Rojava and the new regional security order: Is the levant’s great game ending?

Both the ceasefire and the negotiations between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the interim Syrian government have remained fragile. However, the most recent agreement between the two sides - reached on January 27 and announced publicly three days later - appears to mark an important turning point.

The deal has taken shape under the combined influence of developments on the ground and the broader political and military dynamics unfolding across the Middle East.

In this broader context, the issue of Northeast Syria (Rojava) is clearly not merely an internal Syrian matter. Rather, it sits at the center of the region’s interconnected conflicts and has already produced significant political and security repercussions beyond Syria’s borders.

Following a joint statement by France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States emphasizing the need to halt hostilities and establish a long-term ceasefire, a high-level meeting was held on January 27. The talks brought together Mazloum Abdi, commander-in-chief of the SDF, and Elham Ahmed, co-chair of foreign relations of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), on one side, and Asaad al-Shaibani, foreign minister of the interim Syrian government, on the other.

Reportedly conducted in a “positive” atmosphere, the meeting appears to have laid the groundwork for the agreement between Damascus and Abdi announced on January 30. That agreement proposes a middle-ground approach to the highly sensitive question of integrating the SDF into Syria’s military structures.

Under the latest framework, the SDF would be incorporated as a special military division, contingent on individual fighters undergoing state vetting. While significant challenges are likely to arise during the implementation phase, the agreement has nevertheless attracted notable international support.

Should the ceasefire break

If the January 27 agreement collapses for any reason, several military scenarios could unfold.

First, the Syrian army could intensify its siege of Kobane, the strategic Kurdish-majority city in northwest Syria along the Turkish border. Simultaneously, advancing from the Gire Zaro and Chil Agha axes east of Rojava’s Hasaka province, Syrian forces may attempt a northward push toward the border.

The likely objective of the latter would be to sever the geographical link between Qamishli - the provincial capital of Hasaka and administrative center of the DAANES - and al-Malikiyah (Derik) in northeastern Hasaka. Positioned at the tri-border junction of Syria, Turkey, and the Kurdistan Region, Derik is critical to internal connectivity within SDF-controlled territory.

Second, Damascus may seek to exploit both the siege and the mobilization - or passive acquiescence - of segments of the local Arab population. Notably, some of the Syrian army’s advances east of the Euphrates after January 17 occurred not through sustained combat, but following a shift in allegiance by the al-Sanadid Forces, the Arab tribal component within the SDF. This realignment reduced resistance on certain fronts without direct confrontation.

Third, the border line adjacent to the Kurdistan Region represents a vital logistical artery for the SDF, facilitating both the flow of daily necessities and humanitarian access. Losing control of this corridor would significantly weaken the SDF’s defensive capacity. However, unlike northeastern Deir ez-Zor and north-central Raqqa - where Arab populations predominate - the demographic composition of this area may allow the SDF to sustain a longer defensive effort.

Finally, while Murat Karayilan, a senior figure within the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leadership, recently raised the possibility of resorting to “tunnel warfare,” drawing comparisons to the tactics of the Palestinian Movement Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the effectiveness of such an approach in Rojava remains questionable. The region’s limited strategic depth-narrowing in some areas to just 20-25 kilometers-severely constrains the operational utility of tunnel-based warfare.

US in the new regional security order

Neither the war in Syria nor the prospect of a Syria-Rojava agreement can be understood in isolation from the broader regional security architecture in which the United States has assumed a leading role. This emerging framework rests on several interrelated pillars: weakening the Iran-led ‘Shiite Axis’; promoting a Sunni crescent stretching from Afghanistan to Syria, in which jihadist and Hanafi Sunni actors gain prominence, reinforcing Turkey and Qatar as key regional players and safeguarding Israel’s military and strategic supremacy. Collectively, these objectives also serve to curb China’s and Russia’s growing influence in the region.

Viewed through this lens, Syria’s current trajectory becomes clearer. From the perspective of US President Donald Trump, the situation can be understood as Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s attempt to impose stability - an outcome that aligns with US strategic priorities in several ways.

First, it allows the US to withdraw its forces from Syria after a transitional period, a goal Trump has openly pursued since 2019.

Second, a stable Sharaa-led government could facilitate broader Israeli-Arab arrangements, including potential border agreements between Lebanon and Israel, as well as Syria and Israel. Trump, as the principal architect of the Abraham Accords, may also seek to advance a Turkish-Israeli accommodation. In this context, Washington’s abandonment of the SDF - a position publicly articulated by US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack, who also serves as US ambassador to Ankara - can be seen as a long-sought “achievement” for Turkey. Ankara’s participation in Trump’s proposed Gaza “peace board” may similarly signal the possibility of indirect normalization with Israel, even if indirectly.

Third, Sharaa’s control over Syria’s borders with Iraq would advance efforts to contain Iran’s regional influence. From Washington’s perspective, without US forces, the SDF might be compelled to align with Shiite groups in Iraq and Iran to ensure its survival.

However, during the Syrian civil war, the SDF demonstrated a more pragmatic approach. Despite tensions between the US on one hand and Iran and Russia on the other, the SDF maintained open channels with rival actors, avoiding direct confrontation with Iran, Shiite armed groups, and even Russia, while simultaneously operating alongside US forces. This illustrates a broader reality of Middle Eastern geopolitics: in a theater shaped by great-power competition, neutrality is extremely difficult to maintain, yet choosing sides carries significant and enduring costs.

Iran and Iraq

For Iran and Shiite political actors across the Middle East, Syria’s recent clashes are seen as part of a broader containment strategy pursued by Turkey, Sunni Arab states, and the United States - aligned with Trump’s approach of deterrence and sustained pressure on Tehran.

The strengthened deployment of Syrian forces along Iraq’s borders has revived historical anxieties within the Shiite public sphere, often framed as the “return of the Umayyad army.” Of note, the second caliphate established after the death of the Muslim prophet Muhammad was ruled by the Umayyad dynasty. The reference to the return of the Umayyads is a symbolic expression suggesting that Damascus may harbor long-term ambitions not only toward Iraq’s Sunni triangle, but potentially toward Baghdad itself.

Within this context, Shiite politics increasingly perceives itself as encircled by a Sunni axis stretching from Afghanistan, through the Arab Gulf states, and extending from Syria to Turkey. At both ends of this arc stand two established Hanafi Sunni poles - the Taliban and Sharaa.

The termination of the US alliance with the SDF, alongside Sharaa’s consolidation of authority - a dynamic reminiscent in some respects of Afghanistan - fits into a broader strategy aimed at containing Iran and Iran-aligned actors in Iraq.

This dynamic helps explain recent maneuvers by Iraq’s Shiite Coordination Framework (SCF), the dominant Iran-aligned political alliance formed in 2021. In response to developments in Syria and Rojava, the SCF nominated former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (2006–2014) to lead the government again. The US President swiftly criticized the move as counterproductive, warning that it could prompt Washington to cut aid to Baghdad.

It remains uncertain whether the nomination will withstand US opposition. Robert Gates, former US defense secretary, once noted that Maliki was appointed prime minister because “his position was weak,” only to be sidelined once he grew strong. This logic may help explain Trump’s current stance: what was once an advantage in Maliki’s weakness has now become a liability in Washington’s eyes.
For Iraq, developments in Rojava have also brought the issue of ISIS back to the forefront. Citing the need to control ISIS members and retain leverage with the US and the Global Coalition it leads, Baghdad agreed to assume custody of the detainees.

Before the recent upheavals, roughly 5,000 Iraqi ISIS prisoners were held across six detention facilities in Syria and Rojava, alongside nearly 5,000 Syrian ISIS members and about 2,000 foreign fighters. Iraq appears to have agreed to take responsibility for both Iraqi nationals and foreign detainees, totaling some 7,000 individuals - a decision that has sparked serious concern.

The central question is whether Iraq would be able to secure these facilities in the event of a hypothetical conflict involving Iran and Israel, or Iran and the United States.

One possible US calculation may have been to achieve two objectives simultaneously. On the one hand, in the post-SDF phase, Washington avoids leaving ISIS detainees in the hands of a Syrian state whose intentions and capabilities regarding former jihadists remain uncertain. The situation, however, is not entirely black and white: while Trump and Sharaa may align on certain issues, significant divergences undoubtedly persist.

On the other hand, the presence of roughly 7,000 ISIS prisoners on Iraqi soil - combined with the strengthening of Sunni political forces, Sharaa’s advance toward Iraq’s borders, and sustained US political, diplomatic, and economic pressure - places Baghdad in an increasingly constrained position, forcing it to weigh carefully any stance in a potential US-Iran confrontation.

Turkey’s role in Rojava

For Turkey, the recent offensive by the Syrian army and affiliated armed groups against the SDF achieved much of what Ankara had long sought. The DAANES and Kurdish-led forces no longer maintain a foothold under the geographic and structural parameters of their original establishment. Control over large stretches of the border, key oil and water resources, and areas such as Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa has reverted to the Syrian interim government, while ISIS detainees have been transferred to Iraq. From Ankara’s perspective, the SDF no longer constitutes a “strategic threat.”

At the same time, however, the conflict has reignited Kurdish nationalism - an outcome Turkey had sought to prevent for over a year through Abdullah Ocalan and the PKK disarmament process. Rather than weakening Kurdish political consciousness, the offensive provided a rare boost to nationalist sentiment and added a new layer to the long-standing sense of “historical oppression” felt by Kurds across the Middle East. This sentiment cannot be offset by Damascus’s military gains or the achievements of any other state.

Regional and international powers are likely observing the latter development closely, which may also explain Syria’s current efforts to reassure Kurdish communities that “their rights will be protected.”

Kurdish crossroads

Developments in Rojava have triggered a shift in internal Kurdish politics, with President Masoud Barzani re-emerging as a central reference point for addressing the Kurdish issue in the Middle East. The renewed prominence, however, does not necessarily align with Ocalan’s vision.

During a recent meeting with a Turkish parliamentary delegation, Ocalan reportedly stated, “What Devlet Bahceli represents for Turkish nationalism, I represent among the Kurds of the Middle East.” In that context, he framed the Kurdish issue through the prism of broader geopolitical rivalries and Israeli interests - despite the fact that the Kurdish issue long predates the establishment of Israel.

Ocalan’s proposal for negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian government is realistic given Rojava’s current situation, though opportunities for a more comprehensive settlement existed earlier. He envisions transforming SDF forces into internal security units, implementing revenue sharing, and establishing some form of administrative decentralization. Yet the evolving regional context now makes it clear that any political agreement on Rojava’s future will require the involvement of external actors beyond the SDF and the Syrian government.

At a deeper level, the core of Ocalan’s “ideological transformation,” grounded in the principles of the “brotherhood of peoples” and the rejection of territorial sovereignty as a political solution, has faced serious limitations. The vision of governing roughly one-third of Syria’s territory and uniting diverse communities primarily through an ideological framework proved unsustainable in practice. A fundamental contradiction persists: how can the principles of the Democratic Republic reconcile two ideologically incompatible currents - the Islamist-jihadist tradition on one hand, and the Marxist-Leninist tradition on the other?

Beyond internal politics, the Kurdish community now finds itself at a historic crossroads. It faces a delicate balancing act: maintaining a precarious neutrality or risking isolation by taking sides among the region’s competing powers. The central question is no longer merely the future of Kurds in Syria or the integration of the SDF into the Syrian army. Rather, it is: where is the Kurdish condition headed amid the dynamics of the Sunni Crescent, Shiite containment, and the emerging regional security architecture?

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