Iranian drones penetrate Israeli air defenses in about 10 percent of cases: expert

ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - Iranian drones have had limited success penetrating advanced air defense systems in Israel and the wider region, with only about 10 percent or fewer managing to get through Israeli defenses, according to drone warfare expert Federico Borsari.

Federico Borsari, a Non-Resident Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and a member of the NATO 2030 Global Fellowship, told Rudaw in an remote interview from Paris on Monday that while some Iranian drones have breached Israeli airspace - including incidents in the 12-day war in June 2025 and more recent attacks - overall effectiveness remains low.

"We have evidence that a few drones have penetrated Israeli airspace, not just this time but also in the summer of last year," Borsari said. "Even though it's unclear whether these drones were launched from Iran itself or by Iranian proxy forces in other countries such as Lebanon or Iraq."

“Their effectiveness in penetrating the Israeli air missile defense is not very high. We're talking about probably around 10 percent, even lower,” he said.

He emphasized that Israeli counter-drone measures have proven successful, particularly against drones from Hezbollah in Lebanon or Iranian proxies in Iraq.

The comments come amid an escalating regional conflict that began with US and Israeli strikes on Iran last week, prompting Tehran to retaliate with repeated waves of ballistic missiles and drones targeting Israel, US bases, and sites in Gulf countries hosting American forces. Iran and Iraqi armed groups that support it have also struck locations in Iraq's Kurdistan Region, including Erbil and Sulaimani provinces, with drones.

Borsari noted that penetration often relies on a combination of factors beyond technology alone.

"Yes, I think it's a combination of things," he said regarding how drones occasionally evade systems like Israel's Iron Dome. "First of all, the Iron Dome specifically is a system that is focused on countering low-tier threats... In general, what allows missiles and drones to penetrate more easily is the combination of mass, the numbers, but also the route planning... and synchronization of effects."

He highlighted mission planning, including simultaneous launches of drones and missiles, as key to increasing chances of success.

Addressing the cost asymmetry often cited in drone warfare, where cheap Iranian drones like the Shahed series (around $20,000) face multimillion-dollar interceptors, Borsari cautioned against oversimplification.

"Not necessarily," he responded. "We don't have sufficient evidence to say that very costly interceptors have been used to shoot down drones… Many of these countries have also deployed the Air Force to shoot down drones... So in general, I would say of course it's not cost-effective to use Patriot missiles to counter a Shahed, for instance, but at the same time, we know that there are also other systems that these countries have used."

Borsari distinguished between Iran's own arsenal and those employed by its proxies. Iran maintains thousands of drones, including advanced models like the Shahed-136 and Arash-2 with larger warheads (70–90 kg) and greater range. Proxies in Iraq often use lower-end variants such as the Shahed-101 and Shahed-107, with smaller payloads (10–20 kg) and reduced range.

In attacks on Iraq's Kurdistan Region, including recent strikes on Erbil, Borsari confirmed the use of Iranian Arash-2 drones by ground forces, alongside Samad-2, convertible to kamikaze, and proxy-operated Shahed models.

Countering these threats requires layered defenses, he said, including radar, electro-optical cameras, acoustic sensors, and effectors like missiles, lasers, machine guns, jamming, and spoofing.

"We have seen in the Kurdistan region and Iraq... that US air defenses were apparently quite effective, even though a few drones were able to strike," Borsari noted. Terrain challenges, such as mountains, complicate detection and necessitate distributed sensors.

He assessed Kurdish defenses in Erbil and Sulaimani as "quite good" but incomplete, with penetrations in border areas indicating needs for more sensors, interceptor depth, personnel training, system integration, and airspace deconfliction.

"This is a wake-up call not just for the Kurdistan region but also for many other countries in the Gulf, for instance," he said.

On comparing drones and ballistic missiles, Borsari explained that "ballistic missiles are, of course, more difficult to intercept. They have a much larger warhead, and they can potentially create very big damage compared to drones.”

However, strong anti-ballistic defenses can mitigate missile threats, while inadequate counter-drone investments leave vulnerabilities to cheaper UAVs.

"Both are in their own way a potential serious threat, and they should not be underestimated," he concluded.


The following is a full transcript of the interview with Federico Borsari:

Rudaw: You are an expert on drone warfare. To what extent have Iranian drones been able to occupy or penetrate the air defense systems of Iran and countries in the region?

Federico Borsari: We have evidence that a few drones have penetrated Israeli airspace, not just this time but also in the summer of last year. Even though it's unclear whether these drones were launched from Iran itself or by Iranian proxy forces in other countries, such as Lebanon or Iraq as well. But overall, I would say the successful effectiveness of these drones in penetrating Israeli airspace specifically is not very high. We have fragmentary evidence and the data is not complete, at least in the public knowledge. But I would say the effectiveness of drones specifically - I'm not talking about missiles, of course, but drones - their effectiveness in penetrating the Israeli air missile defense is not very high. We're talking about probably around 10 percent, even lower I would say. And on the other hand, Israeli air defenses, counter-drone countermeasures have been successful, I would say, in countering the drones, especially those coming from Hezbollah in Lebanon or Iraq from Iranian proxies.

How have they been able to get past Israel’s Iron Dome? Was it because of their large numbers or because of their strength?

Yes, I think it's a combination of things. First of all, the Iron Dome specifically is a system that is focused on countering low-tier threats. We are talking about rockets, we are talking about low-flying drones, we are talking about the lower end of the threat spectrum. If we look at the missiles, so ballistic and cruise missiles from Iran and other countries, the systems that Israel has are the Arrow, David's Sling, and these are focused specifically on the missile type of threats. In general, what allows missiles and drones to penetrate more easily is the combination of mass, the numbers, but also the route planning of the missiles. And also the synchronization of effects, so launching multiple systems of different types, drones and missiles at the same time, can help.

But also how the Iranian weaponeers decide to conduct the mission. So what routes the drones take, how many missiles are launched at the same time and against what specific target. And so this falls within the mission planning part of these Iranian strikes. And these are important elements because it's not just about the missile technology or the drone technology, but it is also how it is employed. So it's a combination of mass, route planning, and also synchronization of effects that can provide those strike packages a higher chance of penetrating the air and missile defense, I would say.

Some of these drones cost only around $20,000, while the defensive missile used to shoot them down costs millions of dollars. Is this accurate?

Not necessarily. Thanks for the question. I think when it comes to this specific moment, these days of Iranian attacks and especially against the Gulf countries, including also Israel, of course, but most of the attacks are also against Gulf countries, I would say we don't have sufficient evidence to say that very costly interceptors have been used to shoot down drones. We know that Iran has launched more drones than missiles, but both types of weapons have been used in large numbers. But we also know that countries in the Gulf, Israel also, and the US have built quite large stocks of interceptors even though, of course, now they are under pressure. So when it comes to the drone or counter-drone mission, many of these countries have also deployed the Air Force to shoot down drones. And so we know that the Air Force and fighter jets use different types of missiles. They are, of course, not as cost-effective as specific systems for countering drones, but they are definitely cheaper than using, for instance, Patriot missiles against drones. So in general, I would say of course it's not cost-effective to use Patriot missiles to counter a Shahed, for instance, but at the same time, we know that there are also other systems that these countries have used. So the evidence is not sufficient to say that it's completely unsustainable. We don't have the elements to say that."

What is the difference between Iran’s drones and those used by Iran’s proxy forces? For example, it is said that some of the drones used by Iraqi groups are manufactured inside Iraq.

Yes, I think of course there are differences. We know that Iran has a large and varied arsenal of drones, in the thousands, probably remaining in its stocks. When it comes to what Iranian proxy forces in Iraq, for instance, have used, they typically use lower end type of drones. We are talking about the Shahed 107, the Shahed 101, so these are based on Iranian design, probably, but they have also seen a lot of modifications over time. And they are typically used against fixed targets, and their range is lower compared to, for instance, the Shahed 136 or the Arash 2 drones. These two systems that I just mentioned are used by Iran, whereas the Shahed 101 and 107 have been used often by the proxy forces in Iraq.

And those drones used by proxy forces in Iraq have a lower range, and also the warhead that they use is smaller. It's typically between 10 and 20 kg, depending on what type of targets you want to strike, and also if you put a larger warhead, the range will also decrease significantly due to the trade-off that you have to manage in terms of range, payload, endurance, and speed. And so the differences lie mostly in the warhead, which is smaller. The Shahed 136, for instance, or even the Arash, which Iran uses, the warhead is between 70 and 90 kg, so it's much larger. And also, I would say the numbers are probably lower in terms of stockpiles. So all these things if you put them together, it's a notable difference. Even though we have seen that drones coming from Iran have struck targets in the Kurdistan region, for instance. And we know that Arash drones were used against the Kurdistan region. So these come from Iran, and the Arash is used by the Artesh, the Iranian army."

Have you monitored the drones that have been used against the Kurdistan Region? What type are they?

Yes, we have seen the Arash being used by the Iranian ground forces against the Kurdistan region, I think a couple of days ago. We know also that there have been examples of the Samad 2 also, which is a drone that is typically used for intelligence and surveillance, but it can also be converted into a kamikaze drone with the integration of a warhead. So when it comes to the Kurdistan region, the Arash 2, which is an Iranian drone, but also the Samad 2, the Shahed 101, and the Shahed 107, these are drones that are used by Iranian-affiliated groups in Iraq. And so the differences are in the name but also in the shape and the payload and the speed as well."

The drones that were mentioned as being used in the attacks on Erbil-what kind of weapons are used to counter them?

A variety of weapons, actually. When it comes to countering drones, there are many types of countermeasures that it can use. Typically, the ideal way to do it is to have a layer of different types of systems. You should have radar, electro-optical cameras, acoustic sensors to detect the drone at different ranges of course. And at the same time, different varieties of effectors. For instance, low-cost missiles or laser-guided rockets, but also machine guns or electronic warfare. So soft kill countermeasures like jamming and spoofing, and others. So you need to have all these systems integrated into a layer. And we have seen in the Kurdistan region and Iraq as well in these days that US air defenses were apparently quite effective, even though a few drones were able to strike. But it depends on many factors. It depends on where these countermeasures are positioned. The line of sight of the radar, so the terrain can be a factor here because there are mountains everywhere in the region, and so it's sometimes difficult to track everything in time. And so you need to have these systems really distributed in a good way.

Do you think Erbil and Sulaimani have been successful in defending against drone and missile attacks?

I think they have been quite good at doing it, even though not in a sufficient way to prevent every type of strike. There have been a few drones that were able to penetrate, especially in the bordering area of the Kurdistan region. And of course, this is an indication that terrain is a factor, so you need to account for that when you put the radars. You need to have more sensors also distributed to cover a broader area. And you also need to have a sufficient magazine depth of interceptors, or, for instance, machine gun points deployed to protect strategic targets. I think the Kurdistan region and the authorities have been okay, but there is always room for improvement I would say. So, more capabilities are needed, but you also need to train the personnel. So if you buy something like a counter-drone capability or system, you also need to remember that you need to train the operators. You need to integrate that system into the command and control architecture. You need to deconflict the airspace because sometimes these systems are complex. And also, you need to account for potential collateral effects. And especially in very populated areas, this requires time to do it, so starting earlier is better. And I think it's necessary. This is a wake-up call not just for the Kurdistan region but also for many other countries in the Gulf, for instance."

Between Iranian drones and their ballistic missiles, which are more powerful?

I think it doesn't make much sense to compare them because they are two completely different types of systems. Ballistic missiles are, of course, more difficult to intercept. They have a much larger warhead, and they can potentially create very big damage compared to drones. However, if you have a very good anti-ballistic missile defense architecture, you will be more protected against ballistic missiles, but at the same time, you will be less protected against drones if you haven't invested in counter-drone capabilities, for instance. So in that case, for that specific situation, you will be less protected against drones and drones will represent a bigger threat compared to ballistic missiles. So both are in their own way a potential serious threat, and they should not be underestimated. But if you put them side-by-side and you compare them, ballistic missiles can, of course, cause much bigger damage.

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