had to prioritize. What he did, with the help of Iran…is they reached a deal with a faction in northeast Syria – with the YPG[People’s Protection Units]  . They said to them, “Look. Take over this area. You would administer it, and give us the oil. Allow us to keep the airport. Allow us to keep the security presence.” Because Assad faced so many other challenges…  he was willing to at least not be in confrontation with the Kurds, and he worked up this arrangement with the YPG. In fact, even with the partnership the YPG now has with America, this has more or less remained to this day.

You recently wrote an article in the Atlantic magazine about the statues of Bashar al-Assad being re-erected in cities throughout Syria, and you said that this basically sends a signal of “We are back”…Has Assad won the war? Is there any hope that the US and its allies as well as the opposition  can remove him from power, or is it is all over?

 

I think bringing the statues back is a sign of weakness because it shows he can only rule Syria with fear and terror and by having his security apparatus, the Mukhabarat [intelligence], literally on top of people again. Also keep in mind he is only able to stay in power with the guarantees and protection of his two main foreign patrons - Iran and Russia. Without these two, he is not there. So, what kind of victory is that? 

 

In terms of what happens long term, unfortunately, now everything is linked to these other conflicts, issues, and proxy wars whether inside Syria or in the region. For instance, now this confrontation [between the US and Iran], well, guess what? Syria is a piece of that confrontation, given Iran’s presence and position inside the regime. The same with Turkey and what it wants, and whether the Kurds in the northeast can ever gain autonomy or be part of a future solution. Everything is tangled. Everything is in this sort of web. And now you just have to wait for these threads to untangle, unfortunately. 

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